The centrality of the Iran war to the decisive defeat of Republicans in the 2026 midterm elections has rejuvenated discussion in Congress about how to bring the war to a close. Senator Chris Van Hollen, seeking to replace Chuck Schumer as Majority Leader, has made clear that he believes Democrats must stand firm and vote to block any funding for the Iran war. By contrast, Schumer and his counterpart in the House of Representatives Hakeem Jeffries, appear to oppose a fight over Iran war funding in the lame duck. With government funding set to expire December 11, top Congressional appropriators appear to be clearing the way for a stop-gap funding bill that could give more unrestricted funding to the Department of Defense as it continues a war that was never authorized and which Congress directed be terminated.
Skeptics of the funding cut-off have suggested that a decisive end to the war could empower Iran, betraying trepidation about decisive moves to bring the backfiring war to a decisive close. Yet this zero-sum thinking is precisely what got us into the disastrous war in the first place, and it will keep us in it so long as it is allowed to dictate policy.
So what would Congress cutting off funding for the Iran war actually lead to?
The first and immediate impact would be to bring down the cost of living for Americans, which is what Democrats were elected to do. Americans have correctly connected rising costs to the Iran war. The restrictions caused by the war have driven the price of gasoline and diesel way up, which then fueled inflation across the board. Ending the war would entail ending the blockade of Iranian ports and the U.S. military’s heavy involvement in propping up the Omani corridor. Instead, if the U.S. halts its blockade, Iran will enact its agreement with Oman to direct traffic through each nation’s territorial waters. Iran’s own restrictions on shipping would halt without active military operations ongoing against it.
When a version of this occurred amid the Memorandum of Understanding, the price of gas dropped precipitously – from a peak of $4.50 per gallon across the nation in May to just $3.78 in early July before President Trump returned to the war. Ending the American and Iranian restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz will bring prices down once again.
Second, the U.S. ending the war would empower the factions in Tehran that want to make a deal with Washington in spite of President Trump’s history of shredding deals with Iran. President Trump has on multiple occasions used the cover of diplomacy to prepare for war, then backed out of any agreement struck with Iran. The end result is understandable skepticism of American diplomatic initiatives and an empowerment of hardliners demanding that the U.S. not strike a deal, that all incentives for Iran be up front and for Iran to “finish the job” and drive the United States from the region. So long as the blockade is in place, and the war continues to simmer in and around the Strait of Hormuz, there will be significant internal restraints on dealmaking with Washington. Policymakers in Tehran have long since prepared for two difficult years, calculating that President Trump is too bellicose and erratic to plan for anything less than some level of war.
Ending the war can shift these dynamics away from resistance and toward reconciliation. Key players like President Masoud Pezeshkian and Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf would be able to argue that negotiations would not be surrender, but a way to consolidate victory and secure sanctions relief. Hardline arguments against such negotiations would not hold as much sway when efforts to break Iran had dissipated.
Third, the end of the war will create a more positive environment for resuming nuclear negotiations and resolving lingering questions about the status of Iran’s nuclear program. Amid threats of continued bombing, Iran was disincentivized to make concessions on the nuclear program, and has sought to defer decisions on it as long as possible. This was demonstrated in the Memorandum of Understanding, which back-loaded discussions on the nuclear program until well after an end of the war and several U.S. commitments had been fulfilled. Absent a shift to make negotiations more realistic, the U.S. will be stuck in the Israeli “mow the lawn” cycle, necessitating repeated bombing operations to try to set back Iran’s nuclear and defense infrastructure that will last indefinitely.
Finally, ending the war is likely to be a major positive for the region, with limited impact on Iran’s regional power projection. Amid the war, Iran has no incentive to be a constructive regional player, and every incentive to lash out and disrupt the regional economic and security order. As Iranian officials have stated repeatedly, if they can’t export oil, nobody will. This zero-sum game has been disastrous not just for Iran, but for many of Iran’s neighbors. That is a consequence of pursuing an ill-advised regime change war against a capable adversary like Iran. Ending the war shifts these dynamics and gives Iran something to lose: namely, its ability to rebuild itself after the war. Iran is likely to be much more constructive in accommodating regional requests to rein in the Houthis and end the war that is once again raging in Yemen if it is not being threatened with annihilation. Ultimately, shifting from the zero-sum dynamic of war to one of regional dialogue can allow for a more sustainable security architecture for the entire region to emerge.
Nothing is guaranteed, but there are significant upsides and few real downsides to Congress pursuing an immediate and decisive end to the war. At a minimum, gas prices and the cost of living will go down for Americans as the shadow of war recedes, while a more positive environment for negotiations emerges. Congress can’t negotiate on behalf of Trump, but it can and must take action to end the war. The only likely way for that to happen is by using the power of the purse as soon as possible.


