U.S.-Iran Divide on Negotiations Remains Wide
In early November 2025, a new wave of political and diplomatic remarks from Tehran and Washington revived speculation about the possibility of renewed dialogue between Iran and the United States.
In early November 2025, a new wave of political and diplomatic remarks from Tehran and Washington revived speculation about the possibility of renewed dialogue between Iran and the United States. Yet beneath the cautious signals, the two sides remain separated by deep mistrust, conflicting priorities, and the memory of war. While both are gesturing toward diplomacy, neither appears ready to take the first decisive step.
On 3 November 2025, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, delivered a speech marking the anniversary of the 1979 U.S. embassy takeover. He declared that Iran and the United States have an “inherent incompatibility and a fundamental conflict of interests.” Cooperation with Washington, he said, could be considered only if three conditions were met:
The United States must “completely abandon its support for the Zionist regime.”
It must remove its military bases from the region.
It must stop interfering in the affairs of Middle Eastern nations.
Khamenei added that these conditions would not be achievable “in the near future,” but “could be examined later.” Rejecting the claim that anti-American slogans were the cause of U.S. hostility, he insisted that “America’s enmity arises from its arrogant nature.” During his speech, the audience chanted “Death to America” and “Death to Britain,” underscoring that the ideological divide remains embedded in the Islamic Republic’s political identity.
Just hours before Khamenei’s remarks, President Donald Trump told CBS News that Iran is seeking a new deal with the United States. “They want to make a deal, of course they do, though they don’t say it,” he said in his 60 Minutes interview aired on 3 November 2025. Later, during a White House press conference on 6 November, Trump reaffirmed his claim that Iran had reached out to explore sanctions relief, adding, “I’m open to hearing that — we’ll see what happens.” He also told reporters that he was “very much in charge” of Israel’s June 13 airstrike on Iranian nuclear sites, calling the operation “a powerful strike.” At a dinner with Central Asian leaders that evening, he reiterated, “Iran asked that the sanctions be lifted. I’m ready to listen — the door is open.” Trump’s comments revealed a familiar dual strategy: maintaining maximum pressure while keeping the door open for negotiations. European governments cautiously welcomed his remarks, expressing hope that Oman or Qatar could again serve as intermediaries for limited contact.
In Tehran, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi outlined Iran’s position with a mixture of defiance and restraint. Speaking to Al Jazeera on 1 November, he said Iran “is not in a hurry to resume nuclear talks with the United States.” He added that Tehran has “no desire to hold direct negotiations with Washington” but believes that “an agreement can be achieved through indirect talks.” Araghchi reiterated that Iran will not negotiate over its missile program or regional influence, insisting that “zero enrichment is impossible.” He explained that enrichment represents years of scientific progress that “cannot be traded away.” While confirming that around 400 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent remain “under the rubble” of bombed facilities, he stressed that “technology cannot be destroyed by bombs.”
Araghchi said Iran had received “messages through intermediaries” but denied any recent direct or indirect exchange with the United States. He maintained that Tehran would engage only in “equal and honorable negotiations” based on mutual interest. Referring to the 2015 nuclear agreement, he added: “The formula of trust-building in return for lifting sanctions is still valid — if Washington abandons its excessive demands.” He also asserted that the June war was “a joint U.S.–Israeli operation,” warning that Israel would face “a heavier defeat if it repeats the aggression.”
At the same time, senior officials signaled Iran’s intention to maintain its nuclear and defense posture. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, responding to a journalist’s question about whether Moscow would supply S-400 systems to Iran, said Russia “has no limits” on military-technical cooperation with Tehran and “will provide what Iran needs.” President Masoud Pezeshkian, during a visit to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, pledged full governmental support for expanding the nuclear industry, announcing that eight new power plants are planned on Iran’s southern and northern coasts. Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani confirmed that Tehran had “received messages via Oman” concerning potential talks but declined to discuss details.
Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has issued increasingly urgent warnings. Director General Rafael Grossi told the Financial Times that Iran must “seriously improve cooperation” with inspectors to avoid a new escalation. He stated: “You cannot say, ‘I remain a member of the NPT,’ and at the same time fail to meet your obligations.” Grossi revealed that, since the June war, the Agency has conducted about a dozen limited inspections but has not been granted access to Fordow, Natanz, or Isfahan, the key sites damaged in the airstrikes. The Iranian parliament has further restricted inspections, requiring each visit to be approved by the Supreme National Security Council. Grossi warned that if cooperation does not improve, the Agency risks “losing awareness of the status of Iran’s nuclear materials.” He said that while there is currently “no active uranium enrichment,” satellite imagery indicates continuing activity near storage sites. For now, he sees “no need to refer the case to the UN Security Council,” but emphasized that “cooperation must be significantly enhanced.”
The rhetoric on both sides reflects a contradictory moment. Iran insists that its nuclear activities are peaceful and that it will never relinquish its right to enrichment. The United States demands transparency and broader restrictions that go beyond the nuclear file. Iran refuses direct talks, while Washington questions the usefulness of intermediaries. Khamenei’s framing of the conflict as ideological makes even technical engagement politically sensitive. Yet both capitals understand that renewed confrontation would carry unpredictable consequences. For now, they are testing the waters through limited mediation and controlled signaling.
Analysts in Tehran and Washington describe the current phase as one of strategic patience—a waiting game in which each side expects the other to act first. Iran signals openness to verification talks but only after sanctions relief; the United States insists on full IAEA access first. The resulting stalemate neither resolves tensions nor eliminates the risk of escalation.
As 2025 draws to a close, the relationship between Iran and the West remains defined by contradiction—public hostility alongside cautious maneuvering. Khamenei’s conditions for cooperation are politically unachievable; Trump’s rhetoric mixes threats and outreach; Grossi’s warnings highlight the fragility of oversight. Diplomacy now exists mainly in fragments—scattered remarks, mediated messages, and the faint hope that pragmatic necessity might one day outweigh ideological resistance. The door to negotiation is, as Trump said, “open,” but for now, both sides still stand far from walking through it.