Trump States that Iran Supports Gaza Ceasefire, Senior Conservative in Iran Says Mandatory Hijab is No Longer Enforceable, and More

Ceasefire Signals Amid Uncertainty: Shifting Rhetoric, Military Moves, and Quiet Speculation

The announcement of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas has been followed by a wave of contradictory diplomatic and military signals across the region. During a cabinet meeting in Washington, U.S. President Donald Trump declared that “Iran has informed us that it now wants to work on peace, and [the Iranians] said they are totally in favor of this deal.” He added that his administration would “cooperate with Tehran” in this effort and expressed hope that Iran could “rebuild its country.”

Trump’s remarks come only months after the U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan—strikes he described as “very important” because, as he claimed, “if they hadn’t happened, Iran might have had nuclear weapons by now.” These sharp fluctuations between confrontation and cooperation are typical of Trump’s style, and it remains unclear whether any concrete diplomatic effort is taking place behind the scenes or if his comments are purely rhetorical, tied to the Gaza ceasefire narrative.

So far, Iranian officials have not responded directly to Trump’s latest statements. In an earlier reaction to the ceasefire, Tehran reiterated that it “supports any initiative that ensures an end to genocide, withdrawal of occupying forces, entry of humanitarian aid, release of Palestinian prisoners, and realization of the Palestinian people’s rights.” The language mirrors past official positions and offers no indication of a new approach toward Washington.

Adding to the speculation, Kuwait daily Al-Jarida recently reported that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff had been in indirect contact through mediators, possibly preparing for new talks. However, Araghchi quickly denied the report, calling it “inaccurate” and emphasizing that no such dialogue is underway. The claim, while unverified, reflects persistent rumors about quiet back-channel communications, including that may have resulted in exchanges of messages on the Gaza truce.

Meanwhile, regional military dynamics are intensifying rather than calming. Israel has reportedly increased its deployment of advanced missile defense systems, including the THAAD anti-missile platform, as a precaution against potential retaliation from Iranian-aligned groups. The United States has expanded its aerial presence across the region, deploying refueling aircraft and fighter jets capable of sustained operations, potentially signaling an effort to reinforce deterrence.

In parallel, intelligence and open-source reports indicate that Tehran has received new military shipments from Russia and China, which could include trainer jets, armed drones and air-defense systems. These deliveries suggest ongoing strategic cooperation among the three countries despite Western sanctions and underscore Iran’s efforts to bolster its defense capacity amid rising regional tension.

At the same time, Russian President Vladimir Putin, speaking at a summit in Dushanbe, reaffirmed that Moscow remains in close contact with both Tehran and Tel Aviv. He said Israeli leaders had asked him to convey that they “have no interest in confrontation” with Iran and insisted that issues related to Iran’s nuclear program “can only be resolved through diplomacy and negotiation.” Putin referenced recent discussions with IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi, noting that the Iranian side has expressed a commitment to resolving technical issues, though significant challenges remain.

Taken together, the picture is one of cautious rhetoric overshadowed by continuing military preparations. The Gaza ceasefire has not yet produced tangible diplomatic progress between Washington and Tehran, but could either open space for productive negotiations or provide Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with an opening to reopen tensions with Iran. Trump’s unpredictable statements, Tehran’s silence, and conflicting regional maneuvers leave open the question of whether genuine de-escalation is possible—or whether each side is merely posturing amid an uneasy pause in the fighting.

While media reports hint at renewed back-channel exchanges, the simultaneous military build-up by both the U.S. and Iran and the deepening involvement of Russia and China suggest that the region remains on edge. The Gaza truce may have created a temporary calm, but it has not yet opened a clear path toward durable diplomacy.

Two IRGC Members Killed in Armed Attack at Iran’s Western Border

On Monday night, October 6 (14 Mehr), the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) confirmed that several of its members were killed and wounded in an armed attack near the western border of Iran, in Sarvabad County, Kurdistan Province. The incident occurred when unidentified assailants targeted an IRGC base known as the Hezbollah Junction Resistance Headquarters. According to the IRGC’s Beit-al-Moqaddas Division of Kurdistan Province, “on Monday night, October 6, members of one of the counterrevolutionary groups attacked the Hezbollah Junction Resistance Base in Sarvabad, leading to the martyrdom of two security defenders.” The statement identified the incident as a “terrorist and counterrevolutionary attack.”

The IRGC reported that at least two of its forces were killed and three others injured, one of whom was a cleric. According to the statement, the assailants used hand grenades during the assault, which caused the casualties. The wounded personnel were immediately transferred to hospital for medical treatment. So far, no group has claimed responsibility for the attack. Iranian media outlets have described it as a terrorist operation, while the IRGC blamed “anti-revolutionary elements” operating near the country’s western borders.

The region of Kurdistan Province has long been a sensitive and volatile area for Iran’s security forces, with occasional armed confrontations between the IRGC and Kurdish opposition groups based near the border with Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. Over the past decades, numerous reports have emerged of cross-border clashes between Iranian security forces and Kurdish parties opposed to the Islamic Republic. However, in the past two years, incidents in western Iran had become relatively rare, largely due to the implementation of the Iran–Iraq Security Agreement.

That agreement, signed in March 2023 (Esfand 1401), required Iraq to disarm Iranian Kurdish opposition groups and relocate them away from the border zone. Following the accord, camps belonging to the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) and Komala were evacuated and their members transferred to refugee facilities under Iraqi control. The goal of the pact, officially described as enhancing border security, had been delayed in implementation but was fully enforced earlier this year.

Before that agreement took effect, Iran repeatedly carried out artillery, drone, and missile strikes on positions of Kurdish opposition groups inside Iraqi Kurdistan, claiming these groups were staging attacks or infiltrations into Iranian territory. Those cross-border attacks drew sharp condemnations from the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government, both of which called them violations of Iraqi sovereignty.

The latest assault in Sarvabad marks one of the deadliest incidents since the security agreement came into force and may signal renewed instability along Iran’s western frontier. The IRGC has stated that it will continue its operations “to ensure the complete security of the region” and has vowed to respond decisively to any future attacks.

Over the years, the IRGC has maintained a strong military presence in Kurdistan Province and has frequently conducted joint military and security drills to demonstrate its readiness. Despite these measures, there has been growing criticism inside Iran that border soldiers are not adequately equipped to confront organized and heavily armed groups. Many observers and local officials have pointed out that border guards in remote and mountainous areas often lack proper armored vehicles such as Humvees, modern surveillance equipment, and night-vision systems, leaving them vulnerable to ambushes and grenade or mortar attacks.

At the same time, Iran’s eastern borders—particularly in Sistan and Baluchestan Province—remain highly insecure, with the Jaish al-Adl militant group maintaining an active and dangerous presence in the region. The group has carried out repeated attacks on Iranian border posts, police stations, and convoys in recent years, often using explosives and hit-and-run tactics. Security analysts note that Iran faces simultaneous border threats from different directions—Kurdish insurgent remnants in the west and Sunni militant networks in the east—both testing the country’s ability to secure its extensive frontiers.

The October 6 Sarvabad attack adds to these challenges, underscoring the continuing strain on Iran’s border security forces and the urgent need for better protection, training, and modern equipment for those stationed along the country’s rugged and unstable border regions.

GCC–EU Joint Statement Rekindles Dispute Over Iran’s Gulf Islands

Today October 7, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the European Union (EU) issued a joint statement accusing Iran of occupying the three Persian Gulf islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa, and calling on Tehran to end what they described as the “occupation.” The communiqué also urged Iran to adhere to international law, respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors, and halt the development of its nuclear and drone programs, which the ministers claimed threaten regional and international security.

The meeting was held in Kuwait and concluded with an agreement to rename the gathering as the “Joint Council,” signaling a closer strategic partnership between the 27-member EU and the six GCC states — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain. The final communiqué included five separate references to Iran, combining territorial, security, and non-proliferation concerns.

In their statement, Gulf and European ministers reaffirmed support for the United Arab Emirates’ claim to the three islands, arguing that Iran’s control “violates UAE sovereignty and the principles of the UN Charter.” They urged Tehran to resolve the issue through direct negotiations with the UAE or to accept referral to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The Joint Council also expressed “deep concern” over the lack of progress in resolving the islands dispute, warning that the situation continues to undermine regional stability.

The statement went beyond the islands dispute. It called on Iran to fulfill its obligations under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and reaffirmed that ensuring the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program is “essential for regional and global security.” The ministers further expressed concern about Iran’s ballistic missile and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) programs, describing them as inconsistent with UN Security Council resolutions and destabilizing for the region.

The communiqué also referred to the reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran, noting that “intensive diplomatic efforts failed to create the conditions necessary for extending the suspension of sanctions.” At the same time, the ministers emphasized that this should not mean “the end of diplomacy,” reiterating their view that “a political solution remains the only path forward” for addressing Iran’s nuclear issue.

The Iranian government responded swiftly and forcefully, rejecting all allegations made in the GCC–EU statement. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized Iran’s “indisputable sovereignty” over the islands, declaring that “repeating false and baseless claims in political statements has no legal effect and cannot alter geographical or historical realities.”

Esmaeil Baghaei Hamaneh, spokesperson for the ministry, strongly condemned the GCC–EU statement, describing it as “interventionist and contrary to the principles of good-neighborliness.” He said that the three islands — Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb — are an inseparable part of Iranian territory and will remain so, and that “the repetition of groundless claims does not change historical or legal facts.”

Baghaei also criticized Gulf governments for “providing a platform for destructive foreign interference,” warning that aligning with European powers serves divisive external agendas and undermines regional cooperation. In his remarks, he dismissed the reference to Iran’s missile and nuclear programs as “an illegitimate attempt to interfere in Iran’s sovereign right to self-defense and peaceful technology.”

Iran maintains that its sovereignty over the three islands is absolute, permanent, and non-negotiable. Tehran argues that its reassertion of control in November 1971 — shortly before the establishment of the UAE — restored historical rights over territories long under Iranian jurisdiction. The islands lie near the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s busiest energy transit corridors, giving them significant strategic importance.

Iranian officials point out that the 1971 memorandum between Tehran and the emirate of Sharjah confirmed Iran’s administrative control over Abu Musa, while preserving certain local privileges for Sharjah’s residents. Tehran cites this as evidence that the issue was resolved through mutual understanding more than five decades ago. Iranian historians and diplomats also reference archival maps and documents from the Qajar and Pahlavi eras to demonstrate continuous Iranian possession of the islands.

The UAE, backed by GCC allies, continues to raise the issue in regional and international forums, describing Iran’s control as an “occupation.” Iran categorically rejects this terminology, insisting that no territorial dispute exists and that, consequently, there is nothing to negotiate or arbitrate. The Iranian position is that its sovereignty over the islands is absolute and rooted in international law and historical precedent.

In its response, Iran’s Foreign Ministry accused the GCC–EU bloc of “politicizing legal and historical matters” for geopolitical purposes. It described the statement as a “baseless effort to apply political pressure on Iran under the pretext of international law.” The ministry added that those who repeat such claims “are not seeking peace or regional stability but are fueling division and mistrust.”

Iran’s official position stresses that dialogue and cooperation in the Persian Gulf are possible only when based on mutual respect and non-interference. The Foreign Ministry reaffirmed that Tehran remains committed to regional dialogue, provided that other parties respect Iran’s sovereignty and avoid aligning with external powers.

The dispute over the three islands is among the oldest and most symbolically charged issues in Gulf politics. Iran’s stance has remained consistent through successive governments — from the Pahlavi monarchy to the Islamic Republic. Iranian leaders have repeatedly stated that the islands are an inseparable and eternal part of Iran’s territorial integrity.

The October 2025 GCC–EU statement has therefore revived a long-standing dispute and added new layers of pressure on Tehran by linking territorial claims to nuclear and defense concerns. While the GCC and EU describe their approach as diplomatic, Iran views it as a coordinated political campaign designed to isolate and weaken the country.

Tehran insists that its sovereignty over Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa is non-negotiable, and that no external statement or alliance can alter the facts of geography and history. Iranian officials maintain that true regional stability will only be achieved when neighbors engage directly and respectfully, without foreign interference in the Persian Gulf’s internal affairs.

Iran Executes Seven Individuals on Charges of Terrorism and Armed Activity

Iran’s judiciary announced the execution of seven individuals at dawn on Saturday, October 4, 2025 (12 Mehr 1404), in what it described as the implementation of rulings against members of armed and separatist groups. Six of those executed were accused of participating in a “terrorist network linked to Israel,” while a seventh individual was executed in Kurdistan province on separate charges of armed activity and “corruption on earth.”

The names of the six men executed in Khuzestan are Adnan Ghabishavi, Mohammadreza Moghaddam, Ali Mojadam, Habib Deris, Moein Khanfari, and Salem Mousavi. According to a statement published by Iran’s Judiciary Media Center, the six men were convicted of “designing and executing multiple armed operations” that, according to officials, targeted the security of Khuzestan province. The judiciary claimed the group was responsible for “killing four security officers, bombing a gas station in Khorramshahr, and carrying out several armed attacks and bombings.” It also stated that the verdicts were issued after all legal procedures and appeals had been completed and confirmed by the Supreme Court.

The judiciary identified the four security officers killed in the alleged operations as Allah Nazar Safari, Mohammadreza Rafieinasab, Ali Salehi Majd, and Younes Bahr. It further alleged that the executed individuals were in contact with “foreign hostile elements,” including Israel, and had received support from abroad. According to the statement, their activities included “building and planting bombs, attacking banks, throwing grenades at military centers, and shooting at mosques.” However, no further details about the evidence presented in court or the nature of the defendants’ legal representation were released.

In a separate case, Saman Mohammadi Khayareh was also executed in Kurdistan province. The judiciary stated that he had been convicted of moharebeh (waging war against God) and of participating in “terrorist and takfiri operations.” Officials linked him to the 2009 assassination of cleric Mamousta Mohammad Sheikh al-Islam in Sanandaj, as well as several other violent incidents, including armed attacks and robberies. State media reported that Khayareh had been arrested in 2013 after several years in hiding and that his death sentence, initially overturned by the Supreme Court, was later reinstated following a retrial.

The Iranian authorities emphasized that all seven executions were the result of extensive investigations and judicial proceedings. However, international human rights organizations have repeatedly expressed concern about the lack of transparency and due process in Iran’s judicial system, particularly in cases involving political or security-related charges. Groups such as Iran Human Rights (IHR) and Amnesty International have warned that forced confessions extracted under torture and denial of access to legal counsel are frequent in such trials, raising serious doubts about the fairness of these proceedings.

These executions took place amid continuing tensions in Iran’s border provinces and a period of heightened regional instability. Officials maintain that the measures are necessary for national security, while critics argue they reflect the government’s increasing use of capital punishment as a political and security tool.

Iran has one of the highest execution rates in the world, with hundreds of cases carried out annually, many involving drug-related or security charges. The latest executions highlight the government’s continued reliance on capital punishment as a deterrent in cases it defines as threats to national stability. According to independent monitoring groups, more than 940 people have been executed in Iran since the beginning of 2025 — one of the highest execution rates globally.

Senior Conservative on Expediency Council Says Mandatory Hijab No Longer Enforceable in Iran

In a statement that has sparked significant political and social discussion, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, a senior member of Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council and a long-time conservative figure, declared that the mandatory hijab law is no longer enforceable in Iran and that he has never believed in compulsory hijab. Speaking at a press conference hosted by Khabar Online in Tehran, Bahonar emphasized that the enforcement of mandatory hijab is not part of Iran’s current “national decisions,” saying, “Some people wanted hijab to be mandatory. From the very beginning, I did not believe in mandatory hijab and I still do not. The law of mandatory hijab is no longer necessary to be observed.” This declaration, made by a senior figure within Iran’s establishment, represents one of the most explicit statements to date from a conservative insider questioning the enforcement of dress codes that have defined the Islamic Republic’s public policy for more than four decades.

Despite Bahonar’s statement, government mandates for compulsory hijab persist. Article 638 of Iran’s Islamic Penal Code still stipulates that women appearing in public “without proper Islamic hijab” can face imprisonment from ten days to two months or be fined between 600,000 and three million tomans. While Bahonar’s remarks suggest a de facto suspension of enforcement rather than a legal repeal, they nonetheless signal growing recognition and acceptance that public enforcement has lost its legitimacy and practicality.

President Masoud Pezeshkian has refused to implement the “Hijab and Chastity Law” passed by the previous parliament, effectively freezing its implementation. Pezeshkian, who advocates a more pragmatic and less confrontational governance style, stated several weeks ago in a televised interview that enforcing laws that could “provoke conflict and unrest in society” is counterproductive. He said he did not know how to implement such laws without escalating tensions, signaling a political choice to prioritize stability and public trust over coercive enforcement.

Bahonar, however, tempered his opposition to mandatory hijab with a cautionary note, asking, “The essential question is, how far should nudity be allowed? There must be some limits. Every country has its norms regarding dress, and those norms must be respected.” This duality reflects the conservative establishment’s struggle to balance ideological adherence with social realities, as public opposition to and defiance of enforced dress codes has grown sharply since the 2022 nationwide protests following the death of Mahsa Amini.

Taken together, Bahonar’s remarks and Pezeshkian’s earlier statements reveal a moment of recalibration within Iran’s political system. While no formal repeal of the hijab law has been announced, its practical enforcement appears increasingly untenable, and the political discourse is shifting toward redefining “modesty” within a more flexible and socially responsive framework.

However, the persistence of Article 638 and the possibility of localized enforcement mean that ambiguity and risk remain for Iranian women navigating public spaces. The contradiction between law and practice underscores the broader struggle of the Islamic Republic to reconcile its foundational religious codes with the evolving values of its citizens. In this sense, Bahonar’s acknowledgment that the mandatory hijab is “no longer necessary to be observed” may mark not only a political statement but also a symbolic recognition that coercion has lost its moral and social authority in today’s Iran.

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