The Debate in Iran over a Potential Pezeshkian–Trump Meeting
In the days leading up to President Masoud Pezeshkian’s second trip to New York for the United Nations General Assembly, an intense debate has taken shape inside Iran over whether he should hold a dir
In the days leading up to President Masoud Pezeshkian’s second trip to New York for the United Nations General Assembly, an intense debate has taken shape inside Iran over whether he should hold a direct meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. For reformist and centrist voices, such a meeting is portrayed as an urgent necessity; for hardline and conservative actors, it is a dangerous illusion. The debate itself illustrates Iran’s broader struggle between pragmatic diplomacy and resistance-based strategy.
On one side stand reformist politicians and journalists who argue that Pezeshkian should break with tradition and obtain explicit authorization from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to meet Trump. Figures like Gholamhossein Karbaschi, the long-time leader of the Executives of Construction Party (Kargozaran), have openly urged the president to ask for the Leader’s blessing, framing such a step as the only realistic path to prevent the return of United Nations sanctions and to ease the crushing weight of economic isolation. Karbaschi insisted that coordination with all responsible authorities, “above all the Leader,” is essential, and argued that without this mandate, no diplomacy can succeed.
Other reformist voices have reinforced the call for direct negotiations. Hossein Marashi, secretary-general of Kargozaran, expressed hope that Pezeshkian would use personal courage and initiative in New York to defuse the threat of snapback sanctions, while Mohammad Atrianfar of the same party said that if the Leader grants full authority, the president could even sit down directly with Trump and use the occasion to defend Iran’s interests.
Former MP Ali Motahari wrote that if Trump requests a meeting, Pezeshkian should accept despite Trump’s duplicity, because Trump’s vanity and desire to claim victory could be used to Iran’s advantage. Reformist cleric Mohammad Ali Abtahi also stressed that the expectation of the public is that the president employ every possible means to lift sanctions, and that a successful result would mark a historic turning point. Reformist newspapers have echoed these demands, framing them as a necessary break from ceremonial speeches and fruitless side meetings that have defined previous UNGA trips, and stressing that bold engagement is the only way to answer public despair and bring a measure of economic hope.
On the other side stand conservatives and hardliners who dismiss such ideas as reckless and unrealistic. Media affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps wrote that some political factions view a Pezeshkian–Trump meeting as the cure for Iran’s development, while in reality the president has more urgent priorities at home. Fars News declared that believing one symbolic meeting in New York could solve Iran’s economic crisis was a “naïve notion in the 1390s (2010s)” and today amounts to nothing more than a political fantasy.
These outlets argue that a diplomatic gesture cannot restore investor trust or dismantle sanctions, and that Iran’s real path to progress lies in structural reforms. They highlight five domestic priorities as far more consequential than a photo-op: industrial development and investment in value chains that create jobs and resilience, land distribution to reduce inequality and stimulate domestic demand, increased oil sales managed transparently to generate revenue despite sanctions, the creation of official payment channels with China to bypass dollar dependency and mitigate sanctions risk, and energy efficiency reforms to cut costs and free resources for export. In their framing, these measures will bring lasting benefits for employment and growth, whereas symbolic encounters deliver only fleeting psychological effects.
Conservative politicians have reinforced this line. Nasser Imani, an analyst aligned with the principlists, argued that Pezeshkian should avoid meeting European leaders driving the snapback mechanism, let alone Trump, and instead use the UN General Assembly to expose U.S. and European violations of international law. Hossein Kanani-Moghaddam of the Jebhe-ye Esteghamat said Pezeshkian should highlight Western double standards, pointing to Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal and defiance of the NPT in contrast to Iran’s compliance. Mohammad Kazem Anbarlouei of the Motalefeh Party stressed that if disputes could be solved by a handshake, years of JCPOA negotiations would have sufficed, but since they did not, it is clear that face-to-face meetings cannot alter U.S. strategic calculations.
This divide is not new. Speculation has always surrounded the trips of Iranian presidents to New York. Every leader from Rafsanjani to Raisi has faced questions about possible U.S. meetings, and none has materialized due to mistrust and domestic political constraints. In 2018 and 2019, European leaders tried unsuccessfully to broker a Rouhani–Trump handshake. Today the context is far sharper: Iran has endured a twelve-day war, strikes on nuclear facilities, and the near-certain reactivation of snapback sanctions. For reformists, this heightens the urgency of direct diplomacy; for conservatives, it proves the futility of Western engagement and the necessity of focusing inward and to the East.
President Trump’s speech at the United Nations on Tuesday also struck a hawkish tone, asserting that “almost all” of Iran’s former military commanders are dead and referring to Ali Khamenei as the “so-called” Supreme Leader. Notably, no fatalities were reported in connection with the U.S. strikes on Iran’s evacuated nuclear facilities, so the U.S. President’s commentary invokes the damage done by Israel in the war in June. While he did emphasize that the war between Israel and Iran was one that he worked to end through diplomacy, such provocative remarks are unlikely to make it easy for the Iranian delegation to pursue any new diplomatic initiatives toward the United States.
As Pezeshkian prepares to speak at the United Nations, his presidency already faces a defining dilemma. Many in the reformist camp view a meeting with Trump as a potentially bold act of leadership that could relieve sanctions pressure and calm public anxiety, provided it has the Leader’s approval. The conservative camp, meanwhile, views it as a dangerous distraction from the real work of reforming Iran’s economy and resisting Western aggression. Whether or not the meeting happens, the demand for it—and the backlash against it—have become a focal point of Iran’s political discourse in 2025, underscoring the competing visions of how the country should navigate its confrontation with the United States.