Dr. Nosrat Eftekhari, deputy head of cultural and social affairs for the police command in Sistan and Baluchestan province, was killed on October 9 when a roadside bomb struck the vehicle she was traveling in near Cheshmeh Ziarat, outside Zahedan. Her killing in the attack has highlighted the escalating armed conflict in the country’s southeast and comes amid a sharp increase in attacks on security forces, disputed intelligence claims about thousands of organized militants, and reports that Iran has deployed Afghan militia fighters to the region.
The People’s Fighters Front, a coalition of armed organizations opposed to the Iranian government, subsequently claimed responsibility for the attack that killed Eftekhari.
A native of Sistan and Baluchestan, Eftekhari worked to strengthen relations between the police and local communities. According to Iran’s police spokesperson, she was traveling to an underserved area to meet residents and address concerns affecting local ethnic and tribal groups. Iranian news agencies, including Mehr and Tasnim, described her work as focused on community outreach and social services. Photographs published by Iranian media show her participating in community activities and interacting with residents.
Her killing is particularly significant because her responsibilities centered on community engagement rather than frontline security operations. Relations between residents and security institutions have long been strained in the province. President Masoud Pezeshkian condemned the attack, while Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni dispatched a delegation to investigate the recent violence.
Eftekhari’s death followed four armed attacks on security personnel on October 7 and 8, previously documented by Iran Unfiltered, in Nikshahr, Nosratabad, Jalq and neighboring Kerman province. Further violence was reported on October 12, when Haalvsh and other local Baluch outlets described an attack on the Mortan police station in Rask County. The provincial police command denied that any attack had occurred, while the People’s Fighters Front claimed responsibility. The competing accounts remain unresolved.
On October 13, Iranian security forces reported additional operations in the Chah Ahmad-Korin area near Zahedan. Tasnim initially reported that three armed suspects had been killed in a raid on a suspected militant hideout.
Separately, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced an operation against a group accused of kidnapping an engineer working on a development project. According to the IRGC Ground Forces’ Quds regional headquarters, five suspected kidnappers and one IRGC member were killed, and the hostage was rescued. It remains unclear whether the two official accounts refer to separate operations or different stages of the same confrontation.
Local Baluch sources also reported heavy fighting in Taftan County on October 13, including exchanges of gunfire and the deployment of military reinforcements. Haalvsh claimed that more than 20 Afghan Fatemiyoun fighters had been killed or wounded, but neither the casualty figure nor the identities of those involved have been independently confirmed.
The escalation is reflected in independent conflict monitoring. According to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), approximately 70 armed confrontations between insurgent groups and Iranian security forces had been recorded in Sistan and Baluchestan during 2026 by October 8, exceeding the annual total for any of the previous ten years. ACLED also noted that armed organizations have increasingly targeted fixed security installations, including police stations and intelligence facilities, while demonstrating greater operational coordination. The pattern suggests a more sustained insurgency rather than isolated attacks.
A potentially significant development emerged on October 10, when Nour News, a publication close to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, reported intelligence claims about thousands of organized militants. Nour News alleged that an unnamed Arab state bordering the Persian Gulf was financing and equipping organizations it identified as Sipah-e-Sahaba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, names associated with Pakistan-based Sunni militant groups. Their organizational relationship with the Baluch armed groups operating inside Iran remains unclear.
One version of the Nour News report circulated by regional media referred to more than 50,000 organized members, while another version stated more than 5,000. Both claimed that approximately 1,500 individuals had been dispatched into Iran. The publication’s editing history has not been established, and neither estimate has been independently verified. For comparison, a U.S. State Department assessment in 2024 estimated that Jaish al-Adl, a separate Baluch militant organization, had between several hundred and 2,000 members.
Even the lower figure of 5,000 organized militants, if accurate, could substantially change the security environment, particularly if these networks can sustain attacks, recruit locally and operate across borders.
The risks are heightened by the province’s longstanding social and economic grievances. Sistan and Baluchestan has experienced severe poverty, unemployment, inadequate infrastructure and complaints of ethnic and religious discrimination. A 2025 International Crisis Group assessment, citing Iranian government data, identified 12 of the province’s 26 counties among Iran’s 20 poorest.
The depth of distrust toward security institutions became particularly visible during the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom protests. Although demonstrations spread across Iran following the death of Mahsa Jina Amini, unrest in Sistan and Baluchestan had an additional local catalyst: allegations that a police commander in Chabahar had sexually assaulted a teenage Baluch girl.
The allegations generated widespread anger over the perceived failure of authorities to ensure accountability. On September 30, 2022, security forces opened fire on demonstrators in Zahedan in what became known as Bloody Friday, killing at least 82 people. Unlike most other parts of Iran, demonstrations in Zahedan continued almost every Friday for more than a year, reflecting both outrage over the killings and longstanding grievances concerning discrimination and political representation.
These grievances should not be confused with support for armed insurgency. Baluch society is politically diverse, and there is no evidence that most residents support militant organizations. Nevertheless, unresolved distrust makes renewed militarization particularly sensitive.
Another potentially destabilizing factor is the reported deployment of Afghan fighters affiliated with the Fatemiyoun militia, recruited largely from Afghan Shiites and historically deployed by the IRGC in Syria. In September, Haalvsh reported that hundreds of Fatemiyoun personnel had been deployed across Sistan and Baluchestan. ACLED also noted local accounts of their presence at military facilities and checkpoints.
Molavi Abdolhamid, the prominent Sunni cleric in Zahedan, had issued statements criticizing the alleged use of foreign and proxy fighters in Sistan and Baluchestan. Speaking during his September 18 Friday sermon, he questioned the effectiveness of relying on such forces and urged authorities to build trust with local communities instead. He also warned against bringing foreign ethnic and religious groups into Iran, arguing that the government should rely on Iranians themselves. He did not specifically identify the Fatemiyoun militia.
The number and operational role of these fighters remain independently unverified. If confirmed, the deployment of Afghan Shiite militia fighters in a predominantly Sunni Baluch region could be particularly provocative. Given the history of confrontation with security forces, introducing armed personnel recruited outside local communities could deepen perceptions of exclusion and intensify ethnic and religious sensitivities, especially if they participate in policing or operations involving civilians.
The ongoing war and economic pressure on Iran create additional risks, particularly for border communities dependent on trade and transportation.
Nour News has suggested that the violence forms part of a coordinated foreign-backed campaign to weaken Iran during the war, although its allegations remain unsubstantiated by publicly available evidence. Significantly, the publication also acknowledged that restoring stability requires economic development, employment, local participation and stronger trust between residents and state institutions.
Eftekhari’s killing captures the challenge facing the Iranian government: a female official tasked with building relationships with local communities was killed amid a growing insurgency, while the expanding security response risks further straining those relationships. The combination of increasingly organized armed attacks, longstanding social grievances and an expanding security response could further destabilize southeastern Iran. Preventing further deterioration will require not only protecting civilians and confronting armed organizations, but also addressing the economic, political and social grievances that have shaped the region for decades.