Iranian opposition figure Reza Pahlavi has launched a new campaign to recruit and organize supporters inside Iran through a Telegram bot, raising questions about the security of participants and whether foreign-backed mobilization could again intertwine with another U.S.-Israeli military campaign. The initiative comes amid concerns about renewed fighting and follows Pahlavi’s efforts to insert himself into and direct nationwide protests in December and January that ended in a bloody crackdown. He has also publicly supported the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran.
In an October 27 video message, Pahlavi called on Iranians from all backgrounds to join his National Cooperation Campaign through a Telegram bot named @BarkhizIranBot. Unlike earlier initiatives he suggests focused primarily on military and government personnel, the new campaign invites ordinary citizens to establish direct contact with his team. His office described its purpose as facilitating communication, coordination and organization inside Iran.
The campaign has already prompted concerns about the personal information requested from participants. Screenshots circulated on social media show conversations attributed to the bot asking users about their gender, location, occupation, workplace and telephone number. Iranian commentator Khosro Fravahar publicly questioned the need for such information, warning that the initiative could put people’s lives at risk.
It remains unclear who manages the information collected through the bot, where it is stored, who can access it or what security measures protect participants. Telegram bots do not offer the end-to-end encryption available in Secret Chats, and their operators can process and retain information submitted by users. Pahlavi’s office has warned against counterfeit bots, but this does not address the separate question of whether the official system sufficiently protects sensitive information that could expose them to retaliation from the Iranian state. The security concerns are particularly significant because the campaign seeks to establish an identifiable opposition network inside a country where political organizing against the government can result in imprisonment or execution.
Yet the larger issue extends beyond digital security. Pahlavi is seeking to expand his organizational presence inside Iran at a time when his political strategy has become increasingly connected to foreign military intervention.
Pahlavi previously launched recruitment initiatives aimed at encouraging defections from Iran’s military and security institutions. His office has claimed that tens of thousands registered, although those figures have not been independently verified and many observers have suggested they were fabricated or based on faulty information. At a minimum, no major defections occurred amid the 39 day war when such a cell of defectors could have plausibly been activated. The latest campaign seeks to expand Pahlavi’s networking efforts into broader Iranian society.
During the nationwide protests of January 2026, Pahlavi called for mass demonstrations on January 8 and 9. Large numbers of Iranians took to the streets, and security forces responded with deadly repression. Thousands were reported killed, although the full death toll remains disputed.
Responsibility for the killings lies with those who ordered and carried out the repression. Nevertheless, the experience raises questions about the planning and protection available to people responding to calls for nationwide mobilization. The January protests demonstrated the enormous human cost that can accompany political confrontation when demonstrators face heavily-armed security forces without any means of protection.
Pahlavi’s support for foreign military intervention is not a recent development. He publicly backed Israeli and U.S. military action against Iran during the twelve-day war in June 2025 and again supported the U.S.-Israeli military campaign in 2026. During these confrontations, he called on Iranians to mobilize against the Islamic Republic, presenting foreign military pressure and domestic opposition as complementary means of bringing down the government.
His relationships with Israel have also attracted scrutiny. Pahlavi visited Israel in 2023 and met Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Israeli-linked online efforts promoting his political standing have since been examined by journalists and researchers, although such reporting does not establish entirely that Pahlavi or Israel directed those operations or that his current recruitment campaign is coordinated with Israeli authorities.
The possibility of achieving political change through military action remains contested even within Israel. Former Israeli military chief Gadi Eisenkot has questioned the feasibility of making regime change an objective of war, reflecting disagreements about whether military strikes can produce a stable political transition in Iran.
This history raises a more fundamental question about his latest recruitment campaign: is Pahlavi seeking to build a viable movement for change as he portrays, or is he securitizing Iranian civil society and activism inside Iran in dangerous ways, potentially putting thousands of people at increasing jeopardy for half-baked plans? The distinction is critical. Peaceful civil resistance seeks political change through domestic participation, while mobilization designed to coincide with foreign military strikes could draw civilians into a much broader conflict. Pahlavi has not publicly explained how his new network would operate if war resumes, whether participants would be asked to act in coordination with military developments, or what safeguards would prevent them from becoming exposed to the dangers of a simultaneous internal and external confrontation.
There is no verified evidence that the new campaign is operationally coordinated with Israel or the United States. However, Pahlavi’s record of supporting military intervention and calling for domestic mobilization during previous conflicts makes these questions particularly relevant.
The potential consequences would extend far beyond those who voluntarily join his campaign. If internal unrest were to coincide with another wave of foreign airstrikes, Iran could face simultaneous military attacks, domestic confrontations, disruption of essential services and further instability. Such a scenario could endanger civilians regardless of their political views, particularly if state institutions and critical infrastructure were severely weakened.
Pahlavi argues that the Islamic Republic is responsible for bringing war and instability to Iran and maintains that his movement has a plan for a political transition. His supporters see domestic mobilization and defections from state institutions as necessary steps toward ending the government’s rule. Yet the experience of the January protests and the subsequent war has underscored the human consequences of political and military confrontation. For those living inside Iran, the risks of participation are immediate, while political leaders operating abroad face very different circumstances. Without clearer explanations of the campaign’s objectives, operational boundaries, and safeguards for participants, its implications for the safety of Iranians and the country’s stability remain uncertain.