An Iranian news outlet has reported that authorities have ordered international internet access to be cut immediately if there is a renewed assault on Iran. Current and former officials offer differing accounts of who controls such decisions and how restrictions affect the country.
The Iranian economic news website Zoomon reported on October 21 that unnamed higher authorities had issued a binding directive requiring an immediate shutdown in the event of renewed war. The outlet did not publish the document or identify the institution that issued it. It also said the directive’s date, scope, possible exemptions, and conditions for restoring connectivity were unknown. The reported order has not been independently verified or publicly confirmed by the authorities.
The report followed comments by Vahid Yazdanian, the deputy communications minister responsible for developing Iran’s National Information Network, who said renewed war or unrest could bring another internet shutdown. Speaking to the Iranian technology news agency CITNA on October 10, Yazdanian emphasized that he was not in a position to make that decision. He described restrictions as a possibility and said their extent remained uncertain.
Yazdanian also referred to President Masoud Pezeshkian’s stated position that internet shutdowns should occur only with his authorization. He suggested that the president and government could play a greater role in future decisions, without announcing a formal change in the process or guaranteeing continued access.
Former communications minister Ahmad Motamedi, meanwhile, identified the Supreme National Security Council as the body responsible for deciding on wartime shutdowns. In an October 21 interview with CITNA, he said such decisions should follow collective consideration of information from relevant institutions rather than action by an individual ministry.
Motamedi said ministers who oppose a shutdown should present their technical arguments during those deliberations and try to persuade decision-makers. Once a final council decision is issued, he argued, government institutions are required to implement it. His comments did not confirm the specific directive reported by Zoomon.
Asked about the effectiveness of shutting down the internet during war, Motamedi said he lacked sufficient information to offer a definitive assessment. He also said the Communications Ministry should explain recent disruptions, noting that technical problems and deliberate restrictions could have different causes.
The prospect of another shutdown comes less than five months after authorities began reopening international access following a prolonged blackout that unfolded in two waves. The first wave began on January 8, 2026, in response to an anti-government protest wave that was sparked by economic grievances in the preceding weeks. The second and far more severe phase was triggered on February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel struck targets across Iran. Human Rights Watch, citing Cloudflare measurements, reported a 98 percent decline that day. The level of access varied across those periods, with some domestic services and selected international connections remaining available. A nationwide shutdown therefore did not necessarily mean that every user or institution lost every form of connectivity.
On May 25, Reuters reported that Pezeshkian had ordered international access reopened after most Iranians had spent 87 days largely disconnected, according to NetBlocks. The timing and process of restoration were initially unclear. The restrictions had continued beyond the April ceasefire, leaving businesses and households disconnected after the immediate fighting subsided.
Iran’s National Information Network supports domestic websites and services that can continue operating while access to the global internet is restricted. During the earlier blackout, authorities also introduced selective access arrangements for businesses, commonly described as “Pro internet.”
Communications Ministry officials have acknowledged that these arrangements cannot replace general internet access. In a May interview with ILNA, republished by CITNA, deputy minister Ehsan Chitsaz described Pro internet as an emergency measure intended to maintain essential economic activity. He said its framework was determined outside the ministry through national security decisions and acknowledged problems with its implementation.
Chitsaz said Iranian businesses depend on international cloud infrastructure, software resources, updates, and other services, including when their own data is stored domestically. He also warned that cutting international access could interfere with cybersecurity tools that require updated information and security patches.
The National Information Network, he said, could preserve some domestic functions but could not reproduce the global technology ecosystem. He added that selectively reconnecting businesses would not resolve their problems if customers and suppliers remained disconnected.
Chitsaz defended emergency business access as a temporary response to a crisis rather than a permanent system of unequal connectivity. At the same time, he acknowledged that unstable access and restrictions on ordinary users would continue to weaken demand and disrupt business operations.
Domestic industry representatives have reported substantial losses during previous shutdowns. In a retrospective report, CITNA cited Reza Olfatnasab, head of the virtual businesses union, as saying on May 5 that sales at small online businesses had fallen by 50 to 80 percent. Mehrad Ebad, a representative of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, told CITNA that the disruptions had reduced company sales and damaged communications with customers and suppliers, particularly foreign trading partners. These figures and accounts describe earlier restrictions; they are not estimates of the potential losses from another shutdown.
The effects of disconnection also reached families seeking information during military attacks. In a March statement, Human Rights Watch warned that restrictions impeded access to information about strikes, medical care, food, and shelter, while making it harder for people to contact relatives. The organization also said blackouts obstructed journalists and independent monitors documenting possible violations by parties to the conflict.
Iranian officials have defended wartime restrictions on security grounds. In a March interview with CBS, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said internet access had been restricted because Iran was under attack and authorities were taking emergency measures to protect the population.
Other officials have emphasized the costs and limitations of those measures. Chitsaz’s account of businesses’ dependence on international services, Yazdanian’s acknowledgment that shutdown decisions lie beyond his authority, and Motamedi’s description of the security council’s role provide different parts of the decision-making picture. None establishes who issued the directive reported by Zoomon.
As of October 23, the sources reviewed provided no public text of that alleged directive, no named issuing authority, and no announced timetable for restoring access if it is implemented. Yazdanian’s comments left the possible extent of future restrictions open, while Motamedi said questions about current disruptions should be directed to the Communications Ministry.