Pezeshkian’s Strategic Trip to China: A Turning Point for Iran’s Eastern Alignment
His visit included participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, attendance at the military parade in Beijing, and more.
President Masoud Pezeshkian’s September 2025 trip to China was both symbolic and substantive, taking place during one of the most precarious moments for Iran in recent years. His visit included participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, attendance at the military parade in Beijing, and a series of bilateral and multilateral meetings with key world leaders, underscoring Tehran’s attempt to deepen its eastern alliances as Western pressure mounts.
During the SCO summit, Pezeshkian held sideline talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and several Central Asian leaders. His meeting with Xi carried the most weight, with Beijing publicly reaffirming that it considers relations with Iran a “top diplomatic priority” and emphasizing Iran’s pledge not to seek nuclear weapons. The symbolism was clear: while Europe and the U.S. intensify sanctions through the snapback mechanism, China signaled its willingness to shield Iran diplomatically and economically.
In his exchanges with Putin, Pezeshkian discussed defense and energy coordination, particularly in light of Russia’s growing reliance on Iranian drones and munitions in its ongoing war effort, and the shared goal of bypassing Western sanctions by building alternative trade and financial routes. With Central Asian leaders such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Pezeshkian pressed the case for closer transport and energy linkages, leveraging Iran’s geography as a corridor between the Persian Gulf and Eurasia.
The Beijing military parade was another highlight of the trip. By appearing alongside Xi, Putin, and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, Pezeshkian visually cemented Iran’s place within the bloc of states challenging U.S. power and NATO influence. This was a powerful symbolic victory for Tehran at home, where the government is eager to project strength and international legitimacy after the painful June conflict with Israel. Iranian state media heavily emphasized the images of Pezeshkian shoulder to shoulder with leaders defiant toward Washington, portraying it as proof that Iran is not isolated but instead welcomed into the core of an alternative power system.
In his broader speeches and bilateral meetings, Pezeshkian underscored several recurring themes: resistance to Western “bullying”, commitment to implementing past agreements with China, and the importance of multipolarity through SCO and BRICS. He highlighted Iran’s 25-year strategic cooperation pact with China, pressing for greater investment in infrastructure, energy, and technology transfer. While Beijing has been cautious about fully activating that agreement, Pezeshkian used the trip to remind Chinese counterparts that Iran is both a critical energy supplier and a strategic partner bridging East Asia with the Middle East.
Another important element of the trip was economic outreach. Pezeshkian sought assurances on sustaining and potentially expanding oil exports to China, which remain Iran’s financial lifeline at about 1.3 to 1.4 million barrels per day. He also courted interest in joint projects in transport corridors linking Iran with Central Asia and China under the Belt and Road Initiative framework. Although no major new deals were announced, these conversations signaled Iran’s determination to lock in Chinese commitments at a time when Western sanctions are tightening.
China absorbs the bulk of Iranian crude exports, averaging around 1.3 to 1.4 million barrels per day in the first half of 2025, often through opaque channels that allow both sides to sidestep U.S. sanctions. These flows sustain Iran’s economy, stabilize its foreign currency reserves, and blunt the impact of Western enforcement. For China, the advantage is consistent access to heavily discounted oil. The trip likely included private discussions to secure these flows against an expected tightening of maritime and financial interdiction as the snapback deadline approaches. Even if Chinese state rhetoric is strongly supportive, Chinese banks, insurers, and shippers may quietly limit exposure under U.S. pressure, which could trigger deeper discounts or cause fluctuations in volume.
At the same time, there are real risks and limits. If UN sanctions formally return at the end of September, legal and financial risks for maritime and energy dealings will rise dramatically, even for Chinese actors. Washington has already moved to sanction smuggling networks linked to Iran, and this enforcement is likely to accelerate. Moreover, while SCO and BRICS provide political solidarity, they lack mechanisms to shield Iran fully from economic and military pressure. Regional flashpoints, particularly the risk of renewed clashes with Israel, could further strain Iran’s room for maneuver and force Beijing into uncomfortable decisions it prefers to avoid.
Beyond bilateral diplomacy, the summit itself illustrated the rising consolidation of the East against the West. As the United States imposed punitive tariffs on India and China to discourage their cooperation with Russia, the result was the opposite of what Washington intended. At Tianjin and Beijing, Prime Minister Modi, President Putin, and President Xi appeared in rare alignment, announcing initiatives to deepen energy and trade flows that expand Russia’s ability to sell oil to both India and China. Notably, Russia secured an additional 2.5 million tons of oil exports to China via Kazakhstan, while India and China signaled a thaw in their relations, choosing to emphasize cooperation over border disputes.
For Iran, this shifting landscape is highly consequential. Tehran can position itself as a bridge state within this emerging Eastern bloc, supplying discounted oil, providing critical transport corridors, and aligning rhetorically with the call for a multipolar order. By embedding itself more firmly in these energy and trade initiatives, Iran has the opportunity not just to survive sanctions pressure, but to recast itself as a central player in the architecture of Eastern integration, amplifying its leverage against the West.
Altogether, Pezeshkian’s trip marked one of the most important foreign policy moves of his presidency so far. It demonstrated Iran’s ability to use high-level diplomacy to project an image of strength, consolidate ties with China and Russia, and show the Iranian public that Tehran still has powerful friends willing to stand alongside it in defiance of Western pressure—while also positioning Iran to benefit from the new wave of East–West rivalry that is reshaping global power dynamics. How much this symbolic accomplishment can translate into tangible gains, however, remains to be seen.