New Polling Data Shows Widespread Public Dissatisfaction in Iran
Recent polling data from Iran reveals a striking level of public dissatisfaction with the country’s governance, with 92% of respondents expressing discontent.
Newly disclosed polling data from Iran reveals a striking level of public dissatisfaction with the country’s governance, with 92% of respondents expressing discontent, according to an internal survey conducted by the Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) on behalf of the presidential office. The findings—partially released by a senior administration official—offer one of the clearest indications in years of how Iranians across the country perceive local and national leadership.
The results were shared by Mohammad-Javad Javadi-Yeganeh, the president’s social affairs adviser and head of the Presidential Communication Center. In an Instagram post, he published excerpts of the ISPA survey, explaining that the polling was carried out across 16 provinces ahead of the president’s upcoming provincial trips. The purpose, he said, was to measure public satisfaction with local officials, track how well public demands are followed, and identify gaps in service delivery.
According to the data Javadi-Yeganeh released, the public largely rated the performance of provincial officials as “weak to average.” Even more striking, around 59% of respondents described the performance of their members of parliament as weak, reinforcing broader concerns about the effectiveness of the elected legislature.
In his commentary accompanying the chart, Javadi-Yeganeh wrote: “Pezeshkian distinguishes himself by believing that when people are dissatisfied, the problem lies in our performance. He does not seek to reinterpret results, change questions, adjust polling centers, or alter sampling to manipulate perceptions. Recognizing public dissatisfaction is the first step toward solving problems, and the next poll will be the measure of whether they have been addressed.”
This approach marks a notable departure from past administrations, which often responded to similar surveys with denial, political pushback, or attempts to discredit the data. The fourteenth government, by contrast, appears to be signalling that it intends to use polling results not as a political threat but as an internal tool for improved governance. Javadi-Yeganeh emphasized that the purpose is not propaganda but “a realistic understanding of public sentiment.”
Additional portions of the same ISPA polling were highlighted in a report by Rouydad24 under the headline: “Revealing Confidential Poll Results: Ahmadinejad’s Government at the Top, Rouhani and Pezeshkian at the Bottom.” According to that coverage, preliminary findings suggest that when asked about the overall success of past administrations, respondents gave the highest satisfaction scores to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, while the governments of Hassan Rouhani and Masoud Pezeshkian ranked lowest in perceived performance.
Although full methodological details have not been published, informed sources cited by Rouydad24 confirm that the ISPA data was collected on a national scale, and that results in Tehran differ significantly from those in other provinces. The surveys were designed strictly for internal use by the presidential office, aimed at improving situational awareness rather than for public distribution. Their leak and partial publication provide a rare glimpse into how state institutions currently assess the public mood.
The broader political context helps explain why the dissatisfaction numbers are so high. Years of economic hardship, inflation, currency volatility, unemployment, and public frustration over environmental and social challenges have sharply eroded trust in institutions. Surveys from prior years also show a long-term trend of declining confidence in governance, dissatisfaction with foreign-policy spending, and skepticism about the electoral process. In multiple polls, majorities of Iranians say the country’s regional activities contribute to domestic economic pressures.
The 92% dissatisfaction rate comes at a time when large segments of society—especially younger generations and urban populations—are showing fatigue, disillusionment, and disengagement from formal political participation. Recent elections marked some of the lowest voter turnouts in the Islamic Republic’s history, reflecting this growing detachment. The new ISPA findings reinforce the depth of this sentiment and point to a widening gap between public expectations and the government’s performance.
The implications for governance can be significant. High dissatisfaction does not automatically translate into organized political opposition, but it does highlight a fragile relationship between the state and society. The leadership now faces pressure to address economic grievances, improve service delivery, and respond more effectively to local needs. Javadi-Yeganeh’s framing suggests that at least some within the administration see acknowledging dissatisfaction—not denying it—as the first step toward rebuilding trust.
What happens next is uncertain. The government may attempt reforms based on the survey’s findings, yet structural change has proven difficult inside Iran, and the economic picture is unlikely to significantly improve amid crushing sanctions. The release of these internal data also raises broader questions about transparency and the state’s evolving attitude toward public opinion. Whether this moment marks a durable shift toward greater accountability—or merely a tactical adjustment—remains to be seen.
For now, the newly revealed polling results provide a rare and candid look at the scale of public dissatisfaction in Iran, underscoring profound structural challenges at both the local and national levels. The coming months will determine whether the administration acts on these findings or whether the deep discontent measured by ISPA continues to widen.