The statement issued by Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, regarding the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding may be one of the most consequential political messages of his leadership so far. While he explicitly authorized the agreement and did not oppose it, the language of the statement suggests a deliberate effort to create political distance between himself and the deal. The key passage is his assertion that:
“As a matter of principle, I held a different view. However, based on the commitment made by the President, in his capacity as head of the Supreme National Security Council, on behalf of himself and the other members, and his explicit acceptance of responsibility for the matter, I authorized it.”
This formulation is significant for several reasons. First, Khamenei makes a point of stating that he personally preferred a different course of action. Rather than presenting the agreement as his own strategic choice, he emphasizes that he approved it despite his reservations. This allows him to maintain distance from the policy while still permitting it to move forward. Most importantly, he publicly stated that he had “a different view” and only approved the deal after receiving assurances from President Pezeshkian and the Supreme National Security Council.
Second, he explicitly places responsibility on President Masoud Pezeshkian and the Supreme National Security Council. The statement highlights that Pezeshkian “accepted responsibility” for the agreement before receiving authorization.
By emphasizing that Pezeshkian “accepted responsibility,” Khamenei appears to be assigning political ownership of the agreement to the government rather than to himself. This approach appears intended to address two distinct audiences. The first audience consists of hardline supporters, conservative activists, and segments of the political base that rallied behind the leadership during more than one hundred days of war. Many within these circles remain deeply skeptical of negotiations with the United States. By stressing that he initially opposed the agreement, Khamenei reassures hardline supporters that he has not abandoned the ideological principles of resistance and that the deal should not be interpreted as a personal endorsement of rapprochement with Washington.
The second audience is the broader political establishment. If the memorandum ultimately fails, if negotiations collapse, or if Washington is perceived to violate its commitments, the political responsibility will fall primarily on the government and President Pezeshkian rather than on the Supreme Leader himself. In effect, Khamenei has approved the process while insulating his own political capital from its outcome. The reactions that followed the statement suggest that many officials recognized the potential for this interpretation and sought to counter it.
President Pezeshkian’s response focused heavily on the Supreme Leader’s support for diplomacy. He described the statement as a “roadmap” for protecting Iran’s national interests and emphasized that the government and the Supreme National Security Council remain committed to implementing the Leader’s guidance. Pezeshkian’s response sought to frame the negotiations as a system-wide decision endorsed by the Supreme Leader rather than a personal initiative of his administration.
The President’s communications office reinforced this message, arguing that the Leader’s authorization for negotiations constituted a valuable asset for the negotiating team and rejecting suggestions of disagreement among the leadership.
Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf adopted a notably different tone. Rather than emphasizing diplomacy, he framed the agreement through an ideological and confrontational lens. His response was filled with references to “the front of monotheism,” “the front of falsehood,” “resistance,” “struggle,” and keeping “our hands on the trigger.” He argued that diplomacy itself should be viewed as another battlefield in the broader struggle against adversaries.
The contrast between Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf is revealing. Pezeshkian emphasized governance, diplomacy, and national interests. Ghalibaf emphasized resistance, confrontation, and ideological struggle. While both support the agreement, they appear to be speaking to different audiences.
Pezeshkian is focused on reassuring the broader public and demonstrating that diplomacy can deliver results. Ghalibaf is focused on reassuring hardline constituencies that the agreement does not represent an ideological retreat. Statements from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Supreme National Security Council Secretariat, and conservative cleric Ahmad Alamolhoda followed a similar pattern.
All publicly endorsed the negotiations while simultaneously stressing distrust of the United States, preserving the achievements of the war, and maintaining readiness for military retaliation if the agreement is violated. This messaging appears designed to preserve unity within the political system while preventing backlash from hardline factions.
Taken together, Khamenei’s message can best be understood as a form of conditional and cautious support. He did not block the agreement. He authorized it. But he also made clear that it was not his preferred course of action. This distinction is politically important. By endorsing the negotiations while distancing himself from ownership of them, Khamenei preserves support among hardline constituencies while shifting responsibility for the agreement’s success or failure toward the government.
At the same time, the statement elevated Pezeshkian’s political standing. In recent weeks, the growing visibility of figures such as Ali Larijani and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in the negotiation process had led some observers to conclude that the president had been sidelined. Instead, Khamenei repeatedly emphasized Pezeshkian’s role as both President and Chairman of the Supreme National Security Council, effectively placing him at the center of the process.
The most important political message of the statement, therefore, may not have been directed at Washington at all. It was directed at Iran’s domestic political landscape. The negotiations will proceed. The Supreme Leader has authorized them. But the political ownership - and potentially the political liability - belongs primarily to President Pezeshkian and his government.