Iran’s Snapback Sanctions: Economic Fallout, Domestic Reactions, and Diplomatic Fault Lines

At the turn of the clock to Sunday, September 28, the resolutions came back into force and with it the binding Security Council exhortations, arms embargo, travel bans, and asset freezes that they con

On Friday, September 26, 2025, the United Nations Security Council rejected an attempt by Russia and China to delay the reimposition of sanctions on Iran. That decision cleared the way for the snapback mechanism under Resolution 2231 to take effect, automatically restoring six UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran that had been lifted under the 2015 nuclear agreement. At the turn of the clock to Sunday, September 28, the resolutions came back into force and with it the binding Security Council exhortations, arms embargo, travel bans, and asset freezes that they contained. Iran immediately denounced the move as unjust and illegal, recalling its ambassadors from London, Paris, and Berlin while declaring that it would remain in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

At the Security Council session, the Russian representative strongly rejected the snapback, declaring that it had no legal basis and was never properly triggered under UN Security Council Resolution 2231. China did not explicitly make this argument during the meeting, but Iranian officials have claimed that Beijing has conveyed privately that it shares Moscow’s position and has advised Tehran not to recognize the snapback. This divergence between public ambiguity and private reassurance underscores the delicate diplomacy at play, with Iran hoping to count on both Russia and China to counterbalance Western pressure.

Efforts had been made to avert snapback, but it appears that the Trump administration, the E3 and Iran were far apart on expectations for a deal. While Iran focused on concessions involving restoring transparency to its program, the Trump administration appears to have asked for an abandonment of enrichment and an elimination of its enriched uranium stockpile in exchange for a delay on snapback. Without common ground on terms, each party found it preferable to let the deadline expire and the sanctions to return.

In the days that followed, the Iranian economy felt the shock. The rial depreciated in open markets, trading at a record rate of above 110,000 to the dollar, fueling panic among consumers and traders. Prices of food, medicine, and household goods began to rise, while importers warned of bottlenecks and industrial suppliers reported disruptions. Inflation, already severe, now threatens to spiral higher as reinforced sanctions risk cutting off additional financial channels, pushing transactions into gray markets, and forcing Tehran to sell oil at steeper discounts.

The European Union reinforced the pressure by reinstating its own suspended measures, including bans on Iranian oil and petrochemicals, prohibitions on investment in energy, blocks on trade in gold and diamonds, restrictions on banknotes and coins, and limits on banking services that could cut Iranian institutions off from SWIFT. Shipping and aviation sanctions were also reimposed, striking at the arteries of Iran’s foreign trade.

The Iranian government struck a defiant tone. President Masoud Pezeshkian declared on September 29, “The dream of forcing Iran to its knees is a fantasy and a delusion. We will never yield to such filthy and despicable individuals. Even imagining it is impossible...they sanction us because we refuse to bow down; because we refuse to be humiliated.”

Amir Saeed Iravani, Iran’s ambassador to the UN, took issue with the UN Secretariat’s notification to member states about reactivated sanctions. In letters to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, Iravani accused the Secretariat of siding with the European trio and the United States. He described the Secretariat’s move as a serious violation of Article 100 of the UN Charter and insisted that UN Security Council Resolution 2231 gives no authority to the Secretariat in this regard. Foreign Ministry spokesman Ismail Baghaei echoed these objections, demanding that the sanctions be annulled.

Leaders in the Iranian parliament also denounced snapback, and began to discuss how to respond. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated “We announce that if any country wants to take action against Iran based on these illegal resolutions, it will face serious reciprocal action from Iran, and the three European countries that are the initiators of this illegal action will also face our reaction.” The speaker for parliament’s National Security Commission, Ebrahim Rezaei, detailed that many proposals have been put forward pushing Iran to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Rezaei expressed personal support for withdrawal, noting that Iran has seen no benefit and thus has no reason to stay in the treaty, but indicated that such a decision would require consensus.

In a closed-door session of the Iranian parliament, some representatives reportedly discussed the possibility of withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), though no concrete decisions were made and the talks remained at the level of expressing opinions. According to MP Hashem Khenfari, the meeting was mainly intended for consultation on regional developments and did not follow a specific agenda, with various issues—including the NPT withdrawal and the activation of the snapback mechanism—being raised informally. However, he stressed that these were only discussions without any serious resolution. Meanwhile, in his Telegram channel, MP Mehdi Koochakzadeh claimed that one of the key goals of some parliamentarians who had requested the closed session was precisely to push for debate on the NPT withdrawal in light of what he described as the long record of Western breaches and violations. Yet, he criticized the Speaker of Parliament for not allowing the issue to be formally presented, despite repeated insistence.

Western leaders balanced firmness with openness to diplomacy. In a joint statement, the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany pledged to pursue a new diplomatic arrangement to ensure that Iran never acquires nuclear weapons. Likewise, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas announced the immediate enforcement of sanctions but stressed that this did not close the door on talks, stating that only negotiation could deliver a lasting solution.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio also expressed open to negotiations, stating “A deal remains the best outcome for the Iranian people and the world. For that to happen, Iran must accept direct talks, held in good faith, without stalling or obfuscation.” Britain’s Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper defended the use of the snapback, saying that Iran had offered no guarantees and had refused negotiations, but added that sanctions did not mean the end of diplomacy.

Inside Iran, the snapback provoked sharp debates. Kayhan daily ran an editorial titled “An Ordinary Day,” downplaying the importance of the news and criticizing former president Hassan Rouhani. It argued that sanctions were not what halted progress but the weakness and inaction of certain officials. By contrast, the Jomhouri Eslami newspaper called the sanctions the “ominous legacy” of Ahmadinejad’s governments and criticized officials who tried to minimize their importance, saying they lived privileged lives shielded from hardship. Javan daily declared bluntly that “the JCPOA is finished,” warning that unless political actors reached consensus, internal disputes would weaken the country. Etemad described the situation as “Iran in the Post-Snapback Era,” warning of a serious blow to diplomacy and highlighting the risk of Israeli aggression if Tehran pursued 90 percent enrichment or reduced IAEA oversight.

The conservative daily Aghah ran the headline “Morning of Disgrace,” publishing photos of Javad Zarif, Gholamhossein Karbaschi, and Ali Motahari and accusing them of misleading the public about negotiations. It repeated Ayatollah Khamenei’s position that talks with the U.S. are futile and argued that Pezeshkian’s New York trip ended in failure. Shargh headlined “Death of the JCPOA at New York Time,” calling this one of the toughest moments in Iranian diplomacy. Ham-Mihan ran an editorial called “Worse than Snapback,” accusing some domestic voices of aligning with Israel and stabbing the Iranian people in the back, arguing that Iran’s deepest problems were rooted at home rather than abroad.

Beyond domestic debate, the broader geopolitical context matters. Russia and China both opposed the snapback in different ways. Moscow did so openly at the UN, calling it illegitimate and untriggered, while Beijing avoided making such a formal statement but is reported by Iranian officials to privately share the same position. If China in particular continues purchasing Iranian oil and expanding trade, it could blunt some of the sanctions’ force. Since Iran already has limited direct transactions with the West, its reliance on Asian markets is critical. Continued Chinese demand could provide Iran with a lifeline of revenue and a political counterweight to Western isolation. For Moscow, deepening ties with Iran fits its strategic rivalry with the West, while for Beijing, discounted crude supplies align with both energy security and its independence from U.S.-led pressure. Thus, while the EU and the U.S. tighten sanctions, China’s choice will be decisive for Tehran’s ability to manage the crisis.

Iran’s strategy, therefore, appears two-fold. First, it aims to manage the sanctions through non-Western partnerships, leaning on China and Russia to keep revenues flowing and avoid complete collapse. Second, it hopes to buy time until a better opportunity emerges to restart negotiations, betting that eventually Western powers will prefer diplomacy to an unchecked Iranian nuclear program. Iranian officials have signaled defiance, but beneath that posture lies a calculation: if Iran can weather this storm with Chinese and Russian support, it may return to talks from a position of resilience rather than weakness.

For now, however, the snapback has reshaped Iran’s reality. The rial’s free fall, renewed sanctions on oil, petrochemicals, banking, shipping, and aviation, and sharp political divisions are plunging the country into a dangerous new phase. Western leaders believe they hold leverage, while Iran insists on resistance and counts on Eastern partners. Diplomacy remains possible, but the gulf has widened considerably and mutual interest appears minimal. What comes next will depend on whether Tehran escalates with nuclear steps or successfully manages sanctions through Eastern partnerships long enough to reopen negotiations on its own terms.