Iran’s Nuclear File at a Turning Point, Pezeshkian’s Trip to China, Homayoun Shajarian’s Free Concert in Iran Cancelled, and More

Iran’s Nuclear File at a Turning Point after EU Snapback Trigger

Iran has entered a critical diplomatic phase, responding to Europe’s activation of the snapback mechanism with a mix of quiet negotiations, public defiance, and outreach to eastern partners. Tehran is simultaneously emphasizing its commitment to diplomacy while warning that Western actions are unlawful and destabilizing. By pressing its case in direct talks with the European Union and coordinating closely with China and Russia, Iran appears to be attempting to contain the political and economic fallout of a potential return of UN sanctions.

On Thursday, September 4, in Doha, EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas held a discreet meeting with Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, aimed at testing whether a negotiated off-ramp is still possible within the shrinking window. The agenda centered on immediate IAEA inspector access to key sites and clarity over Iran’s 60% enriched uranium stocks. Tehran later characterized the discussion as part of its “consistent commitment to diplomacy,” while insisting the E3 move is unlawful and reminding Brussels of its duties as JCPOA Joint Commission coordinator under Resolution 2231.

Tehran’s legal and diplomatic push has broadened beyond Europe. Iran, China, and Russia sent a joint letter to the UN Secretary-General opposing the E3’s snapback track, arguing it lacks legal standing and urging the Council to treat it as null. In parallel, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, leaders adopted the Tianjin (“Changhai”) Statement, which, among other positions, condemned recent strikes on Iranian territory—including against nuclear-related infrastructure — and signaled solidarity on regional stability. Framed together with Iran’s consultations with Beijing and Moscow, Tehran’s strategy clearly aims to reduce the bite of renewed UN measures by deepening eastern diplomatic, political, and economic backing.

Inside Iran’s debate, senior official Ali Larijani stated that talks with the United States are “not closed,” but any demand to limit Iran’s missile program is a deal-breaker. He doubled down in public remarks defending Iran’s deterrent posture and rejecting external dictates on defense. Regionally, Iranian officials warned that the risk of a direct war with Israel remains high, even as they say they are working to prevent another conflict.

On verification and monitoring, IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi cautioned that negotiations on inspections “cannot go on for months” and pressed for a deal within days, underscoring that the agency still lacks visibility on Iran’s highly enriched inventory since the June 13 strikes. Confidential assessments shared with diplomats indicated that as of June 13, Iran held roughly 440.9 kg of 60% enriched uranium—material that, if further refined, could yield multiple weapons’ worth of fissile material—while total enriched stocks reached record highs in mid-May. Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Esmail Baghaei, said no IAEA inspections are currently taking place and stressed that any cooperation will be governed by parliamentary law and the Supreme National Security Council; he added that the E3’s snapback move will inevitably impact the inspection track.

From an analytical standpoint, it appears that Iran is unwilling to give away its strongest cards—namely, access for IAEA inspectors to attacked sites and clarification of the fate of its 60% uranium stockpiles—in exchange for only a temporary six-month extension of UN sanctions relief. Tehran is signaling that it would rather face the snapback than concede leverage too cheaply, unless the EU offers a more substantial and durable deal. This calculation reflects Iran’s assessment that its bargaining position is stronger if it holds firm, counting on eastern support and geopolitical divides to mitigate the costs of renewed UN sanctions.

The diplomatic clock is now unforgiving. Unless the Doha channel quickly produces a path forward from the stalemate, the default outcome is re-imposition of UN measures by late September. In the meantime, Iran is visibly hedging against sanctions risk by intensifying coordination with China and Russia and leveraging the SCO platform, even as it signals conditional openness to negotiations with the West. The crisis has entered a phase where procedural timetables, inspection access, and great-power alignments will determine whether the next chapter is managed de-escalation—or a deeper rupture with wider regional and economic spillovers.

Pezeshkian’s Strategic Trip to China: A Turning Point for Iran’s Eastern Alignment

President Masoud Pezeshkian’s September 2025 trip to China was both symbolic and substantive, taking place during one of the most precarious moments for Iran in recent years. His visit included participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, attendance at the military parade in Beijing, and a series of bilateral and multilateral meetings with key world leaders, underscoring Tehran’s attempt to deepen its eastern alliances as Western pressure mounts.

During the SCO summit, Pezeshkian held sideline talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and several Central Asian leaders. His meeting with Xi carried the most weight, with Beijing publicly reaffirming that it considers relations with Iran a “top diplomatic priority” and emphasizing Iran’s pledge not to seek nuclear weapons. The symbolism was clear: while Europe and the U.S. intensify sanctions through the snapback mechanism, China signaled its willingness to shield Iran diplomatically and economically.

In his exchanges with Putin, Pezeshkian discussed defense and energy coordination, particularly in light of Russia’s growing reliance on Iranian drones and munitions in its ongoing war effort, and the shared goal of bypassing Western sanctions by building alternative trade and financial routes. With Central Asian leaders such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Pezeshkian pressed the case for closer transport and energy linkages, leveraging Iran’s geography as a corridor between the Persian Gulf and Eurasia.

The Beijing military parade was another highlight of the trip. By appearing alongside Xi, Putin, and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, Pezeshkian visually cemented Iran’s place within the bloc of states challenging U.S. power and NATO influence. This was a powerful symbolic victory for Tehran at home, where the government is eager to project strength and international legitimacy after the painful June conflict with Israel. Iranian state media heavily emphasized the images of Pezeshkian shoulder to shoulder with leaders defiant toward Washington, portraying it as proof that Iran is not isolated but instead welcomed into the core of an alternative power system.

In his broader speeches and bilateral meetings, Pezeshkian underscored several recurring themes: resistance to Western “bullying”, commitment to implementing past agreements with China, and the importance of multipolarity through SCO and BRICS. He highlighted Iran’s 25-year strategic cooperation pact with China, pressing for greater investment in infrastructure, energy, and technology transfer. While Beijing has been cautious about fully activating that agreement, Pezeshkian used the trip to remind Chinese counterparts that Iran is both a critical energy supplier and a strategic partner bridging East Asia with the Middle East.

Another important element of the trip was economic outreach. Pezeshkian sought assurances on sustaining and potentially expanding oil exports to China, which remain Iran’s financial lifeline at about 1.3 to 1.4 million barrels per day. He also courted interest in joint projects in transport corridors linking Iran with Central Asia and China under the Belt and Road Initiative framework. Although no major new deals were announced, these conversations signaled Iran’s determination to lock in Chinese commitments at a time when Western sanctions are tightening.

China absorbs the bulk of Iranian crude exports, averaging around 1.3 to 1.4 million barrels per day in the first half of 2025, often through opaque channels that allow both sides to sidestep U.S. sanctions. These flows sustain Iran’s economy, stabilize its foreign currency reserves, and blunt the impact of Western enforcement. For China, the advantage is consistent access to heavily discounted oil. The trip likely included private discussions to secure these flows against an expected tightening of maritime and financial interdiction as the snapback deadline approaches. Even if Chinese state rhetoric is strongly supportive, Chinese banks, insurers, and shippers may quietly limit exposure under U.S. pressure, which could trigger deeper discounts or cause fluctuations in volume.

At the same time, there are real risks and limits. If UN sanctions formally return at the end of September, legal and financial risks for maritime and energy dealings will rise dramatically, even for Chinese actors. Washington has already moved to sanction smuggling networks linked to Iran, and this enforcement is likely to accelerate. Moreover, while SCO and BRICS provide political solidarity, they lack mechanisms to shield Iran fully from economic and military pressure. Regional flashpoints, particularly the risk of renewed clashes with Israel, could further strain Iran’s room for maneuver and force Beijing into uncomfortable decisions it prefers to avoid.

Beyond bilateral diplomacy, the summit itself illustrated the rising consolidation of the East against the West. As the United States imposed punitive tariffs on India and China to discourage their cooperation with Russia, the result was the opposite of what Washington intended. At Tianjin and Beijing, Prime Minister Modi, President Putin, and President Xi appeared in rare alignment, announcing initiatives to deepen energy and trade flows that expand Russia’s ability to sell oil to both India and China. Notably, Russia secured an additional 2.5 million tons of oil exports to China via Kazakhstan, while India and China signaled a thaw in their relations, choosing to emphasize cooperation over border disputes.

For Iran, this shifting landscape is highly consequential. Tehran can position itself as a bridge state within this emerging Eastern bloc, supplying discounted oil, providing critical transport corridors, and aligning rhetorically with the call for a multipolar order. By embedding itself more firmly in these energy and trade initiatives, Iran has the opportunity not just to survive sanctions pressure, but to recast itself as a central player in the architecture of Eastern integration, amplifying its leverage against the West.

Altogether, Pezeshkian’s trip marked one of the most important foreign policy moves of his presidency so far. It demonstrated Iran’s ability to use high-level diplomacy to project an image of strength, consolidate ties with China and Russia, and show the Iranian public that Tehran still has powerful friends willing to stand alongside it in defiance of Western pressure—while also positioning Iran to benefit from the new wave of East–West rivalry that is reshaping global power dynamics. How much this symbolic accomplishment can translate into tangible gains, however, remains to be seen.

A Silenced Song: The Cancellation of Homayoun Shajarian’s Free Concert

The cancellation of Homayoun Shajarian’s much-anticipated free concert in Tehran’s Azadi Stadium has become a cultural and political flashpoint in Iran. What was intended as a unifying public celebration of music quickly turned into a contested issue, drawing fire from hardliners inside the country and opposition voices abroad, before ultimately being blocked by city authorities.

Shajarian, one of Iran’s most celebrated traditional singers, had announced plans to hold a free outdoor concert—an unprecedented event of this scale in Tehran. Supported initially by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, the concert was framed as a gift to the public in difficult times, offering millions of Iranians an opportunity to enjoy live music without financial barriers. Yet from the start, the announcement sparked controversy. Some conservative voices cautiously welcomed the initiative, while others within the hardline camp criticized it. More surprisingly, sections of the exiled opposition also lashed out—flooding social media with accusations that Shajarian was “collaborating with the regime” or “providing a distraction” from the country’s crises. The hostile comments ranged from personal insults against the artist to disparagement of those who planned to attend. This dual opposition—both from inside the establishment and from forces abroad—created an unusual alignment as apparent opponents both attempted to delegitimize or sabotage the concert, either by undermining its credibility or by discouraging public participation.

As preparations began, Tehran’s municipality withheld permission for stage and sound equipment to enter the venue. In a heartfelt Instagram post, Shajarian explained: “What I feared has unfortunately come true. For two days now, our equipment has not been allowed in. It seems there is no capacity to manage the massive crowd that was expected.” He thanked his supporters and acknowledged the disappointment of millions who had been anticipating the concert. Officials later announced that the concert would be moved to Azadi Stadium instead of Azadi Square, citing logistical and security concerns.Which is very unlikely to be accepted by Shajarian. The city’s spokespersons claimed they were notified too late to prepare, shifting responsibility to other state bodies. The shifting explanations only fueled speculation that political pressure, rather than practical obstacles, was behind the cancellation.

The cancellation provoked a storm of responses across Iranian media and social platforms. Reformist commentators argued that canceling the event symbolized the state’s continued inability to embrace genuine social openness. One sociologist wrote that “the cancellation had become more symbolic than the concert itself.” Hardline figures justified the move as a logistical necessity, while some mocked the entire idea of a street concert. Opposition activists abroad denounced Shajarian, accusing him of legitimizing the government. Some likened the planned event to the violinists on the Titanic, providing music as the country sinks deeper into crisis.

Ordinary Iranians, meanwhile, expressed both anger and disappointment. Many pointed out the hypocrisy of permitting large political rallies while banning a musical performance meant to lift spirits. One journalist summed it up bitterly: “This cancellation is itself the most powerful symbol of Iran’s broken governance system.”

As several observers noted, the controversy around the Shajarian concert goes beyond cultural policy. It highlights deep divides within the conservative establishment over whether to allow limited social openings, as well as the persistent mistrust between the state and society. At the same time, it underscores the paradox of Iranian politics: when governments resist reform, they alienate their citizens; yet when they cautiously allow openings, opposition forces often attack them as mere window dressing. Shajarian found himself caught in this paradox—targeted simultaneously by those inside the system who fear social freedoms, and by outside critics who refuse to recognize any incremental steps as meaningful.

Homayoun Shajarian is not just another musician; he is a cultural figure whose artistry connects deeply with Iranians across generations. His free concert was meant to offer solace in difficult times marked by economic hardship, political tension, and the aftermath of war abroad. By canceling it, authorities not only silenced a musical performance but also missed an opportunity to show respect for the people’s desire for joy, dignity, and unity. As journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi observed, when governments finally show signs of reform, disappointed opposition groups often rush to destroy them, blocking peaceful and gradual change. In this sense, the cancellation of Shajarian’s concert is more than a cultural setback—it is a reminder of the fragile space for hope and reform in Iran.

Minister of Energy: Empty Fuel Reserves, Sanctions and Sabotage at Root of Crisis

Iran is experiencing one of its most severe energy crises in recent decades, marked by daily electricity blackouts, water shortages, and widespread disruptions to industry and daily life. In a recent session of parliament, Minister of Energy Abbas Aliabadi outlined the scale of the crisis, its underlying causes, and the challenges the government faces in addressing it. His remarks revealed the depth of Iran’s infrastructure problems as well as the political and economic conditions that have intensified them.

A central factor in the crisis has been the departure of foreign contractors, including Chinese companies, who left Iran due to international sanctions and domestic restrictions. Their exit has left many power plants without the technical expertise needed to maintain operations, forcing some facilities to go offline. Aliabadi also disclosed that sabotage against Iran’s energy infrastructure, particularly its gas pipelines, has worsened the situation. While he avoided details in the open parliamentary session, previous incidents such as the February 2024 explosions along Iran’s main north–south gas pipeline underscore the vulnerability of this infrastructure. With roughly 85 percent of Iran’s electricity generation dependent on gas-fueled plants, any disruption to gas supplies has immediate and devastating consequences for the power grid.

Compounding these challenges are long-standing structural weaknesses. More than 15,000 megawatts of Iran’s installed power capacity comes from plants that have exceeded their operational lifespan, making them inefficient and unreliable. At the same time, the imbalance between supply and demand has grown sharply. When the new administration of President Masoud Pezeshkian took office, it inherited a shortfall of nearly 20,000 megawatts, empty seasonal fuel reserves, and factories forced to halt production under the previous government of Ebrahim Raisi. In order to prevent complete collapse, authorities resorted to burning mazut, a heavy fuel oil that damages equipment and generates severe environmental pollution.

Aliabadi’s remarks also served as an implicit critique of the Raisi government, which frequently blamed its failures on the Rouhani administration. He emphasized that not only were fuel reserves exhausted when Pezeshkian’s team assumed office, but that broader mismanagement, economic imbalances, and lack of investment had deepened Iran’s energy crisis. The failure to revive the nuclear deal (JCPOA) and ease sanctions reduced government revenues and discouraged investment, leaving Iran unable to modernize plants or expand renewable energy at a meaningful scale. In addition, critics of Aliabadi point to his tenure as head of MAPNA, Iran’s largest energy conglomerate, where monopolistic practices allegedly blocked private sector participation and reinforced systemic inefficiencies.

The human and economic costs of the crisis are significant. Ordinary citizens endure several hours of blackouts daily, particularly during peak summer demand, leading to mounting frustration and protests. Businesses and industries face production losses, while hospitals and essential services struggle to operate without reliable electricity. The shortages have worsened the broader economic downturn, undermining growth and fueling public dissatisfaction with government performance.

The government has promised both short-term relief and long-term solutions. Aliabadi assured parliament that household blackouts will soon be resolved, citing renewed coordination with the Ministry of Oil to refill depleted fuel reserves. He also pledged to expand renewable energy capacity from 1,250 megawatts at the beginning of the Pezeshkian administration to 7,000 megawatts by the end of the year. While such measures could provide partial relief, they do not address the full scale of the shortfall.

The current crisis underscores Iran’s dangerous overreliance on aging, gas-dependent infrastructure, its lack of investment in modern power systems, and the severe consequences of geopolitical isolation. Aliabadi’s public acknowledgment of mismanagement in previous governments marks a rare moment of political candor, but analysts warn that without systemic reforms in domestic policy, foreign relations, and governance of the energy sector, Iran’s power shortages are likely to persist or worsen in the years ahead.

University Entrance Exam Results Echo Educational Inequality in Iran

The announcement of top national university entrance exam (Konkur) rankings for 2024 has reignited debates about deep inequalities within Iran’s education system. The list of single-digit ranked students revealed once again the marginal role of public schools in producing top performers, drawing attention to the stark gap in educational quality.

Statistics show that only 7 percent—just 2 out of the top 30 ranked students—came from public schools. In contrast, the overwhelming majority of top students were educated in selective magnet schools (such as SAMPAD) and especially in private schools. In fact, 73 percent of the top students across the three main exam groups were from private institutions. Perhaps most strikingly, despite Tehran accounting for 27.5 percent of top scorers overall, not a single one of them came from a public school in the capital. This underlines the severe inequalities between schools in Iran, which are most visible in Tehran.

The case of Khorasan Razavi province is telling. With 1.3 million students—around 8 percent of the national student body—it produced seven top scorers, or 17.5 percent of the total, six from Mashhad and one from Neyshabur. Meanwhile, neighboring North and South Khorasan provinces, despite cultural and demographic similarities, had no representatives among the top students.

The comparison with previous years suggests a long-term decline in the standing of public school students. Last year, public schools accounted for 8 percent of top scorers, slightly higher than this year’s 7 percent, confirming a downward trajectory that shows little sign of reversal.

This inequality exists despite the fact that, according to the Ministry of Education, more than 16.5 million students are enrolled in roughly 100,000 public schools across the country. Many experts consider this number of schools inadequate given the size of the student population, stressing that the system requires significant investment in infrastructure and quality improvement. By contrast, the total number of students enrolled in private schools is estimated to be less than 3 million, or just 15% of the overall student population.

Further evidence of systemic weakness is visible in final exam results, a key indicator of student performance. Average national scores have been alarmingly low. Recently, the head of the National Assessment Center reported that the average GPA for science students was just 12 (out of 20), 11.82 in mathematics and physics, and only 9.13 in humanities—figures that reveal an alarming decline in learning outcomes.

The issue goes beyond university admissions. Despite government slogans about “educational justice” and “universal coverage,” dropout rates are rising sharply. According to the latest data from Iran’s Statistical Center, over 929,000 students dropped out of school in the past academic year alone. With low rates of reintegration for these children, the number of permanently out-of-school youth continues to grow.

Meanwhile, government policies have raised additional concerns. The controversial “Asset Monetization” plan launched in late 2022 created fears of further reductions in the number of public schools, as state properties—including schools—became vulnerable to sell-offs. In large cities like Tehran, this has coincided with the rapid expansion of private schools, often at the expense of already underfunded public ones.

In theory, Iran’s education system should work to reduce social inequality. In practice, however, there are many signs that it has exacerbated it. The results of the 2024 university entrance exam serve as yet another stark reminder that public education is failing millions of students, while private institutions continue to expand their dominance, deepening the divide between privilege and disadvantage.

Iran’s U21 Volleyball Team Crowned World Champions After Stunning Win Over Italy

The Iranian U21 (under 21) men’s volleyball team captured the World Championship title after defeating Italy 3–1 in the final, marking the country’s third gold medal at this level.

The final match, held after a challenging tournament run, began with Italy taking the first set 25–15 thanks to sharp serves and solid defense. But the Iranians, led by head coach Gholamreza Momeni Moghadam, responded with remarkable resilience. Tactical adjustments in the second set brought fresh energy as players like Pouya Aryakhah and Shayan Mehrabi entered the court, turning the momentum around. Iran dominated the second set 25–18 and carried that spirit into the third, edging out Italy in a tense finish 25–22. By the fourth set, Iran had full control, sealing the championship with a decisive 25–14 win.

Matin Hosseini emerged as the match’s top scorer, earning 18 points and playing a crucial role in the comeback. The Iranian squad—featuring Omran Kookjili, Ali Mombini, Arian Mahmoudi-Nejad, Seyed Matin Hosseini, Armin Gholich-Niazi, Taha Behbodnia, and Morteza Tabatabaei—outplayed Italy’s lineup of Mariani, Barotto, Zlatanov, Magalino, Mati, Taiwo, and Loreti.

This championship adds to Iran’s growing legacy in youth volleyball. The U21 team has now reached the podium four times in its 15 appearances: gold in 2019, 2023, and 2025, and bronze in 2007. The victory in 2025 is especially memorable, as the team had to overcome a gauntlet of strong opponents—Kazakhstan, Puerto Rico, South Korea, Canada, Poland, Argentina, China, and the United States—before toppling Italy in the final.

The final also echoed the dramatic 2019 championship, when Iran defeated Italy 3–2. This time, however, Iran showed greater maturity and tactical strength, closing out the match with authority. With their flawless teamwork, sharp serves, and airtight defense, the Iranian youth team once again demonstrated that they are a respected powerhouse on the world stage, fully capable of beating Europe’s strongest sides.

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