Iran’s Leadership Signals a New Phase of Hijab Enforcement Amid Ambiguity and Expanding Pressure

In the past week, Iran’s internal struggle over compulsory hijab has intensified sharply, moving from uncertainty and mixed messaging to a coordinated escalation by the country’s top authorities.

In the past week, Iran’s internal struggle over compulsory hijab has intensified sharply, moving from uncertainty and mixed messaging to a coordinated escalation by the country’s top authorities. What began as controversy around an 11-minute leaked audio file and the government’s reluctant confirmation of a written directive from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has now transformed into a public, multi-layered campaign led by Khamenei, Judiciary Chief Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei, and 155 conservative lawmakers. Their combined interventions signal a deliberate move to reassert state control over women’s appearance, even though the Hijab and Chastity Law remains formally suspended and the country is still navigating the profound social shifts that followed the 2022 protests.

The earlier report showed how the leaked audio—attributed to Azim Ebrahim-Pour—claimed that the Minister of Intelligence had delivered a “shocking” report to Khamenei outlining organized cultural dissent and widespread rejection of compulsory hijab. According to the recording, Khamenei responded with alarm and issued written orders for intensified intelligence operations to identify “project-makers” behind cultural change. This narrative gained credibility when Hossein Rafiei, a senior seminary official, publicly confirmed the existence of the report and emphasized that Khamenei had expressed “deep dissatisfaction” and issued explicit instructions.

The Pezeshkian government then acknowledged the directive through Elyas Hazrati, head of the Government Information Council, who confirmed that the order was real but described the leaked audio as “incomplete,” “inaccurate,” and “exaggerated.” Hazrati stressed that the Intelligence Ministry report actually addressed 23 different social issues, with hijab being just one of them, and insisted that the government would not return to coercive models such as the morality police, which President Masoud Pezeshkian called ineffective and socially damaging. Khamenei himself initially avoided mentioning hijab in a major televised speech, and his office published the now-symbolic image of an unveiled female martyr, Nilufar Ghalevand, which many interpreted as a quiet challenge to hardline demands (read more on earlier developments here).

That moment of ambiguity ended abruptly. In a new and forceful speech to a large gathering of women, Khamenei directly addressed the hijab issue, warning that domestic media must not repeat “Western narratives” about women, freedom, or dress. He argued that hijab enables women to “progress more than others” and called for the Islamic Republic’s position on women to be promoted both domestically and abroad. This public alignment with conservative messaging effectively greenlights a harder line after days of speculation.

Judiciary Chief Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei escalated matters further during a visit to Yazd. He announced that punishments for dress-code violations would become “heavier,” and that non-compliant businesses—including restaurants and cafés—would face long-term sealing, not temporary closures. He revealed that he has issued formal orders to intelligence agencies to track “organized currents” promoting unveiling. Most strikingly, he declared that police are obligated to intervene in cases he described as “clear and observable crime,” adding that if someone appears “semi-naked or naked,” police must take action.

This phrase—“semi-naked or naked”—is both legally undefined and deeply ambiguous. Ejei did not clarify whether it refers to women appearing without headscarves, wearing short sleeves, showing hair, or something else entirely. In Iran’s current context, where millions of women appear unveiled daily without police confrontation, the judiciary’s refusal to define the term gives security forces broad discretionary authority while obscuring the threshold for punishment. This vagueness also raises the question of whether authorities intend to revive morality-police-style enforcement or whether they plan to impose a new, less visible model grounded in intelligence-driven monitoring and judicial pressure.

Ejei further warned that event organizers and even permit-issuing officials will be held responsible if women appear unveiled at ceremonies or public gatherings. He did not specify which legal statutes authorize such prosecutions. This signals a shift toward institutional liability, suggesting that authorities may pressure society through businesses, cultural venues, and public institutions rather than relying on street patrols.

Simultaneously, 155 conservative lawmakers issued a sweeping letter accusing the judiciary and the government of failing to enforce hijab laws, warning of a foreign-backed “nudity movement,” and criticizing what they called “negligence” by officials, managers, and judges. They demanded that the judiciary fulfill its “legal and religious duty” and implement enforcement immediately. Their intervention adds political weight to the judiciary’s new directives and significantly increases pressure on the Pezeshkian administration.

All of this unfolds while the 70-article Hijab and Chastity Law—passed by parliament but suspended by the Supreme National Security Council—remains unenforced. Government spokespeople continue to insist that no budget has been allocated for the law and that the administration will not reintroduce the morality police. Yet the escalating rhetoric from Khamenei, Ejei, and parliament signals the construction of a parallel enforcement system—one that relies on intelligence agencies, judicial discretion, administrative closures, and indirect pressure on cultural and commercial institutions.

The tension now centers on whether Iran is preparing to revive the morality police or replace them with a new, less visible enforcement model. So far, officials deny plans to return to street-level patrols. However, Ejei’s language about mandatory police action, the undefined term “semi-naked,” the reactivation of intelligence units, and the move to punish businesses and organizers collectively point to a strategy designed to restore greater control without the optics that sparked the 2022 uprising.

This new phase comes at a time when Iranian society has fundamentally changed since the death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini. Public non-compliance with hijab norms is widespread, and millions of women have normalized unveiled presence in urban life. The state is now attempting to reverse a social transformation that traditional enforcement mechanisms can no longer easily contain. The latest speeches by Khamenei and Ejei—and the pressure campaign from parliament—represent a coordinated effort to rebuild ideological authority and prepare a more assertive enforcement apparatus.

What began as a leaked audio file and a contested directive has now become a public three-branch escalation. Whether this leads to broad, visible enforcement or remains a selective, intelligence-driven pressure campaign remains unclear. What is clear is that Iran’s leadership is laying the groundwork for a more forceful approach at a moment when society has already moved far beyond the state’s old instruments of control, and simmering anger over a number of issues - from inflation, to pollution to a water crisis - remains palpable.