Iranian Reactions to the U.S.–Iran Agreement Reveal Broad Support for Diplomacy, but Significant Hardline Resistance Remains
The announcement of a preliminary agreement between Iran and the United States to end more than one hundred days of war has triggered a broad debate across Iran’s political spectrum. While disagreements remain over the details of the agreement and the prospects for a final settlement, the most striking feature of the reaction has been the breadth of support for diplomacy, including from figures and institutions not traditionally associated with the reformist camp.
Unlike the debates surrounding the 2015 nuclear deal, the emerging divide is no longer simply between reformists who support engagement and conservatives who oppose it. Instead, many influential conservative figures, state-affiliated media outlets, establishment insiders, academics, journalists, and civil society voices have endorsed the agreement as a means of consolidating Iran’s wartime gains and avoiding further destruction. At the same time, a smaller but vocal hardline faction continues to warn against trusting the United States and making concessions at the negotiating table.
The Iranian press offers perhaps the clearest illustration of this shift. Reformist newspaper Shargh ran the headline “The War Is Over”, framing the agreement as an opportunity to transition from military confrontation to diplomacy. In an editorial titled “The Difficult Road Ahead,” the paper argued that the agreement is intended primarily to create space for the next phase of negotiations rather than resolve all outstanding disputes. Shargh emphasized that issues such as Iran’s missile program and regional allies are not included in the current framework and that the agreement is focused on ending hostilities, lifting economic pressure, and creating a pathway toward a comprehensive settlement.
Etemad similarly welcomed the agreement under the headline “The First Day of Understanding”, publishing the full text of the memorandum and describing it as the beginning of a new phase rather than the end of the process. The newspaper highlighted provisions calling for a permanent end to military operations across all fronts, including Lebanon, mutual respect for sovereignty, and a commitment to negotiate a final agreement within sixty days.
Sazandegi offered one of the strongest endorsements, featuring the headline “A Major Step Forward” and presenting the agreement as an opportunity for economic recovery, reconstruction, and Iran’s reintegration into international diplomacy. Ettelaat likewise embraced the diplomatic opening, warning that “those who benefit from war want war to continue.” The paper argued that sanctions profiteers, political opportunists, and those invested in perpetual confrontation should not be allowed to derail a chance for peace.
Perhaps the most noteworthy position came from Javan, a newspaper closely associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Rather than criticizing negotiations, Javan argued that diplomacy should be viewed as a continuation of the battlefield. The paper wrote that “negotiation can be like war and a continuation of it,” criticizing those who reject all forms of diplomacy and arguing that governments can fight and negotiate simultaneously. Javan insisted that diplomacy should not automatically be equated with surrender and warned against portraying every agreement either as a complete victory or a betrayal.
By contrast, Kayhan has remained deeply skeptical. Its headline — “The Enemy Was Defeated on the Battlefield; Beware the Loopholes of the Agreement” — encapsulates its position. Editor Hossein Shariatmadari argues that the conflict between Iran and the United States is fundamentally ideological and existential. While not rejecting the end of the war itself, he insists that Iran must not surrender the achievements secured through military resistance. Shariatmadari warned that Washington’s long-term objective remains weakening the Islamic Republic and argued that Iran’s armed forces must remain fully prepared even if a final agreement is reached.
What is particularly notable is that support for the agreement extends beyond political elites and into civil society, academia, and the broader intellectual sphere. Emad Baghi, one of Iran’s most prominent human rights advocates, described the agreement as a “win-win negotiation.” While arguing that the war itself could and should have been avoided, Baghi maintained that Iran’s ability to withstand pressure from major world powers and emerge with an agreement represented a source of national pride. More importantly, he suggested that the agreement offers a lesson for domestic politics: if Iran and the United States can move beyond decades of hostility and negotiate, then political actors within Iran should likewise embrace dialogue rather than exclusion. He argued that differing viewpoints should be heard rather than criminalized and called for a less polarized political environment.
Reformist sociologist and political commentator Mohammadreza Jalaipour linked the agreement to a broader process of political moderation and consensus-building inside the Iranian system. He argued that the agreement would not have been possible without the election of President Masoud Pezeshkian, the more pragmatic leadership of Parliament under Ghalibaf, years of reformist efforts to build consensus, and what he described as the successful synergy between the battlefield, diplomacy, public mobilization, and state institutions. In Jalaipour’s view, the agreement represents the culmination of a political strategy that rejected both radical confrontation and political despair.
Notably, support for the agreement has also emerged from long-time critics of the Islamic Republic. Ali Afshari, a prominent democracy advocate and former student activist, described the understanding as “a victory for Iran as a country and an ancient nation.” While emphasizing that the struggle for democracy remains unresolved, Afshari argued that ending the war was an essential first step and urged Iranians to focus on social cohesion, economic recovery, and realistic political reform rather than either triumphalism or cynicism.
Legal scholar and attorney Bahmani Ghajar used the agreement to call for national reconciliation. Describing the agreement as a major military, political, and diplomatic achievement, he urged authorities to accompany it with a general amnesty for political prisoners and detainees. Ghajar argued that rebuilding the country after the war requires the participation of all Iranians and that national unity should be strengthened through forgiveness and inclusion.
Retired university professor Yadollah Karimpour offered one of the most detailed public defenses of the agreement. He argued that the central question facing critics is whether they genuinely preferred the continuation of war and destruction to a diplomatic opening. Karimpour contended that even an imperfect agreement shifts both countries from a military phase to a diplomatic phase, making a return to war significantly more costly. He further argued that the agreement creates breathing room for society and the economy, weakens the influence of those who profit from perpetual crisis, and provides a framework for distinguishing genuine supporters of peace from advocates of continued confrontation. Summarizing his position, Karimpour wrote that “even the worst peace agreements are usually more effective than the best and most justifiable wars.”
Outside formal political institutions, several prominent journalists and analysts have also publicly welcomed the agreement. Ahmad Zeidabadi wrote that “the darkness of war has passed and a new tomorrow has arrived,” calling for reconciliation, forgiveness, and national healing after months of conflict. Conservative commentator Mohammad Mohajeri argued that if diplomacy succeeds in ending the war, “the business of sanctions profiteers and war profiteers will come to an end,” reflecting broader frustration with ideological opposition to negotiations.
Several notable former officials from varied political backgrounds have also expressed support for the agreement. Former President Hassan Rouhani described the agreement as a major national achievement and urged Iranians to protect it from sabotage. He warned that Israel would likely attempt to undermine the diplomatic opening, just as it sought to destroy previous agreements, and stressed that the coming sixty days would be critical for securing a lasting settlement. Rouhani wrote that “the achievement of the preliminary understanding must be protected” and emphasized that national unity would be essential for reaching a final agreement.
Former President Mohammad Khatami similarly endorsed the agreement w hile emphasizing caution. In a widely circulated statement, he argued that “this is not the end of the crisis, but the beginning of a difficult and lengthy road toward overcoming it and opening a horizon of life free from war.” Khatami praised the military, the negotiating team, and national institutions while stressing that the ultimate objective should be lasting peace and regional stability.
Former First Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri described the agreement as “a major achievement in ending a costly war” and called on all political and civil currents to support it. He argued that the agreement could open a new chapter for addressing Iran’s economic and social challenges and provide an opportunity for reconstruction and development.
Notable pragmatic centrists also supported the agreement. Mohsen Hashemi, chairman of the central council of the Executives of Construction Party, argued that if the agreement is accompanied by realism and national consensus, it could become “the beginning of a new era of stability, development, and reconstruction of Iran’s national power.” He also called for a reassessment of Iran’s economic relationships with China and Russia and argued that Tehran should use any diplomatic opening to pursue more balanced international partnerships. Hossein Marashi, secretary-general of the Executives of Construction Party, declared that “the time has come for all political currents, including critics of the negotiations, to join the nation and welcome the agreement.” Marashi urged political factions to focus on reconstruction, economic growth, and improving living conditions rather than prolonging political disputes.
One of the most politically significant endorsements came from Seyyed Hassan Khomeini, grandson of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and a figure often viewed as a bridge between establishment and reformist currents. In a speech defending both the agreement and the role of Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Khomeini argued that “the collective wisdom of the Islamic Republic has concluded that action must be taken today.” He urged Iranians to trust the decisions of senior officials and warned that “we may not succeed through consensus, but we will certainly fail through division.”
Khomeini explicitly defended Ghalibaf, describing him as “a war commander, the brother of a martyr, and one of the Islamic Republic’s first-rate managers.” He stressed that Ghalibaf was serving in a key decision-making and negotiating role and argued that “attacking and undermining senior decision-makers serves no purpose.” Significantly, Khomeini emphasized that major decisions regarding negotiations and diplomacy are being taken under the supervision and approval of the country’s highest leadership, directly challenging hardline efforts to portray negotiators as acting independently or irresponsibly.
Support for the agreement has also emerged from within Parliament and the broader conservative establishment. Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a member of Parliament’s National Security Committee, stated plainly that “we must move toward peace with the United States.” He criticized hardline opponents of diplomacy and argued that if they stop creating obstacles, Iran can successfully reach a durable agreement.
Alaeddin Boroujerdi, another member of the National Security Committee, described the fourteen-point memorandum as an agreement that “serves Iran’s interests to a significant degree.” He argued that the United States had been forced into negotiations by military and economic pressure and pointed to the easing of restrictions on Iranian shipping as an early sign that the agreement was already producing tangible benefits.
Mahmoud Vaezi, former chief of staff to President Rouhani, defended the agreement as one negotiated “from a position of strength” and approved by all major institutions of the state. Former MP Jalal Rashidi Koochi directly challenged hardline criticisms after the agreement became public, asking: “Which part of this agreement turns Iran into an American colony?” He criticized accusations that negotiators had betrayed national interests and argued that many of the attacks were politically motivated rather than substantive.
Meanwhile, Saeed Ajorlou, a member of the negotiating team’s media operation, described the agreement as a “step-by-step” framework that preserves Iran’s leverage and includes mechanisms for reversibility. He argued that the United States had accepted obligations exceeding those undertaken by Iran and characterized the current moment as “the season for securing national interests.”
Despite the breadth of support, opposition has not disappeared. The strongest criticism continues to come from figures associated with the Paydari Front and hardline media outlets. Mahmoud Nabavian, Amirhossein Sabeti, Hamid Rasai, and Qasem Ravanbakhsh have all warned that Iran risks squandering military gains through diplomacy. Ravanbakhsh summarized this view by declaring: “Victory in diplomacy is a gift; just do not turn the victories of resistance into defeat.” Hardline critics generally argue that Iran’s achievements on the battlefield - including preventing regime change, preserving territorial integrity, and demonstrating military deterrence - should not be traded away in negotiations whose final outcomes remain uncertain.
Yet even among critics, an important distinction has emerged. Most opponents are not openly advocating a return to war. Rather, they argue that diplomacy must proceed only under conditions that preserve what they view as Iran’s strategic gains. This marks a notable departure from previous periods when opposition to negotiations was often more categorical.
Overall, the debate surrounding the U.S.–Iran agreement reveals a political landscape far more complex than the one that existed during the nuclear negotiations a decade ago. Support for diplomacy now extends beyond reformists and moderates to include influential conservative figures, establishment insiders, security officials, newspapers aligned with state institutions, academics, civil society leaders, and even some long-time critics of the Islamic Republic. The principal divide is no longer between reformists and conservatives, but between those who view diplomacy as the next chapter in the defense of the homeland and those who see negotiations as a potential threat to the gains achieved through resistance.
For now, supporters of the agreement appear to hold the upper hand. From Khatami and Rouhani to Seyyed Hassan Khomeini, from Shargh and Etemad to Javan and parts of the conservative establishment, from human rights advocates like Emad Baghi to democracy activists like Ali Afshari, a remarkably broad coalition has emerged around the idea that Iran should use the current opening to secure peace, reduce economic pressure, and begin rebuilding after war. Whether that coalition can hold together through the next sixty days of negotiations may determine not only the fate of the agreement itself, but also the future direction of Iranian politics.