Iran’s parliament is advancing a national security bill aimed at countering foreign intelligence infiltration that, in its currently reported form, could also place significant new restrictions on how Iranians interact with foreign media, universities, embassies, civil society organizations and other institutions abroad. The proposal could have particularly important consequences for Iranian Americans and other diaspora communities whose professional, academic and civic work depends on maintaining contact with people inside Iran.
The 19-article “Plan to Counter the Infiltration of Intelligence Services and Foreign Governments or Institutions” emerged amid growing concern in Tehran over foreign intelligence operations. Those concerns have taken on greater urgency following the war and revelations about the extent of Israeli intelligence penetration inside Iran. Supporters argue that existing espionage laws have not kept pace with modern intelligence operations, which they assert involve social media, academic relationships, journalism and professional networks rather than traditional clandestine methods.
The concern over foreign infiltration is not difficult to understand. The more difficult question is whether the proposed response draws a sufficiently clear line between intelligence activity and ordinary engagement with the outside world. Right now, the legislation appears to muddle espionage with normal cross-cultural exchange, posing risks to ordinary people and inhibiting opportunities for greater understanding.
Among the most consequential provisions are restrictions on foreign media. Interviews with outlets financed by the United States or Israel could carry a six-year prison sentence, while interviews with other foreign media would require authorization from the Intelligence Ministry. Sending photographs, videos or other information to foreign media or individuals involved in media activities abroad could carry additional prison terms.
The proposal would also extend government oversight into academic cooperation. The Intelligence Ministry would maintain a list of foreign governments, universities and institutions approved for scholarships, research grants, memoranda of understanding and scientific events. Academic cooperation outside that approved framework could potentially expose Iranian professors, researchers and students to criminal penalties.
Civil society organizations would face similar constraints. NGOs, associations, political organizations and other groups seeking financial support or formal cooperation with foreign governmental or nongovernmental institutions could be required to obtain government authorization. Violations could lead not only to prison sentences for those involved but also to organizational and professional penalties.
The draft also regulates certain contacts with foreign embassies and institutions and includes provisions covering cultural and educational activities. Some of its most serious penalties concern individuals accused of acting under foreign direction or training and attempting to influence government policy or public decision-making in ways deemed contrary to the country’s fundamental interests.
While the provisions are presented as safeguards against foreign intelligence activity, they could give security institutions considerable opportunity to crack down on international engagement that is not ordinarily understood as espionage or efforts to compromise national security. Secretly providing classified military information to a foreign intelligence service is one thing. Speaking to a foreign journalist, collaborating with a university researcher, attending an academic program or working with a civil society organization is another. A legal framework that does not distinguish these activities with sufficient precision risks creating uncertainty over where legitimate international engagement ends and prohibited foreign cooperation begins.
The implications are especially important for Iranians living abroad, including the Iranian-American community. Consider an Iranian-American journalist interviewing a source inside Iran, a U.S. university conducting research with Iranian academics, or a diaspora organization working with Iranian civil society. The activity may be entirely lawful and routine on the American side while potentially creating reporting requirements, authorization requirements or legal risks for the Iranian participant.
Some provisions of the reported draft also explicitly contemplate individuals outside Iran. In certain circumstances involving contacts covered by the proposal, Iranians abroad would be expected to obtain authorization through an Iranian embassy or consulate. The potential impact on the diaspora therefore should not be understood as entirely indirect.
This could matter even in the absence of widespread prosecutions. Laws governing international communication can influence behavior simply by creating uncertainty about what is permissible. A journalist who is unsure whether speaking with an American outlet could create legal trouble may decline an interview. A professor may decide that collaborating with an American university is not worth the risk. An Iranian organization may avoid working with a diaspora group rather than determine whether government authorization is required.
The cumulative effect could be to further narrow already limited channels between Iranian society and the outside world. For Iranian Americans, those channels have already been constrained by decades of political tension, sanctions, the absence of diplomatic relations and restrictions on financial and institutional exchanges.
The same issue matters for understanding Iran itself. Foreign journalists, researchers and policymakers frequently depend on conversations with people inside the country to obtain perspectives that cannot be captured through official statements alone. If fewer Iranians feel comfortable speaking with people abroad, the result may be greater isolation not only for those inside Iran but also less reliable information about Iranian society for the outside world.
The proposal should not be interpreted as establishing a general prohibition on communication between Iranians and their relatives or friends abroad. Routine family contact is not the same as the institutional and professional activities targeted by the reported provisions. Much will depend on the final definitions of terms such as “cooperation,” “communication,” “foreign institution” and foreign “direction,” as well as how authorities interpret them in practice.
For now, the proposal has not yet been adopted into Iranian law. The legislation remains subject to the parliamentary process, individual provisions can be amended or removed, and any final legislation would require review by the Guardian Council before taking effect. That process will determine whether lawmakers narrow the proposal around genuine counterintelligence concerns or preserve its broader restrictions on media, academic and civil society engagement.
Iran’s concern about foreign intelligence penetration is grounded in real security failures exposed during the conflict. Yet this response risks impacting journalism, scholarship and civil society. That is ultimately what makes this legislation consequential beyond Iran’s internal security debate. If its final language clearly distinguishes espionage from ordinary international engagement, it could remain primarily a counterintelligence measure. If those boundaries remain broad or ambiguous, the legislation could instead make routine contact with the outside world increasingly subject to security oversight, further complicating connections between Iranians inside the country and communities abroad, including in the United States.