Iran is approaching winter with warnings of a severe natural gas shortage that could disrupt household heating, industrial production, and electricity generation. Despite possessing some of the world’s largest natural gas reserves, the country could face a daily supply deficit of up to 430 million cubic meters during peak winter demand. Iranian officials say damage to major gas facilities during the U.S.-Israeli military campaign has significantly worsened an energy crisis that existed long before the war. With several provinces facing potential supply disruptions, the government is urging conservation while struggling to restore damaged infrastructure.
Fatemeh Mohajerani, spokesperson for President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration, warned that gas interruptions could occur if consumption remains elevated. She identified northern provinces as particularly vulnerable and said provincial authorities had been placed on alert.
Saeed Tavakoli, managing director of the National Iranian Gas Company, estimated that the country’s gas deficit could reach approximately 400 million cubic meters per day during periods of peak consumption. He identified Mazandaran, Golestan, and North Khorasan among the most vulnerable provinces, while warning of possible localized problems elsewhere. The estimates of 400 million and 430 million cubic meters reflect different official projections rather than a continuously measured shortage.
The immediate challenge is that Iran enters the cold season with substantial gas processing capacity still unavailable following military strikes earlier this year. According to Tavakoli, attacks on four facilities associated with the South Pars gas complex initially removed approximately 230 million cubic meters of daily processing capacity. Emergency repairs and adjustments elsewhere have restored around 100 million cubic meters, but an estimated 130 million cubic meters of daily capacity remains offline.
South Pars, shared with Qatar, is central to Iran’s energy system, supplying gas for households, electricity generation, petrochemical operations, and major industries. Damage to its facilities therefore affects much more than residential heating. Iranian petroleum officials say reconstruction is continuing, but no definitive timetable has been announced for restoring all damaged capacity.
The war has intensified Iran’s energy imbalance, but it did not create it. Even before the conflict, authorities regularly restricted industrial gas supplies during winter to prioritize households. Years of insufficient investment, aging infrastructure, limited gas storage, inefficient buildings, and high domestic consumption have contributed to recurring shortages. International sanctions have further complicated access to financing, specialized equipment, and technology needed to modernize the energy sector.
The result is a longstanding contradiction: Iran possesses enormous natural gas reserves but lacks the infrastructure and operational flexibility to reliably meet domestic demand during the coldest months. The approaching winter could make this imbalance particularly severe. Tavakoli has warned that every one-degree Celsius decline in temperature during peak demand can increase daily gas consumption by approximately 25 million cubic meters. He also reported that residential and commercial consumption had risen by roughly 70 million cubic meters over five days as temperatures declined.
Government officials have responded by calling for reductions in consumption. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf has urged households to reduce gas usage by 10 percent, while other officials have suggested that reductions approaching 20 percent may be necessary across different sectors. First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref has also warned that excessive consumption could result in higher tariffs for heavy users.
However, conservation policies raise questions about fairness, particularly for low-income families living in poorly insulated homes. Such households may consume more gas simply to maintain adequate indoor temperatures and often lack the resources to improve insulation or replace inefficient heating equipment.
The consequences are already being felt in industry. Ali-Akbar Alvandian, secretary of the Cement Industry Employers Association, reported that gas supplies to most cement factories had been suspended, forcing producers to switch to alternative fuels, particularly mazut, a heavy fuel oil that pollutes heavily.
According to Alvandian, cement factories had previously received only five to six million cubic meters of gas daily against an estimated requirement of 28 million. He said clinker production had declined by 4.2 percent, although existing inventories helped maintain cement output.
The restrictions have increased operating and transportation costs for manufacturers already facing inflation, disrupted trade, and other economic pressures. There is also disagreement over the extent of industrial restrictions. While cement industry representatives describe widespread interruptions, Tavakoli stated on November 12 that industrial gas supplies had not been restricted. The conflicting accounts remain unresolved.
Greater reliance on mazut is likely to worsen Iran’s already serious air pollution problems. Burning heavy fuel oil generally produces more sulfur dioxide and particulate pollution than natural gas, potentially increasing health risks in industrial areas and nearby cities.
The electricity sector faces similar pressures because natural gas supplies much of the fuel used by Iranian power plants. When gas becomes scarce, authorities must choose between restricting electricity generation, using more polluting fuels, or reducing deliveries to industrial consumers.
These choices carry significant economic and social consequences. Factories may reduce production or working hours, while households could face interruptions in heating or electricity during periods of extreme cold.
The government has explored additional gas imports from neighboring countries, including Turkmenistan. Tavakoli said discussions involving imports, transit, and gas swaps had progressed, but implementation remained dependent on agreements and operational arrangements. No sufficiently large new supply has been confirmed to resolve the anticipated winter deficit.
The crisis also highlights the human costs of U.S. military action and economic sanctions. While Iran’s energy shortages are rooted partly in years of domestic mismanagement and underinvestment, damage from U.S.-Israeli strikes and sanctions-related obstacles to reconstruction have compounded the problem. Ultimately, it is ordinary Iranians who bear much of the burden, through the risk of heating and electricity shortages, lost jobs, rising production costs and worsening air pollution. The consequences of war and sanctions extend far beyond military and political targets, directly affecting the daily lives and economic security of millions of civilians.
Recent remarks by U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent make this contradiction particularly striking. Bessent warned of a harsh winter for Iranians while reaffirming Washington’s intention to maintain economic pressure on Tehran. His comments raise a fundamental question about a policy that seeks to pressure Iran’s government while acknowledging the hardships facing its population. When ordinary Iranians are already struggling with the consequences of war, damaged infrastructure, and economic sanctions, intensifying that pressure risks deepening civilian suffering rather than simply targeting political decision-makers.
Iran’s immediate challenge is to get through the winter without widespread disruptions to heating, electricity, and industrial activity. Its longer-term challenge is to ensure that a country with such vast energy resources no longer faces recurring shortages that undermine the economic security and everyday lives of its population.