Iran at the United Nations, Khamenei’s Speech and Parliamentary Challenges to His Nuclear Fatwa, New Criteria-Based Amnesty for Prisoners in Iran, and More

Iran at the United Nations: A Week of Confrontation, Negotiation, and Uncertainty

This week’s United Nations General Assembly in New York placed Iran at the center of global diplomacy as competing narratives and escalating tensions over its nuclear program unfolded across speeches, negotiations, and looming Security Council decisions.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian defended Tehran’s record, arguing that Iran has never sought a nuclear bomb and accusing Western powers of failing to honor their commitments under the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA). “What kind of negotiation is this,” he asked, “where we must uphold our obligations but they uphold none?” He reminded audiences that it was the United States that tore up the deal, not Iran, and described the recent Israeli attack on Iranian soil as an assault that undermined ongoing talks. Speaking to anti-war activists, he condemned what he called the distorted global meaning of terrorism: “They attack wherever they want, and when we respond, they call us terrorists.”

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reinforced the hard line. Earlier this week he declared that direct talks with the U.S. are useless and harmful, stressing that Washington threatens, reneges on promises, and even resorts to assassination. He insisted that negotiations would only result in the suspension of Iran’s nuclear activities, which he called an unacceptable outcome.

At the same time, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu used his U.N. platform to demand that the international community prevent Iran from reconstituting its nuclear capacity. He warned that Israel and its allies had already struck Iranian facilities and insisted that Iran’s uranium stockpiles be eliminated. U.S. President Donald Trump, addressing the assembly earlier in the week, also adopted a hard line, touting the efforts of Washington and Tel Aviv from the June war and the imposition of symbolic restrictions on Iranian diplomats in New York.

As the politics of the UN speeches this week took center stage, Britain, France and Germany’s (the E3) impending reimposition of “snapback” sanctions on Iran has continued to progress toward its deadline. Under the “snapback” mechanism, all suspended U.N. sanctions are set to automatically return by September 28 unless a new diplomatic agreement is reached. These sanctions cover financial and economic restrictions, bans on arms sales, and the authorization of inspections of Iranian ships and aircraft suspected of sanction violations.

To avert this, Russia and China submitted a draft resolution urging a six-month delay in the reimposition of sanctions to give space for renewed diplomacy. The draft received a vote today but ultimately failed to pass, which means that the snapback procedure will continue as planned.

The E3 had previously floated their own six-month delay proposal, but with conditions: that Iran restore full IAEA inspector access, address concerns about enriched uranium stockpiles, and engage in talks with the U.S. Iran rejected the framing as “unjust and illegal,” with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warning of “unpredictable consequences” if Europe proceeds. He also cautioned in a published op-ed that if the Council allows sanctions to return, it would destabilize West Asia and undermine collective security.

Ali Larijani, Iran’s National Security Council secretary, meanwhile, confirmed that Tehran had received “new proposals” from Europe, which it is reviewing. He insisted that Iran would not negotiate on reducing missile range or halting enrichment. He also reassured Iranians that snapback sanctions carry a “psychological weight” more than practical impact, and that measures were prepared to mitigate them. Nonetheless, in recent days Iran’s currency and gold markets have surged, reflecting public anxiety.

European leaders hardened their positions. German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul declared, “Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons,” while French President Emmanuel Macron laid out three demands for any new agreement: full IAEA access, transparency over uranium reserves, and immediate resumption of negotiations. A senior French diplomat added that Iran has yet to meet these conditions.

Araghchi pointed to a new Cairo agreement with the IAEA, mediated by Egypt, as evidence of Iran’s willingness to cooperate, but warned that if U.N. sanctions snap back, Tehran will suspend that cooperation as well.

In this tense environment, each actor blamed the other for the diplomatic deadlock. The E3 accused Iran of stonewalling, while Iran denounced the West for bad faith and shifting demands. Larijani captured the Iranian view: “At first they said, if we reach an agreement with the IAEA, snapback will be withdrawn. We accepted with conditions, but then they changed their position.”

This week at the U.N. illustrates the fragmented voices shaping Iran’s nuclear future. Pezeshkian pleads for fairness, Netanyahu threatens intervention, Trump presses containment, and Europe demands compliance. The Security Council result likely puts Iran, its rivals, and the international community on a pathway to renewed escalation.

Iran and Russia Sign $25 Billion Agreement to Build Four Nuclear Power Plants

Iran and Russia have formalized a landmark $25 billion agreement for the construction of four advanced nuclear power units in southern Iran. The deal was signed between Iran Hormoz Company and Rosatom Project Company (REP), representing the Russian state nuclear corporation.

The agreement covers the design and construction of four third-generation advanced nuclear reactors, each with a capacity of 1,255 megawatts, for a total of 5,020 MW of nuclear electricity generation. This mega-project will be built in Sirik, Hormozgan Province, specifically in the Kouhestak region of southeastern Iran, on a 500-hectare site.

According to the contract, Rosatom (REP) is tasked with building the power plants, and the Iran Hormoz nuclear site is set to become one of the country’s largest nuclear facilities, capable of producing 5,000 MW of nuclear power. Site selection studies have already been completed, while engineering, environmental assessments, and site preparation activities are underway. The project is expected to soon move into the design and equipment phase.

Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesperson of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), highlighted that the agreement followed the recent visit of AEOI head Mohammad Eslami to Moscow. During the trip, Eslami and his delegation attended the World Atomic Forum, marking the 80th anniversary of Russia’s nuclear program. The visit provided opportunities for extensive discussions and inspections of Russian nuclear industries, culminating in agreements to build larger-scale reactors beyond Bushehr, each with a capacity of 1,200 MW, totaling nearly 5,000 MW in southern Iran.

Kamalvandi also emphasized the importance of small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs), which he described as the future of global nuclear energy. These modular plants are replicable and scalable, and Iran expects to receive technology transfers from Russia in this field. A memorandum of understanding was signed for SMR cooperation, and a Russian delegation will travel to Iran for follow-up talks.

He added that the Moscow visit was “highly successful,” laying the groundwork for expanded cooperation in large and small nuclear plants as well as other advanced nuclear technologies, including fusion research and radio-pharmaceutical production. Kamalvandi expressed hope that bilateral nuclear cooperation would deepen further in the coming years.

The nuclear agreement is also closely tied to Iran’s domestic energy crisis. This past summer, the country faced severe electricity shortages, forcing daily power cuts of several hours in many cities. Officials admitted that the grid is under heavy strain due to rising consumption, outdated infrastructure, and declining hydroelectric output caused by drought. By expanding its nuclear power capacity, Iran hopes to reduce reliance on fossil fuels, stabilize the electricity grid, and address chronic shortages that have become a source of public frustration.

The agreement also carries symbolic weight, demonstrating Iran’s ability to secure large-scale nuclear infrastructure investment despite mounting international sanctions and the pending activation of the UN “snapback” mechanism. For Russia, the deal underscores its role in helping aligned countries build “sovereign nuclear industries” independent of Western pressure. For Iran, the deal reinforces its strategic partnership with Moscow, strengthens its domestic energy grid, and signals resilience in the face of diplomatic isolation.

Despite its scale, the project faces serious challenges. Sanctions could hinder financing, equipment imports, and insurance coverage. Transparency concerns may also arise, as international watchdogs will closely monitor whether Iran keeps its nuclear activities within peaceful bounds. Financial strain, cost overruns, and security risks—given the vulnerability of nuclear sites in a volatile region—add to the uncertainty.

The agreement consolidates Iran’s nuclear trajectory, combining large-scale civilian power plants with emerging SMR cooperation. While the official narrative stresses peaceful use, some analysts argue that the line between civilian capability and potential military leverage is increasingly blurred as Iran strengthens its nuclear infrastructure. This dual perception—peaceful energy development versus latent strategic capacity—may continue to fuel tensions with Western powers and regional rivals.

Still, the Iran–Russia nuclear agreement is a technological milestone, a geopolitical signal, and a political gamble. It could transform Iran’s energy sector while raising new questions about the future direction of its nuclear program.

Iran Announces New Criteria-Based Amnesty for Prisoners

In September 2025, Iran’s judiciary announced a broad amnesty for prisoners approved by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on the occasion of the birthdays of the Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq. Unlike past pardons, this round has been introduced as a “criteria-based” amnesty, with eligibility determined not by individual lists of names but by general conditions and categories defined in advance.

According to Hojjatoleslam Muzzafari, the Deputy Head of the Judiciary, this marks a departure from previous practice, where the Amnesty and Clemency Commission compiled lists of specific prisoners and submitted them to the Chief Justice, who then presented them to the Supreme Leader for approval. This time, criteria were drawn up under the order of Judiciary Chief Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei, and these standards were sent directly to Khamenei. With his approval, any prisoner meeting the criteria may benefit from sentence reductions or full pardons.

The criteria-based system is designed to cover a large number of convicts across multiple jurisdictions, including the general and revolutionary courts, the military judiciary, and the Organization for Government Sanctions and Penalties (Ta’zirat). Those eligible include prisoners who have served part of their sentences, elderly inmates, and others whose personal circumstances meet the announced benchmarks. For example, convicts sentenced to prison, fines, flogging, or other penalties must have already served part of their punishment in order for the remaining sentence to be lifted.

Muzzafari emphasized that judicial authorities in every province must immediately establish special committees to review ongoing cases and quickly identify prisoners who qualify. He stressed that the number of people covered under the new criteria would be significantly larger than those included under earlier name-based amnesties. Responsibility for implementation falls on provincial judiciary chiefs and prosecutors, while heads of other relevant organizations are tasked with carrying out the amnesty in their respective institutions. If judicial authorities encounter ambiguities about specific cases, they must refer them in writing to the Judiciary’s deputy office, where a special working group will review and issue formal decisions.

Importantly, the judiciary announced that for the first time, some security prisoners—who have historically been excluded—may be eligible under two strict conditions. The first requirement is that at least five years of their sentence must have been served with no anti-state or anti-security activity during that time. The second is that during the recent 12-day war with Israel and its aftermath, they must have shown positive alignment with the people of Iran and the Islamic Republic, contributing to national unity rather than undermining it. If the prisoner’s continued detention is deemed unnecessary and their release poses no risk to public safety, they may be granted clemency.

Still, the judiciary made clear that certain crimes remain explicitly excluded from the amnesty. These exceptions include armed robbery or aggravated theft, major drug trafficking or armed drug crimes, acid attacks, buying and selling or smuggling of firearms and war weapons, serious crimes against internal and external security, espionage, and collaboration with hostile states—especially with Israel. Offenses categorized as grade three or more serious under Iran’s penal code also remain outside the scope of this pardon.

Muzzafari framed the amnesty as both a humanitarian gesture and a political signal. He noted that it comes “in recognition of the national solidarity and resilience demonstrated during the 12-day war,” suggesting that the judiciary is using the measure to reinforce domestic cohesion. While many convicts in nonpolitical cases are expected to benefit, the continued exclusion of large categories—particularly political prisoners, dissidents, and those convicted of security-related charges—has drawn sharp criticism from human rights groups.

But these selective amnesties, while offering relief to some, underscore the systematic bias of Iran’s judicial system: mercy for ordinary convicts, but ongoing repression of dissenters. While the new criteria-based amnesty in Iran represents a procedural shift that broadens eligibility for thousands of convicts, it also maintains red lines around many political and security prisoners. It may relieve prison overcrowding and project an image of clemency, but critics argue that as long as many dissenters and prisoners of conscience remain excluded, the amnesty cannot be seen as a genuine step toward justice or reconciliation.

Khamenei’s Speech and Parliamentary Challenge to His Nuclear Fatwa

This week, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, delivered a nationally broadcast speech in which he reiterated that “Iran has decided not to build nuclear weapons” but at the same time “will not halt uranium enrichment.” Speaking on state radio and television, Khamenei emphasized three core themes: national unity, uranium enrichment, and relations with the United States.

On the subject of negotiations with Washington, Khamenei was categorical. “Negotiation with America has no benefit and causes harm,” he said, adding that “no nation negotiates under threat.” He accused the United States of breaking promises, threatening Iran, and resorting to assassination when given the opportunity, insisting that talks with such a government would be “pure damage.” In his view, the result of any negotiation would be nothing less than the shutdown of Iran’s nuclear industry and enrichment activities, a demand he dismissed as unacceptable. “Iranian people will slap the mouth of anyone who says enrichment should stop,” he declared, responding to recent American statements calling for the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program.

Khamenei stressed that the solution for Iran’s progress lies in becoming strong. He called for strength in the military, scientific, governmental, and structural domains, asserting that “when we are strong, the other side will not threaten us.” He highlighted that Iran today stands among the ten countries in the world capable of mastering uranium enrichment technology. He noted that while states building nuclear weapons enrich uranium to 90% purity, Iran had deliberately limited enrichment to 60%, which he described as both “very high” and “necessary for certain domestic applications,” while reiterating that Tehran has no need for weapons-grade enrichment.

The timing of the speech was notable. Hours earlier, U.S. President Donald Trump, addressing the UN General Assembly, said he had written a “generous letter” to Khamenei but claimed he received only hostility in return. Trump branded Iran the “world’s biggest sponsor of terrorism” and insisted it “must never have nuclear weapons.” He defended U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites during the recent 12-day war with Israel, claiming that “no other country in the world but the United States had the capability to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities.” During that conflict, the United States bombed enrichment centers at Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow, and Israel killed more than 50 senior Iranian commanders and nuclear scientists, among them Hussein Salami, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, Mohammad Bagheri, and several others. Khamenei said the enemy’s goal in the war was not simply military victory but to “create chaos in the streets, exploit ethnic and political differences, and disrupt the Islamic Republic.” He insisted that America and Israel had planned for the “end of the system,” but had failed.

This was Khamenei’s fourth televised address since the outbreak of the Iran-Israel war, and once again he reaffirmed that Iran neither possesses nor intends to develop nuclear weapons. He also underlined the peaceful applications of nuclear technology in electricity, medicine, agriculture, and industry, crediting Iranian specialists with advancing the country to its current level of capability.

However, Khamenei’s unwavering position is facing an unusual internal challenge. Just a day before his speech, more than 70 members of Iran’s Parliament released a letter addressed to the Supreme National Security Council and the heads of the three branches of government, urging a “review of Iran’s defense doctrine” and a revision of Khamenei’s fatwa prohibiting nuclear weapons. The lawmakers argued that while the use of nuclear weapons falls under the original 2010 fatwa banning weapons of mass destruction, the building and maintaining of such weapons for deterrence should be considered separately.

The MPs emphasized that in Shi’a jurisprudence, changing conditions can alter rulings, and that the overriding interest of preserving Islam, now tied to safeguarding the Islamic Republic, could allow for a reinterpretation. They wrote: “The use of nuclear weapons is prohibited under the Supreme Leader’s fatwa of 2010, but building and keeping them for deterrence is another matter.” The signatories framed their request as a secondary ruling (hukm-e thanavi) that would not negate the original prohibition but would adapt it to current circumstances.

This was not the first such appeal. A year earlier, 39 parliamentarians had submitted a similar request, though it was not publicized. The devastating war with Israel and the subsequent bombings of Iran’s nuclear facilities, however, have emboldened more politicians to call openly for a nuclear deterrent. The latest letter appears to be the same as last year’s but with a significantly higher number of signatories, reflecting a growing sense of urgency.

Khamenei’s fatwa against nuclear weapons has long been central to Iran’s international diplomacy. He has described weapons of mass destruction as “a crime against humanity” and declared their use absolutely forbidden. The fatwa was registered as an official document at both the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council, and leaders from countries including Japan and the United States once cited it as evidence of Iran’s restraint during the 2015 nuclear negotiations. Yet in recent years, several Iranian officials—including former intelligence minister Mahmoud Alavi and senior nuclear negotiators—have hinted at the possibility of revisiting the fatwa if Iran’s security environment worsens.

The internal debate coincides with renewed international pressure. Just three days before Khamenei’s speech, the UN Security Council voted to reverse the termination of UN sanctions on Iran that had been lifted under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Tehran’s Supreme National Security Council responded by declaring that cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would be suspended, while conservative lawmakers announced that a bill to withdraw Iran from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was ready for introduction in Parliament.

The convergence of Khamenei’s defiant speech, Trump’s threats at the UN, the impending resumption of UN sanctions, and the parliamentary letter calling for a nuclear deterrent highlights a moment of profound tension. Iran’s leadership is projecting resilience and unity, yet internal dissent within Parliament suggests that the Supreme Leader’s religious authority may be tested in ways not seen before.

It appears that Iran’s long-standing strategy of remaining a “threshold nuclear state”—a country on the edge of nuclear capability without crossing into weaponization—is breaking down. Khamenei continues to insist on this approach, but voices inside Iran are increasingly pushing for an outright nuclear deterrent. While the official government line rejects nuclear weapons, these demands, combined with expert warnings that pursuing the bomb could trigger open war, create a dangerous ambiguity. It remains unclear which voice will ultimately dominate Iran’s policy over the medium and long term.

Iran Crowned World Greco-Roman Wrestling Champion in Zagreb

In September 2025, Iran’s national Greco-Roman wrestling team achieved one of the most memorable victories in its sporting history, reclaiming the world championship title after an eleven-year absence. The World Wrestling Championships were held in Zagreb, Croatia, from September 18 to September 21, and the Iranian squad displayed total dominance, finishing with 180 points in the team standings, far ahead of the 89 points totaled by runner-up Azerbaijan with and the 72 points of third-place Uzbekistan. This was only the second time in history that Iran has captured the Greco-Roman team crown, the previous title having come in 2014. The triumph was all the more meaningful because it coincided with the freestyle team’s championship win only a week earlier, making 2025 the first year in which Iran has held both the freestyle and Greco-Roman team titles simultaneously.

Iran’s medal count in Greco-Roman wrestling was highly impressive: four gold, two silver, and two bronze medals across the ten weight categories. The gold medalists were Amin Mirzazadeh at 130 kilograms, Mohammadhadi Saravi at 97 kilograms, Gholamreza Farrokhi at 82 kilograms, and Saeid Esmaeili at 67 kilograms. Mirzazadeh delivered a dominant performance in the heavyweight division, defeating Hungary’s Dárius Vitek 7–2 in the final, securing his second world gold at 130 kilograms and confirming his place as one of the premier heavyweights of this era. Saravi, already an Olympic medalist, prevailed over Russia’s Artur Sargsian 3–1 in a tactical, hard-fought match at 97 kilograms, further cementing his reputation as a consistent champion. Farrokhi broke through at 82 kilograms, shutting out Georgia’s Gela Bolkvadze 4–0 in the final, and Esmaeili capped his spectacular tournament at 67 kilograms by edging Azerbaijan’s Hasrat Jafarov 2–1 in a dramatic final after a series of decisive technical victories in earlier rounds.

The silver medals came from Payam Ahmadi at 55 kilograms and Alireza Mohmedi at 87 kilograms. Ahmadi, competing at the senior world level for the first time, showed promise by advancing to the final and ultimately settling for silver. Mohmedi produced one of the most dramatic campaigns of the tournament, defeating Hans Wagner of Germany 5–1 in the opening round, outscoring Bulgaria’s Daniel Aleksandrov 11–3 in the second, beating Janibek Zhanishov of Kyrgyzstan 4–1 in the quarterfinal, and overcoming David Losonczi of Hungary 6–3 in the semifinal. In the final he faced Aleksandr Komarov of Serbia and narrowly lost 3–4, earning silver but also valuable team points.

The two bronze medals completed Iran’s tally. Mohammad-Mehdi Keshtkar secured bronze at 63 kilograms, defeating Russia’s Sergey Emelin 6–4 in the medal bout. Keshtkar had begun with a bye, then defeated China’s Buxing Huang 2–1, overwhelmed Azerbaijan’s Murad Mammadov 8–0, lost a close semifinal to his Korean opponent, and then rebounded with his bronze-winning victory. Danial Sohrabi added the other bronze medal earlier in the competition, defeating his Armenian rival 7–0 in a commanding performance. These contributions from both veterans and younger wrestlers highlighted the depth of talent in the Iranian program.

Particularly impressive were the paths of the final-day medalists. Esmaeili’s gold at 67 kilograms was marked by a sequence of dominant technical wins: 9–0 against Sebastian Nad of Serbia, 8–0 against his Uzbek opponent, another 8–0 over Norway’s representative, and 10–0 against Russia’s Danil Ogiev in the semifinal, before his hard-fought 2–1 win in the final against Jafarov. Mohmedi’s silver came at the end of a long campaign of victories against Germany, Bulgaria, Kyrgyzstan, and Hungary before his narrow final defeat. Keshtkar’s bronze, after overcoming strong rivals from China and Azerbaijan and recovering from his semifinal loss, demonstrated the resilience of Iran’s wrestlers.

The scale of the victory was significant. With 180 points, Iran finished 91 points ahead of Azerbaijan. Such a margin illustrates not only the strength of individual champions but also the team’s ability to score consistently across all weights. For a wrestling program that had waited eleven years to reclaim the title, the victory in Zagreb was a demonstration of both continuity and renewal. Established champions such as Mirzazadeh and Saravi delivered as expected, while younger talents like Ahmadi and Keshtkar revealed the future of Iranian Greco-Roman wrestling.

The symbolic value of the triumph was heightened by the broader context. Just a week earlier, Iran’s freestyle team had captured its first world title since 2013, winning two gold, two silver, and three bronze medals. In the freestyle team standings Iran outscored the United States, which earned three gold, one silver, and one bronze, and Japan, which earned two gold, two silver, and one bronze. With that victory Iran became the only country to win seven medals across the ten freestyle weights in Zagreb. The combination of the freestyle and Greco-Roman titles created a historic double crown, unprecedented in Iran’s sports history. For the first time, the nation stood atop the world in both major disciplines of wrestling simultaneously.

Reactions to the victory in Iran were jubilant. Wrestling has long been the national sport and a key source of international prestige. The media celebrated the team’s achievement as evidence of both athletic excellence and national resilience. For many Iranians, the victory was not only about medals but also about reaffirming cultural pride and unity at a time of broader social challenges.

Looking forward, Iran’s triumph in Zagreb provides momentum for the Olympic cycle. The established champions are expected to be medal contenders in upcoming Olympic Games, while the younger wrestlers will be given greater opportunities to develop and contribute. The depth shown in Zagreb ensures that Iran will remain a leading force in Greco-Roman wrestling.

The Debate in Iran over a Potential Pezeshkian–Trump Meeting

Published September 24, 2025

In the days leading up to President Masoud Pezeshkian’s second trip to New York for the United Nations General Assembly, an intense debate has taken shape inside Iran over whether he should hold a direct meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. For reformist and centrist voices, such a meeting is portrayed as an urgent necessity; for hardline and conservative actors, it is a dangerous illusion. The debate itself illustrates Iran’s broader struggle between pragmatic diplomacy and resistance-based strategy.

On one side stand reformist politicians and journalists who argue that Pezeshkian should break with tradition and obtain explicit authorization from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to meet Trump. Figures like Gholamhossein Karbaschi, the long-time leader of the Executives of Construction Party (Kargozaran), have openly urged the president to ask for the Leader’s blessing, framing such a step as the only realistic path to prevent the return of United Nations sanctions and to ease the crushing weight of economic isolation. Karbaschi insisted that coordination with all responsible authorities, “above all the Leader,” is essential, and argued that without this mandate, no diplomacy can succeed.

Other reformist voices have reinforced the call for direct negotiations. Hossein Marashi, secretary-general of Kargozaran, expressed hope that Pezeshkian would use personal courage and initiative in New York to defuse the threat of snapback sanctions, while Mohammad Atrianfar of the same party said that if the Leader grants full authority, the president could even sit down directly with Trump and use the occasion to defend Iran’s interests.

Former MP Ali Motahari wrote that if Trump requests a meeting, Pezeshkian should accept despite Trump’s duplicity, because Trump’s vanity and desire to claim victory could be used to Iran’s advantage. Reformist cleric Mohammad Ali Abtahi also stressed that the expectation of the public is that the president employ every possible means to lift sanctions, and that a successful result would mark a historic turning point. Reformist newspapers have echoed these demands, framing them as a necessary break from ceremonial speeches and fruitless side meetings that have defined previous UNGA trips, and stressing that bold engagement is the only way to answer public despair and bring a measure of economic hope.

On the other side stand conservatives and hardliners who dismiss such ideas as reckless and unrealistic. Media affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps wrote that some political factions view a Pezeshkian–Trump meeting as the cure for Iran’s development, while in reality the president has more urgent priorities at home. Fars News declared that believing one symbolic meeting in New York could solve Iran’s economic crisis was a “naïve notion in the 1390s (2010s)” and today amounts to nothing more than a political fantasy.

These outlets argue that a diplomatic gesture cannot restore investor trust or dismantle sanctions, and that Iran’s real path to progress lies in structural reforms. They highlight five domestic priorities as far more consequential than a photo-op: industrial development and investment in value chains that create jobs and resilience, land distribution to reduce inequality and stimulate domestic demand, increased oil sales managed transparently to generate revenue despite sanctions, the creation of official payment channels with China to bypass dollar dependency and mitigate sanctions risk, and energy efficiency reforms to cut costs and free resources for export. In their framing, these measures will bring lasting benefits for employment and growth, whereas symbolic encounters deliver only fleeting psychological effects.

Conservative politicians have reinforced this line. Nasser Imani, an analyst aligned with the principlists, argued that Pezeshkian should avoid meeting European leaders driving the snapback mechanism, let alone Trump, and instead use the UN General Assembly to expose U.S. and European violations of international law. Hossein Kanani-Moghaddam of the Jebhe-ye Esteghamat said Pezeshkian should highlight Western double standards, pointing to Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal and defiance of the NPT in contrast to Iran’s compliance. Mohammad Kazem Anbarlouei of the Motalefeh Party stressed that if disputes could be solved by a handshake, years of JCPOA negotiations would have sufficed, but since they did not, it is clear that face-to-face meetings cannot alter U.S. strategic calculations.

This divide is not new. Speculation has always surrounded the trips of Iranian presidents to New York. Every leader from Rafsanjani to Raisi has faced questions about possible U.S. meetings, and none has materialized due to mistrust and domestic political constraints. In 2018 and 2019, European leaders tried unsuccessfully to broker a Rouhani–Trump handshake. Today the context is far sharper: Iran has endured a twelve-day war, strikes on nuclear facilities, and the near-certain reactivation of snapback sanctions. For reformists, this heightens the urgency of direct diplomacy; for conservatives, it proves the futility of Western engagement and the necessity of focusing inward and to the East.

President Trump’s speech at the United Nations on Tuesday also struck a hawkish tone, asserting that “almost all” of Iran’s former military commanders are dead and referring to Ali Khamenei as the “so-called” Supreme Leader. Notably, no fatalities were reported in connection with the U.S. strikes on Iran’s evacuated nuclear facilities, so the U.S. President’s commentary invokes the damage done by Israel in the war in June. While he did emphasize that the war between Israel and Iran was one that he worked to end through diplomacy, such provocative remarks are unlikely to make it easy for the Iranian delegation to pursue any new diplomatic initiatives toward the United States.

As Pezeshkian prepares to speak at the United Nations, his presidency already faces a defining dilemma. Many in the reformist camp view a meeting with Trump as a potentially bold act of leadership that could relieve sanctions pressure and calm public anxiety, provided it has the Leader’s approval. The conservative camp, meanwhile, views it as a dangerous distraction from the real work of reforming Iran’s economy and resisting Western aggression. Whether or not the meeting happens, the demand for it—and the backlash against it—have become a focal point of Iran’s political discourse in 2025, underscoring the competing visions of how the country should navigate its confrontation with the United States.

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