Iran has appointed a veteran of its missile and aerospace industries as defense minister, signaling a renewed emphasis on strengthening the military capabilities that have sustained its confrontation with the United States and Israel, while addressing weaknesses exposed by recent wars.
Mehrdad Akhlaqi Ketabchi, 68, received 237 votes in favor and 15 against during a virtual parliamentary session on October 18. He succeeds Aziz Nasirzadeh, who was killed in the opening US-Israeli strikes on February 28. The ministry had been led by acting minister Majid Ebn al-Reza for nearly eight months.
Akhlaqi’s appointment comes as Iran continues diplomatic discussions aimed at ending the conflict while preparing for the possibility of renewed attacks. His extensive background in missile production suggests that Tehran intends to build on one of its principal military strengths rather than fundamentally change its defense strategy.
Unlike the US secretary of defense, who sits within the operational chain of command between the president and military commanders, Iran’s defense minister does not directly command the country’s armed forces. Under Iran’s constitution, the supreme leader serves as commander-in-chief, exercising ultimate authority over military strategy, senior appointments, and major defense decisions. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regular military, known as the Artesh, maintain separate command structures, with the Armed Forces General Staff playing a central role in coordinating military operations.
Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics is primarily responsible for weapons production, procurement, research, technological development and logistical support. Although the minister is nominated by the president and approved by parliament, the armed forces ultimately operate under the supreme leader’s authority.
Akhlaqi therefore will not directly command Iran’s missile forces, the IRGC, or the regular military. His influence will instead depend largely on his ability to sustain and expand the industrial capabilities on which those forces rely.
Although relatively unknown to the Iranian public before his nomination, Akhlaqi has spent more than four decades working within the country’s defense-industrial establishment. Born in 1958, he studied chemical engineering at Amirkabir University of Technology and later earned a master’s degree in strategic management from Malek Ashtar University of Technology, an institution associated with Iran’s defense sector.
He began his career in military research before moving into industrial production in the 1990s. His previous positions include leadership of the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, involved in ballistic missile development, and the Aerospace Industries Organization, a major institution within the Defense Ministry. His experience includes work related to solid-fuel missile propulsion, a technology that allows missiles to be stored in a more ready-to-launch condition and reduces preparation requirements.
During the parliamentary debate, President Masoud Pezeshkian emphasized Akhlaqi’s past cooperation with prominent figures in Iran’s military and technological establishment, including Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, a founder of Iran’s ballistic missile program; nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh; and Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the former commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force. Tehrani Moghaddam died in a 2011 explosion, Fakhrizadeh was assassinated in 2020, and Hajizadeh was killed in an Israeli strike in 2025.
Akhlaqi’s involvement in Iran’s missile industry also brought him under international sanctions. His name appeared in UN Security Council Resolution 1747 in 2007 because of his leadership of the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, and he has faced American and European restrictions related to Iran’s missile activities. Pezeshkian portrayed this history as evidence of Akhlaqi’s qualifications, arguing that his experience in sensitive defense programs and the threats against him demonstrated his importance to Iran’s military establishment.
His nomination also received support from senior military leaders, including IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi and army commander Amir Hatami, indicating broad institutional backing for his appointment. Akhlaqi’s presentation to parliament emphasized expanding missile production, strengthening air defense systems, advancing military technology, and repairing facilities damaged during the war.
He also discussed plans to develop an entirely Iranian-made heavy fighter aircraft, suggesting that an initial aircraft could fly next year. Iran has previously announced domestic aircraft development projects, but producing a modern combat aircraft requires advanced engines, avionics, and manufacturing capabilities. The proposed timeline remains an official projection.
The emphasis on missiles and drones reflects the central role these weapons have played in Iran’s military strategy and its ability to maintain pressure on adversaries despite repeated attacks. Iran’s domestically-produced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones have enabled it to conduct operations across the region and sustain a degree of military leverage against technologically-superior adversaries.
While American and Israeli strikes have damaged military facilities and equipment, Iran has retained the ability to deploy missiles and drones. The extent of its remaining inventories, production capacity, and wartime losses is not independently established, though Iran’s leaders suggest there has been no drop-off in capabilities amid the war. These capabilities have also influenced Tehran’s diplomatic position. Iran’s ability to impose costs on its adversaries and disrupt regional security calculations has provided leverage that extends beyond conventional military comparisons.
At the same time, recent wars have exposed significant vulnerabilities in Iran’s air defenses and its aging combat aircraft fleet. Despite decades of investment in missiles and drones, Iran has struggled to develop or acquire modern fighter aircraft and sufficiently-effective air defense systems to fully protect its territory against advanced American and Israeli airpower.
Akhlaqi’s priorities appear to reflect both sides of this experience: expanding capabilities that have provided Iran with military leverage while addressing weaknesses in air defense and combat aviation. One potentially important element of his program is greater cooperation with private manufacturers and knowledge-based companies. Iran’s advanced weapons production has traditionally been concentrated in state-controlled and military-affiliated organizations. Akhlaqi has argued that outsourcing should become a necessity rather than simply an option, while emphasizing research and technological development.
Greater participation by private companies could expand industrial capacity and diversify production networks. However, sanctions, financing constraints, access to specialized technology, and security requirements remain substantial obstacles. Questions raised by lawmakers during the confidence debate also suggested concern about how private manufacturers would operate alongside established defense organizations.
Beyond industrial development, Akhlaqi has adopted a confrontational tone toward Washington. During his parliamentary appearance, he warned that renewed American or Israeli attacks would provoke a broad response. Asked about reports concerning the possible use of the American GBU-43/B bomb, commonly known as the “Mother of All Bombs” or MOAB, he claimed Iran had prepared countermeasures and threatened retaliation against US forces in the region.
His remarks come amid continuing diplomatic efforts to end the conflict, with Tehran and Washington remaining divided over sanctions, maritime restrictions, and the terms of a broader settlement. The appointment suggests that Iran is pursuing military development and diplomacy simultaneously. Even if negotiations produce an agreement, Tehran appears determined to maintain and expand the capabilities it considers essential to preventing future attacks.
That strategy carries significant economic implications. Iran must finance military development while confronting inflation, pressure on government revenues, damaged civilian infrastructure and the broader economic consequences of war. Expanding missile production, modernizing air defenses, and developing combat aircraft will require substantial resources that could otherwise support civilian reconstruction and economic recovery. Moreover, any capabilities could be targeted in future rounds of warfare.
The central question is not whether Iran still possesses a functioning defense industry, but how successfully it can expand its existing strengths while overcoming technological and financial limitations. For Washington, Akhlaqi’s appointment highlights the limits of assessing Iran’s military position solely through the destruction of facilities or equipment. Iran retains technical expertise, industrial networks, and operational capabilities that can support continued weapons development, even as sanctions and military attacks constrain production.
For Tehran, the challenge is to translate those capabilities into a more balanced defense system without placing additional unsustainable burdens on the economy. Ultimately, Akhlaqi’s appointment reflects an effort to reinforce the missile and drone capabilities that remain central to Iran’s military power while investing in areas where its weaknesses have become increasingly apparent. Whether that effort strengthens Iran’s deterrence or contributes to a prolonged regional arms confrontation will depend not only on military production but also on the course of negotiations and the prospects for a durable political settlement.