Twenty-five days after Iran and the United States signed a memorandum intended to end the previous round of fighting, the conflict has returned with significant military, maritime, and regional escalation. U.S. forces have carried out successive waves of strikes across southern Iran, Tehran has launched missiles and drones against U.S. military facilities in several regional countries, commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has fallen sharply, and Washington has announced the resumption of its naval blockade of Iranian ports.
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The latest American attacks were reported across a broad area of southern Iran, including Bandar Abbas, Qeshm, Jask, Sirik, Abu Musa, Abadan, Ahvaz, Mahshahr, Omidiyeh, Behbahan, Dezful, and Shadgan. Iranian provincial authorities reported casualties in several locations. According to officials in Khuzestan, strikes on Abadan killed at least two people and wounded three others, while a projectile that struck an agricultural water-pumping station in Mahshahr killed a guard and injured four people. Earlier attacks on Farur Island near Bandar Lengeh reportedly killed a telecommunications maintenance worker and wounded two colleagues. Iranian officials also reported extensive damage to the country’s electricity network, claiming that more than 4,000 megawatts of generating or transmission capacity had been lost during the broader campaign.
U.S. Central Command said its operations targeted Iranian air-defense systems, coastal radar sites, missile and drone capabilities, military small boats, and facilities associated with attacks on commercial shipping. In one notable development, the United States used unmanned surface vessels in combat for the first time. Three Corsair sea drones reportedly struck a submarine and ship-maintenance facility at the Bandar Abbas naval base. CENTCOM presented the operation as part of an effort to weaken Iran’s ability to attack ships in and around the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran responded by announcing missile and drone attacks against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Oman, and other regional locations. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed that it targeted helicopter maintenance facilities, an aircraft hangar, and a drone command-and-control center at Bahrain’s Sheikh Isa Air Base. It also claimed attacks on fuel storage facilities at Jordan’s Prince Hassan Air Base, a Patriot air-defense system at Kuwait’s Ali Al Salem Air Base, and a strategic radar installation at Ahmed Al Jaber Air Base. Iran’s regular army separately said it had struck American air-defense, missile, shelter, and logistical facilities in Kuwait. These claims have not all been independently verified.
Kuwait’s Defense Ministry confirmed that three locations in northern Kuwait were attacked and that a drone struck an offshore platform belonging to the Kuwait Oil Company, causing material damage and injuring one employee. Bahrain accused Iran of targeting civilians, while Iranian officials insisted that their operations were directed exclusively at U.S. bases and facilities used to attack Iran. Oman summoned the Iranian ambassador after reported drone strikes in Musandam and Al Batinah, describing the incidents as violations of its sovereignty. Tehran, meanwhile, warned regional governments that providing territory, logistical assistance, or military support for U.S. attacks would be regarded as participation in the war and could make the locations from which those attacks were launched legitimate targets.
The immediate center of the confrontation remains the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has announced that passage through the Strait is suspended until further notice because of what it describes as illegal U.S. military activity. Iranian forces have reportedly attacked or threatened vessels attempting to transit without Iranian authorization, including ships using the southern route near Oman. CENTCOM has rejected Iran’s position, declaring that the Strait remains open to lawful international navigation and that U.S. forces are deployed to guarantee freedom of passage.
The practical effect, however, has been a severe reduction in shipping. Marine-tracking data cited in the reports indicated that no commercial vessel publicly transmitting its location had been observed passing through the Strait for a significant period. Kpler data showed that only eight commercial vessels crossed on Sunday, compared with 21 on Saturday and 14 on Friday, while several of those ships reportedly disabled their tracking signals during transit. This suggests that, regardless of competing legal declarations from Washington and Tehran, shipping companies are treating the waterway as an active conflict zone.
President Donald Trump has now announced that the United States is reinstating the naval blockade of Iranian ports. CENTCOM said the renewed blockade would apply to vessels entering or leaving Iranian ports and coastal areas, while ships not violating the blockade would continue to receive U.S. protection in regional waters. The first phase of the blockade had been implemented between April 13 and June 18, during which CENTCOM said American forces disabled several vessels and redirected more than 100 others attempting to trade with Iran.
Trump has also declared that the Strait will remain open “with or without Iran,” described the United States as the “Guardian of the Hormuz Strait,” and proposed charging a fee equal to 20 percent of cargo value for U.S.-provided security. The International Maritime Organization responded that there is no legal basis for imposing a compulsory toll solely for passage through an international strait. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi replied sarcastically that Trump was correct that whoever guarantees secure commercial passage should be compensated, adding that Iran had always been the guardian of the Strait and would remain so, although he suggested that a 20 percent fee was excessive.
The dispute over the Strait appears to have been the immediate cause of the breakdown in negotiations. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said the recent talks in Muscat focused on arrangements under Clause Five of the memorandum, which required Iran to make its best efforts to facilitate safe, cost-free commercial passage for a limited period. Tehran appears to have interpreted that provision as recognizing a central Iranian role in managing maritime passage. Washington, by contrast, has since sought to erode Iran’s role in managing the navigation of the strait, taking steps to set up separate navigation pathways while framing these steps in line with freedom of navigation.
Baghaei accused the United States of dismantling the broader 14-point understanding and pressuring Oman not to accept Iran’s proposed arrangements. Trump offered a very different account, claiming that Iran and the United States had been close to an agreement before Iran attacked a commercial vessel with a drone. He said Iran had been prepared to make major concessions before abruptly reversing course. The conflicting narratives demonstrate that the disagreement is no longer merely about whether ships can pass, but about who has the authority to determine the conditions of passage.
The conflict has also expanded into Yemen. The internationally-recognized Yemeni government said it struck the runway at Sana’a International Airport to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing. The flight was subsequently diverted to Hodeidah. The Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out the attack, declared that the period of de-escalation had ended, and launched ballistic missiles and drones against Abha International Airport in Saudi Arabia. They also warned airlines against operating in Saudi airspace until what they call the blockade of Sana’a Airport is lifted.
This represents one of the most serious escalations between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia since the 2022 truce reduced direct hostilities. There have also been reports of small boats approaching a tanker near Yemen, raising concerns that attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea may resume. The importance of these developments extends beyond Yemen: renewed Houthi operations could place the Bab al-Mandab Strait under pressure at the same time that shipping through Hormuz is already severely disrupted. Previous Houthi threats against Red Sea shipping have demonstrated how rapidly uncertainty in that waterway can affect freight rates, insurance costs, and global energy markets.
Taken together, these developments suggest that Iran may have concluded that it faced a fundamental strategic choice. The first option was to accept the American interpretation of the post-war memorandum, an interpretation generally reflected in Trump’s public statements and subsequent U.S. actions. In Tehran’s view, that would have meant accepting not only an American role in determining the rules of passage through the Strait of Hormuz, but also major changes in the Lebanese ceasefire.
The Lebanon issue should not be reduced to Hezbollah’s operational freedom. From Iran’s perspective, the more consequential concern is that the ceasefire has not produced a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory. Instead, Israel’s continuing presence in parts of southern Lebanon risks turning a temporary military arrangement into the long-term loss or occupation of portions of Lebanese land. At the same time, many predominantly Shiite towns and villages in southern Lebanon have been destroyed or rendered uninhabitable. Accepting such an outcome would mean accepting both the continued Israeli presence and a post-war reality in which large areas of Lebanon’s Shiite south remain devastated, depopulated, or inaccessible to their residents.
The same logic applies to the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has historically regarded the Strait not simply as an international shipping route but as a central source of sovereignty, deterrence, and regional influence. An American declaration that Iran does not control the Strait, combined with a U.S.-enforced blockade of Iranian ports and a proposed American toll on passing cargo, would effectively strip Tehran of one of its most important remaining instruments of leverage. Even if commercial passage continued, Iran would have to accept that the United States—not Iran—was setting and enforcing the security rules.
Iran therefore appears to have been willing to risk the breakdown of the memorandum, and a return to war, before these arrangements became established facts. This does not necessarily mean Tehran expects to defeat the United States militarily. Rather, its decision may be based on the belief that renewed conflict now offers a better opportunity to position Iran for these evolving security arrangements than waiting several months.
Iranian decision-makers may believe the timing of the current breakdown is favorable for several reasons. First, global energy importers may not yet have fully replenished their strategic reserves or adapted their supply networks to another prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz. A renewed disruption now could therefore have a greater and faster effect on oil prices, shipping insurance, and global inflation than a similar disruption after governments and markets have had more time to prepare.
Second, Tehran may calculate that Trump remains particularly vulnerable to rising fuel prices and inflation in advance of the November midterm election. Iran may therefore believe that economic pressure generated by maritime instability can produce results more quickly than military pressure alone. The objective would not necessarily be to sustain a permanent closure of Hormuz, but to demonstrate that the United States cannot impose its interpretation of the agreement without incurring significant costs.
Third, the Houthis’ entry into the confrontation could multiply that pressure. Iran’s effort to break the air blockade of Yemen appears to have led to the renewed outbreak of hostilities. If fighting with Saudi Arabia expands and Houthi forces resume attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, Washington and its partners could face simultaneous disruptions at both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab. Hormuz affects the exit route for much of the Gulf’s oil and liquefied natural gas, while Bab al-Mandab connects the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Pressure on both chokepoints could produce far greater consequences than disruption at either one alone.
Iran may consequently believe that it has a limited window in which military and economic escalation can improve its negotiating position. Its calculation appears to be that Washington will eventually return to negotiations once the cost of securing Hormuz, defending regional bases, protecting Gulf infrastructure, reassuring commercial shipping, and containing a renewed Yemen front becomes sufficiently high.
However, this is an extremely dangerous strategy. It assumes that the United States will respond to higher costs by negotiating rather than expanding its military campaign or withdrawing altogether. It also assumes that Iran can impose meaningful economic pressure before its naval, missile, energy, and command infrastructure is severely degraded. The attacks on southern Iran, the renewed blockade, and the first U.S. combat use of sea drones show that Washington is prepared to employ new capabilities to reduce Iran’s ability to threaten shipping.
The strategy also risks further alienating regional countries. Iranian attacks on American facilities situated inside Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Jordan, Qatar, and other states may be described by Tehran as strikes against the United States, but those governments are increasingly treating them as violations of their own territory and sovereignty. Iran may therefore gain short-term military leverage while losing diplomatic space among neighboring states that could otherwise play a mediating role.
For now, it is impossible to know whether Iran’s analysis is correct. The outcome will depend on whether disruption in Hormuz becomes sustained, whether the Houthis reopen the Red Sea front, whether global energy prices rise enough to affect U.S. political calculations, and whether Washington decides that negotiations are preferable to an expanded war.
What appears clearer is that Iran did not view the emerging post-ceasefire order as a tolerable compromise. Tehran seems to have concluded that accepting Washington’s interpretation would mean acquiescing to a long-term Israeli presence on Lebanese territory, the destruction and possible long-term displacement of Shiite communities in southern Lebanon, and the loss of Iran’s effective control and leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. Faced with that choice, it appears to have selected renewed war in the hope that immediate pressure will produce a more favorable agreement later. Whether that judgment proves strategically successful or disastrously mistaken remains to be seen.