Emerging Divisions Within Iran's Political Establishment Over the Iran-U.S. Agreement and the Future of Decision-Making Authority

The political controversy surrounding the recent Iran-U.S. memorandum of understanding has exposed some of the most visible disagreements within the Islamic Republic’s governing establishment in recent years. While senior government officials insist that the agreement was negotiated and approved through Iran’s formal institutional mechanisms and with the knowledge and authorization of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, a coalition of conservative clerics, parliamentarians, ideological factions, and media outlets has increasingly challenged both the substance of the agreement and the legitimacy of the negotiating process itself.

The most significant manifestation of these disagreements emerged on June 27, when 63 of the 88 members of Iran’s Assembly of Experts issued an unprecedented statement calling for retaliation for the killing of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The statement described U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as individuals whose killing could constitute a religious obligation for Muslims who have access to them. The signatories also demanded that Iranian negotiators strictly adhere to what they described as the Supreme Leader’s “red lines,” insisted that Iran’s nuclear rights remain outside the scope of negotiations with Washington, and criticized Tehran’s decision to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, describing it as a strategic mistake.

The statement quickly received support from conservative circles. According to Mehr News Agency, more than 25,000 individuals, including university professors, seminary scholars, and political elites, signed a petition endorsing the Assembly members’ position. However, less than twenty-four hours later, the Secretariat of the Assembly of Experts issued an extraordinary public response, describing the statement as “unconventional” and “without precedent.” The Secretariat emphasized that official positions of the Assembly have traditionally been issued only through formal institutional procedures, either through plenary sessions or through statements approved by the chairman, leadership board, or Secretariat itself.

This unprecedented public disagreement between the Assembly’s leadership and a substantial majority of its members revealed significant institutional divisions within one of the Islamic Republic’s highest political bodies. At the same time, the Secretariat’s own statement contained criticism of the government’s negotiating approach, arguing that Iran should not have agreed to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and should not have permitted Iran’s nuclear program to become part of negotiations with the United States. These positions appear to contradict the framework of the agreement that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has reportedly approved in principle.

Simultaneously, President Masoud Pezeshkian traveled to the religious center of Qom, where he met with senior clerics and religious authorities. During these meetings, he warned about what he described as efforts by domestic and foreign actors to undermine national unity and disrupt the implementation of the agreement. In subsequent public statements, Pezeshkian repeatedly emphasized that the negotiations were conducted with the full knowledge and approval of the Supreme Leader, insisting that the agreement had undergone extensive review by expert, security, and political institutions and had received strong support from the Supreme National Security Council.

The political controversy intensified further following the publication of a written message attributed to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, in which he reportedly stated that he had “in principle preferred a different approach” but had nevertheless approved the agreement after accepting the judgment of President Pezeshkian and the Supreme National Security Council. This statement immediately became the subject of competing interpretations. Opponents of the agreement argued that the Supreme Leader had personally opposed the negotiations and that the negotiating team had ignored his preferences. Supporters of the agreement, however, argued that the statement demonstrated the institutional nature of decision-making within the Islamic Republic and reflected the Supreme Leader’s willingness to defer to collective expert judgment.

The government subsequently launched an unusually public effort to defend the legitimacy of the agreement. President Pezeshkian declared that all stages of the negotiations had been conducted with “full and continuous coordination” with the Supreme Leader, emphasizing that the agreement was approved through Iran’s official institutional procedures. He also stressed that Iran’s obligations under the agreement remained conditional upon reciprocal American compliance, stating publicly that “if the American side remains committed to the agreement, we will also fulfill our obligations.”

Perhaps the most significant intervention came from Mohammad Jafar Ghaempanah, the Executive Deputy to the President, who publicly disclosed details of the Supreme National Security Council meeting that approved the agreement. According to Ghaempanah, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei ordered that a special meeting of the Supreme National Security Council be convened with the participation of senior military commanders and instructed that the agreement should be accepted if three-quarters of participants voted in favor. Ghaempanah revealed that the meeting included the President, the Speaker of Parliament, the Chief Justice, senior military commanders, the Foreign Minister, the Interior Minister, representatives of the Supreme Leader, and other senior officials, and that all participants except one voted in favor of approving the agreement.

Ghaempanah explicitly rejected efforts to portray the agreement as contrary to the Supreme Leader’s wishes, arguing that the Supreme Leader’s statement that he had “another opinion” should not be interpreted as opposition. Instead, he argued that the statement demonstrated the existence of a “chain of governance” within the Islamic Republic and reflected a system in which difficult national security decisions are made through collective institutional mechanisms rather than through individual preferences alone.

Despite these efforts, criticism from conservative factions has continued to intensify. Mahmoud Nabavian, a parliamentarian closely associated with the Paydari Front, publicly disclosed portions of what he claimed was a confidential letter from the Supreme Leader instructing negotiators not to discuss nuclear issues with the United States. Nabavian and other hardline figures subsequently accused the negotiating team of violating the Supreme Leader’s guidance and called for the suspension of negotiations. He later declared that any decision that contradicts the Supreme Leader’s personal preference constitutes not a national interest but a national harm.

Additional pressure emerged from a public letter signed by approximately 2,000 university professors and seminary scholars, which called for a halt to negotiations and accused the negotiating team of deviating from the Supreme Leader’s instructions. The signatories demanded that Iranian officials refrain from further negotiations until the United States fully implemented key provisions of the agreement.

The growing divisions have also become increasingly visible within conservative media outlets traditionally aligned with the Islamic Republic. The newspaper Javan, which is closely associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), warned that continued opposition to negotiations could harm national interests and argued that if the agreement failed, “the entire nation would bear the costs.” Javan also rejected claims that negotiations represented a betrayal of the former Supreme Leader’s legacy and criticized certain state television programs for contributing to domestic polarization.

At the same time, the newspaper Kayhan, whose editor is appointed directly by the Supreme Leader, expressed concern about increasingly hostile disputes among conservative factions. Without explicitly naming individuals, Kayhan appeared to refer to growing tensions between supporters of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili, warning that disagreements among revolutionary forces had crossed traditional political red lines and were creating an artificial political polarization within the governing establishment.

Underlying many of these political disputes are significant strategic and economic considerations. Several government officials have acknowledged publicly that the American maritime blockade imposed after the ceasefire created economic pressures that were in some respects more severe than traditional sanctions. Mohsen Zanganeh, a member of parliament’s budget committee, stated that the American maritime blockade and the prospect of a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz created strategic and economic pressures exceeding those experienced during the forty-day war itself.

Government officials have increasingly argued that ending the maritime blockade, restoring commercial navigation, and stabilizing the Iranian economy constituted urgent national security priorities that justified compromise. According to this interpretation, practical strategic calculations played a more significant role in the decision to accept the agreement than purely ideological considerations.

Taken together, these developments suggest that the ongoing political struggle surrounding the Iran-U.S. agreement is no longer simply a disagreement over negotiations with Washington. Rather, it has evolved into a broader debate over the nature of authority, legitimacy, and decision-making within Iran’s post-war political system.

While all major political factions continue to affirm loyalty to the Islamic Republic and to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, they increasingly disagree over who possesses the authority to interpret the Supreme Leader’s intentions, define national interests, and determine the strategic direction of the state. The repeated efforts by government officials, senior clerics, military figures, and conservative media organizations to explain, reinterpret, or defend the Supreme Leader’s position suggest that the central issue is no longer ideological disagreement but rather competing claims to political legitimacy and institutional authority.

The ultimate significance of the current political dispute extends beyond the Iran-U.S. agreement itself. The outcome of the agreement may determine the future distribution of power within the Islamic Republic, strengthening either pragmatic institutional actors or hardline ideological factions. In this context, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appears to be deliberately positioning himself between both camps, allowing negotiations to proceed while simultaneously distancing himself from full ownership of the process. This strategy allows him to preserve his authority regardless of whether the agreement succeeds or whether Iran ultimately returns to confrontation with the United States.