Deepening Divides: Iranian Officials Clash Over Ties With Russia
Iran’s relationship with Russia, long described as “strategic,” has become the center of fierce new political infighting in Tehran.
Iran’s relationship with Russia, long described as “strategic,” has become the center of fierce new political infighting in Tehran. On October 26, 2025, the dispute reached an unprecedented level when Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, publicly accused former president Hassan Rouhani and ex–foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif of damaging the path of strategic cooperation with Moscow. The clash exposed deep divisions over the Islamic Republic’s “Look to the East” policy and the extent to which Iran should rely on Russia as a counterweight to the West.
Iran, Russia, and China jointly sent a letter to the United Nations rejecting Western efforts to reactivate sanctions under the so-called “snapback mechanism.” Ghalibaf hailed this coordination as proof of a new global alignment in which Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing stand together against Western dominance. Addressing the parliament on 26 October 2025 (4 Aban 1404), he declared that national unity required protecting this “strategic achievement,” and then sharply attacked Rouhani and Zarif for allegedly undermining it.
“I find it necessary to express my explicit criticism toward the former president and our former foreign minister,” he said, “who, precisely when the course of our strategic cooperation with Russia is advancing, have with their statements harmed this path.” Coming from the head of the legislature, this was more than a partisan remark; it amounted to an official warning that criticism of Russia or dissent from pro-Russia policy could be construed as a threat to national interests.
Zarif, in a series of leaked and public remarks, responded to criticism from Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov by arguing that Moscow had deliberately obstructed Iran’s rapprochement with the West during the 2015 nuclear negotiations, preferring to keep Tehran trapped in the geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the United States. He said Iranian diplomacy had repeatedly been sacrificed to the “field” and to Russian interests. Zarif also criticized Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov for proposing what he called a “very bad formula” on the snapback clause during the nuclear talks, which Iran had to reject after “a lot of effort.”
Rouhani, for his part, reiterated that Iran’s foundational principle of foreign policy must remain “neither East nor West.” Replacing Western dependence with Eastern dependence, he warned, would leave Iran both subordinate and uncreative. He reminded his audience that Russia and China had voted for all six UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran between 2006 and 2010 — evidence, he said, that neither power had acted as Iran’s unconditional ally.
Ghalibaf’s accusations opened the floodgates for hardline attacks in the parliament. Amirhossein Sabeti, a young Tehran MP and former Ofogh TV host, denounced Rouhani as “the most hated politician in Iran,” accused him of opposing anti-corruption measures, and invoked the 2019 gas-price protests to portray him as responsible for a national tragedy. He called on the judiciary to prosecute Rouhani for “acts and omissions,” insisting that he should “end up behind bars, not think of higher office.” Other hardline deputies joined in, chanting “Death to Fereydoun” (Rouhani’s family name) and “Trial!” across the chamber.
Veteran conservative Hamid Rasayi accused Rouhani of “eight years of submission to America” that had brought only more sanctions and humiliation, and demanded that judiciary chief Gholamhossein Ejei investigate alleged misconduct in Rouhani’s presidency and even in his academic record. What had begun as a policy debate quickly turned into threatening a political purge, fusing foreign-policy loyalty tests with personal vendettas.
Reformist figures reacted with alarm. Political analyst Ahmad Zeydabadi asked whether “the Russians have demanded that Iranian citizens remain silent toward Kremlin policies as a condition for cooperation,” calling such a demand “the ugliest and most disgraceful form of colonial subordination.” He questioned why the remarks of two now-private citizens could be considered harmful to national interests. Hesameddin Ashena, Rouhani’s former adviser, admonished Ghalibaf that “it is unwise for the Speaker to read aloud everything that reaches his hands.”
Behind this uproar lie two conflicting strategic visions. The first, championed by Ghalibaf and the existing security establishment, sees Russia and China as indispensable partners for circumventing Western sanctions, ensuring energy and arms cooperation, and asserting ideological defiance of the United States. The second, represented by Rouhani, Zarif, and the reformist camp, views such alignment as risky and one-sided, warning that Moscow exploits Iran’s isolation to treat it as a junior partner. To them, balanced, multi-directional diplomacy is essential for preserving Iran’s independence.
It also reflected the unease of Iranian officials aware of Moscow’s irritation over Zarif’s criticisms, suggesting that the Iranian parliament’s posture partly aimed to placate the Kremlin. This backlash to remarks from former officials has cast a light on Iran’s internal debate over its orientation toward Russia. What began as a discussion over the snapback mechanism has evolved into a broader ideological confrontation between those who view alignment with Moscow as salvation and those who fear it as subjugation.