Renewed fighting between Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Kurdish militants in western Iran has raised concerns about a possible escalation of armed conflict along the country’s borders. An unverified claim that Kurdish fighters have used attack drones against Iranian forces is particularly significant. The clashes coincide with intensifying insurgent activity in southeastern Iran, raising questions about possible foreign support and risks of simultaneous internal fighting coinciding with U.S.-Israeli military operations.
Fighting between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the armed Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) was reported on October 15 and 16 in the Shaho mountains, spanning parts of Iran’s Kurdistan and Kermanshah provinces. According to the Kurdistan Human Rights Network, Iranian forces deployed heavy equipment and drones around Daleh Marz village in Sarvabad County and launched artillery and drone strikes against the Dasht-e Qalb area. Local sources reported restrictions on civilian access to the surrounding mountains.
An unnamed PJAK-affiliated source told Deutsche Welle Persian that Iranian troops initially entered the area in vehicles bearing civilian license plates before receiving reinforcements. The source claimed that PJAK fighters pushed back Iranian forces during ground engagements, prompting intensified artillery and drone attacks.
Most significantly, the source claimed that PJAK’s aerial units responded with attack drones of their own. A local resident separately reported prolonged gunfire, artillery explosions, and drone activity on Thursday night.
Neither PJAK’s alleged drone attacks nor its claims of battlefield success have been independently verified. No reliable casualty figures or visual evidence establishing the type of drones reportedly used by PJAK have emerged.
If confirmed, the use of attack drones could represent an important development in the organization’s capabilities. PJAK has traditionally relied on guerrilla tactics, small arms, and its familiarity with difficult mountainous terrain. Even inexpensive commercially-adapted drones could allow its fighters to strike military positions and vehicles beyond direct line of sight.
Whether PJAK possesses an organized drone force, has obtained a limited number of improvised systems, or has received outside equipment or training remains unknown. The latest confrontation follows months of military activity in the region. In June, clashes were reported around Marivan, Baneh, and Mahabad, while Iranian forces have repeatedly targeted Kurdish opposition positions across the border in Iraqi Kurdistan.
PJAK differs from several other Iranian Kurdish armed organizations because it maintains a presence in remote mountains along the Iran-Iraq border and inside western Iran. Many others rely primarily on established camps in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Signs of a larger Iranian military deployment around Shaho also preceded the latest fighting. On October 3, the Kurdistan Human Rights Network reported that the IRGC had moved heavy equipment into the mountains near Ravansar and temporarily prohibited civilian access, citing military exercises. Further deployments were reported around Paveh and Daleh Marz on October 16, although the scale and purpose of the operation remain unclear.
The fighting also threatens the protected Shaho-Kosalan mountain area. Earlier artillery bombardments reportedly caused extensive fires, while restrictions on movement have affected local communities dependent on access to the mountains.
The developments are particularly concerning because Iran is simultaneously experiencing a sharp increase in armed attacks in Sistan and Baluchestan, on its southeastern frontier. As Iran Unfiltered previously reported, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project (ACLED) recorded approximately 70 armed confrontations between militant groups and Iranian security forces in the province during 2026 through October 8, already exceeding the annual total for any of the previous ten years.
The violence has continued. On October 12, local Baluch sources reported an attack on a police post in Mortan, Rask County, although provincial police disputed that account. On October 13, Iranian security forces announced operations against armed suspects near Zahedan, while local sources reported additional fighting in Taftan. On October 14, two security personnel, including a female Basij commander and a police officer, were killed in separate attacks in Mehrestan County.
The growing frequency and geographical spread of attacks suggest that armed organizations in southeastern Iran are capable of sustaining pressure on security forces across multiple locations. However, the extent of their coordination and outside assistance remains uncertain.
Although Kurdish and Baluch armed movements have different objectives, organizations, and historical grievances, their simultaneous activity creates an additional security challenge for Tehran during its ongoing war with the United States and Israel. It also raises the possibility that external actors could seek to exploit these conflicts. There is documented evidence that Washington explored cooperation with Iranian Kurdish armed opposition groups earlier in the war. President Trump has expressed consternation that the U.S. has provided “lots of guns: to Kurdish groups for distribution inside Iran, but they have kept them.
In March, The Washington Post reported that President Donald Trump had contacted Kurdish political leaders in Iran and Iraq, offering American support, including potential air cover, for operations against Iranian government forces. The discussions reportedly included facilitating the movement of Iranian Kurdish fighters from Iraqi Kurdistan into Iran. However, a Reuters investigation published in April found that conflicting signals from Washington, uncertainty over promised assistance, and sustained Iranian military pressure had prevented Kurdish organizations from launching the anticipated offensive.
These reports establish that potential U.S. cooperation with Kurdish armed groups has been seriously considered. They do not demonstrate that the current PJAK operations in Shaho are receiving American or Israeli support. Moreover, the groups involved in earlier discussions were not necessarily operating under a unified command, and their relationship with PJAK’s current activities remains unclear.
Questions about foreign involvement have also emerged in southeastern Iran. Nour News, a publication close to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, recently alleged that an unnamed Arab state bordering the Persian Gulf was financing and equipping militant networks. However, the allegations have not been independently substantiated, and the relationship between the organizations identified by Nour News and the Baluch armed groups currently fighting Iranian forces remains unclear.
The simultaneous escalation in western and southeastern Iran warrants investigation, but timing alone does not establish foreign sponsorship or operational coordination. Both regions have longstanding armed movements and local grievances predating the current war. Militant organizations could be acting independently, taking advantage of the military and political pressures facing Tehran.
Nevertheless, the possibility of external assistance becomes especially consequential when considered alongside the ongoing U.S.-Israeli military campaign. A scenario in which renewed American and Israeli airstrikes coincide with sustained armed operations in Iranian Kurdistan and Sistan and Baluchestan could create a dangerous convergence of external and internal military pressures.
Airstrikes against Iranian military infrastructure, command facilities, and transportation networks could weaken the resources available to security forces confronting insurgents. Simultaneously, attacks in geographically distant regions could compel Tehran to disperse personnel and equipment across multiple fronts.
Such a scenario would not necessarily allow armed Kurdish or Baluch groups to make major gains, such as capturing and holding major cities. Their ability to sustain large-scale operations or establish territorial control remains uncertain. However, even without major territorial gains, prolonged fighting could disrupt transportation, damage infrastructure, increase displacement, and impose substantial costs on local communities.
There are also political limitations to any strategy relying on armed ethnic opposition organizations. Neither Kurdish nor Baluch communities are politically homogeneous, and militant groups cannot be assumed to fully represent the populations among whom they operate. Both regions have longstanding grievances involving economic marginalization, discrimination, political representation, and relations with security institutions. Foreign military involvement could intensify these tensions and expose civilians to further violence.
For now, the evidence points to renewed armed confrontation in Iranian Kurdistan alongside a more sustained insurgency in Sistan and Baluchestan. Whether these conflicts are receiving coordinated foreign support remains unproven. The reported use of attack drones by PJAK deserves particular attention because confirmation could indicate a significant change in the capabilities of armed Kurdish groups. The broader danger is that Iran’s war with the United States and Israel could increasingly intersect with longstanding domestic conflicts, creating a more fragmented and destructive security crisis whose greatest costs would fall on civilians.