Executive Summary

The 2026 Iran War caused a civilian catastrophe fully corroborated by independent international organizations. Civilian death tolls range between 1,030 and 2,362 — with the true figure difficult to determine given Iran’s internet blackout, restricted journalist access, and the fact that approximately 40% of bodies were initially unidentifiable due to the nature of munitions used. At least 254 to 376 children are confirmed among the dead, and over 26,500 people were injured across the 40 days.

“In practice, the war has destroyed the lives and livelihoods of ordinary citizens with little influence over the Islamic Republic’s policies. Those supposedly meant to benefit from the war ended up bearing its heaviest human and economic costs.”

— Hadi Kahalzadeh, welfare economist; Non-Resident Fellow, Quincy Institute. Responsible Statecraft, April 15, 2026

The Minab school strike — killing 156 people including 120 schoolchildren on the opening day of the war, confirmed by the local prosecutor and independently verified by satellite imagery, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the UN, and major news organizations — stands as the single most documented atrocity of the conflict and has prompted formal war crimes investigations. The cumulative pattern of incidents — including the Lamerd sports hall, the Niloofar Square killings, and the double-tap Karaj bridge strike — reflects a war in which civilian concentrations were repeatedly struck.

On housing, the Red Crescent’s final confirmed total of 125,630 civilian units damaged — including 100,000 residential units — is the most authoritative national figure available and has been cited directly by UN OCHA in its humanitarian updates. Tehran bore the largest single-city burden with 46,623 residential units damaged and 649 recorded impact points, while the western border provinces of Kermanshah, Kurdistan, and Ilam recorded the most severe damage outside the capital. The scale of destruction was approximately 15 times greater than the damage caused by the June 2025 Twelve-Day War, and in total magnitude is broadly comparable to the residential damage inflicted over the entire eight-year Iran-Iraq War.

The most scientifically independent measure — the Oregon State University satellite assessment of at least 7,645 buildings with confirmed structural damage — provides the externally verified scientific floor. The gap between this figure and the Red Crescent’s 125,630 units reflects fundamentally different definitions of damage: the satellite methodology captures only significant structural change, while the ground registration counts any impact including broken windows and cracked walls. The government’s own categorisation confirms that the vast majority of the 125,630 units fall into the minor damage category — but that does not make the smaller number more “true.” Both figures document real harm to real people’s homes.

The displacement of 3.2 million Iranians — 60% of them women and children — is confirmed by both OCHA and UNHCR, and represents one of the largest internal displacement events in Iranian history since the Iran-Iraq War. Taken together, the documented human and material costs of this conflict place it among the most destructive episodes of civilian harm in the modern Middle East.

1.1 Total Death Toll — Cross-Source Verification

Four independent sources provide the primary death counts. Their convergence across distinct methodologies makes the civilian casualty figures among the most robustly documented of the conflict.

Iranian Ministry of Health / Al Jazeera tracker (May 5, 2026): At least 3,468 people were killed in US-Israeli attacks on Iran between February 28 and April 8, 2026, according to Iran’s Ministry of Health. The victims were aged between eight months and 88 years and included seven infants, 376 children, and 496 women. More than 26,500 people were injured, including at least 4,000 women and 1,621 children.

EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT — RED CRESCENT RELIEF WORKER, TEHRAN

“I saw a man standing on the rubble. Shortly after, his wife’s body was found near the building. The intensity of the strike had made identification of the body extremely difficult. In one moment, that man had lost everything — his home was destroyed and not a single member of his family remained by his side.”

— Elias Nazpour, journalist and relief worker, Iranian Red Crescent Society (Khorasan Razavi unit). Source: Fararu / Mehr News Agency, May 2026

HRANA — Human Rights Activists in Iran (US-based NGO): As of April 7, HRANA documented 3,636 total deaths in Iran due to strikes, including 1,701 civilians (among them at least 254 children), 1,221 military personnel, and 714 unclassified. HRANA noted it is believed that military casualties are significantly higher than reported, as confirmations depend on government data obscured due to the sensitive nature of military information.

Hengaw Organization for Human Rights (Norway-based NGO): At least 7,650 people were killed during the 40-day phase of the war, of whom 1,030 — equivalent to 13.5% — were civilians, and at least 6,620 were military personnel. Hengaw’s significantly higher total reflects its deeper documentation of military casualties, particularly across Kurdish provinces where it has strong field networks.

UN OCHA Humanitarian Update No. 3 (April 16): As of 7 April, the Ministry of Health and Medical Education reported at least 2,362 civilian deaths and more than 32,314 injuries nationwide, with the highest casualties recorded in Tehran, Hormozgan, and Isfahan.

By contrast, this civilian death range is higher than the 1,030 cited by Hengaw and 1,701 confirmed civilian dead cited by HRANA. However, a death toll of 2,362 in the February 28 - April 8 phase of the war is certainly plausible and perhaps even likely given documentation barriers. The total death toll (civilian + military combined) ranges from 3,375–7,650, depending on sources.

Read the full report on the NIAC website…

The session carried strong symbolic messages. Lawmakers paid tribute to Ali Khamenei and senior military and political figures killed during the war and chanted slogans calling for “revenge.” A portrait of Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran’s new Supreme Leader, was displayed inside the parliament building. The Majles also approved procedural changes allowing future parliamentary sessions to be held virtually or outside the parliament building during emergency conditions, reflecting the security environment that has shaped Iranian politics since the beginning of the conflict.

The confrontational rhetoric was reinforced further when more than 180 members of parliament signed a public pledge declaring that they would “stand in the line of revenge.” The lawmakers vowed to answer the calls of senior clerics and members of the Assembly of Experts who had declared retaliation against those responsible for killing Iran’s leaders to be a religious obligation. They pledged not to neglect “planning or practical measures” and committed themselves to legislation concerning revenge for those killed in the recent war, the exercise of Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, and the creation of effective strategic deterrence against future attacks by the United States and Israel.

The letter also revealed continuing frustration within parliament over its four-and-a-half-month suspension. The signatories argued that the overwhelming majority of lawmakers had opposed the prolonged closure of the Majles and believed that its legislative and oversight functions should have resumed much earlier. They implicitly criticized the delay in reopening parliament and argued that the parliamentary rules should have been amended sooner to allow the institution to continue operating under wartime conditions.

The reopening of parliament comes after months of political controversy. Since the beginning of the war, Israel and the United States successfully targeted numerous senior Iranian military and political leaders, forcing much of the country’s leadership into secure locations and effectively preventing parliament from convening.

During the extended break, lawmakers closely associated with the Paydari Front including Hamid Rasai repeatedly demanded that parliament resume its sessions. They openly accused Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf of deliberately preventing parliament from meeting in order to avoid legislative interference in negotiations with the United States. These same lawmakers consistently opposed diplomacy with Washington and repeatedly called for the resignation of Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, one of the principal architects of Iran’s negotiating strategy. Ghalibaf’s allies, however, maintained that the suspension of parliamentary sessions had been ordered by the country’s security authorities rather than by parliament’s leadership.

The session also entailed the formal introduction of the “Strategic Action for the Security and Sustainable Development of the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf” legislation, a comprehensive maritime security and sovereignty bill governing navigation, access, transit fees, enforcement and Iran’s exercise of jurisdiction in the vital energy waterway. However, this bill should not be interpreted as a victory for the hardline faction. Protecting Iran’s role in securing and managing the Strait of Hormuz has become a matter of broad institutional consensus, supported by officials across the political establishment, including Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, the Supreme National Security Council, and the IRGC. The political differences concern implementation and diplomacy—not the strategic importance of Hormuz itself.

The most significant development occurred not in the parliamentary speeches but in the leadership elections of the Majles National Security and Foreign Policy Committee. In the committee’s internal vote, Seyed Mahmoud Nabavian, who had served as First Vice Chairman during the first two years of the current parliament, and Ebrahim Rezaei, who had served as the committee’s spokesman, were both removed from the committee’s leadership.

Instead, lawmakers elected Ebrahim Azizi as chairman, Abbas Moqtadaei and Amir Hayat-Moqaddam as first and second vice chairmen, Hassan Ghashghavi as spokesman, and Bahnam Saeidi and Yaqub Rezazadeh as the committee’s secretaries. This reshuffle is politically important because Nabavian and Rezaei have been among the parliament’s most vocal opponents of negotiations with the United States and leading representatives of the ideological hardline current. Throughout the parliamentary suspension, they repeatedly criticized Ghalibaf and Araghchi, arguing that parliament should take a much more confrontational position toward diplomacy with Washington.

Their removal from the committee’s leadership represents one of the clearest institutional indicators that the hardline faction has failed to translate its wartime visibility into greater political control. This finding is particularly significant when viewed alongside developments over the past week.During Ali Khamenei’s funeral ceremonies, public messaging appeared to be dominated by calls for revenge and by outspoken hardline figures, creating the impression that radicals were emerging as the dominant force within the Islamic Republic following the leadership transition.

The reopening of parliament presents a different picture. Although revolutionary rhetoric remains highly visible, the institutional balance of power continues to favor the more pragmatic establishment represented by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Masoud Pezeshkian, and Abbas Araghchi. The parliamentary majority did not elevate the leading anti-negotiation figures; instead, it removed two of their most prominent representatives from the leadership of parliament’s most important national security committee.

This suggests that media visibility and political influence should not be confused with institutional authority. Hardline figures continue to shape public discourse and mobilize ideological supporters, but they have not demonstrated that they command the parliamentary support necessary to redirect Iran’s national security or foreign policy.

Taken together, the first parliamentary session after four and a half months of suspension indicates that the post-war political equilibrium remains largely intact. While revolutionary rhetoric continues to serve important symbolic and mobilizational purposes, the governing institutions still appear to be controlled by the more pragmatic coalition that has overseen Iran’s strategic decision-making, diplomacy, and crisis management throughout the conflict. The sidelining of Seyed Mahmoud Nabavian and Ebrahim Rezaei may ultimately prove to be a more meaningful indicator of Iran’s internal political trajectory than the highly publicized rhetoric that dominated Ali Khamenei’s funeral ceremonies.

The latest American attacks were reported across a broad area of southern Iran, including Bandar Abbas, Qeshm, Jask, Sirik, Abu Musa, Abadan, Ahvaz, Mahshahr, Omidiyeh, Behbahan, Dezful, and Shadgan. Iranian provincial authorities reported casualties in several locations. According to officials in Khuzestan, strikes on Abadan killed at least two people and wounded three others, while a projectile that struck an agricultural water-pumping station in Mahshahr killed a guard and injured four people. Earlier attacks on Farur Island near Bandar Lengeh reportedly killed a telecommunications maintenance worker and wounded two colleagues. Iranian officials also reported extensive damage to the country’s electricity network, claiming that more than 4,000 megawatts of generating or transmission capacity had been lost during the broader campaign.

U.S. Central Command said its operations targeted Iranian air-defense systems, coastal radar sites, missile and drone capabilities, military small boats, and facilities associated with attacks on commercial shipping. In one notable development, the United States used unmanned surface vessels in combat for the first time. Three Corsair sea drones reportedly struck a submarine and ship-maintenance facility at the Bandar Abbas naval base. CENTCOM presented the operation as part of an effort to weaken Iran’s ability to attack ships in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran responded by announcing missile and drone attacks against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Oman, and other regional locations. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed that it targeted helicopter maintenance facilities, an aircraft hangar, and a drone command-and-control center at Bahrain’s Sheikh Isa Air Base. It also claimed attacks on fuel storage facilities at Jordan’s Prince Hassan Air Base, a Patriot air-defense system at Kuwait’s Ali Al Salem Air Base, and a strategic radar installation at Ahmed Al Jaber Air Base. Iran’s regular army separately said it had struck American air-defense, missile, shelter, and logistical facilities in Kuwait. These claims have not all been independently verified.

Kuwait’s Defense Ministry confirmed that three locations in northern Kuwait were attacked and that a drone struck an offshore platform belonging to the Kuwait Oil Company, causing material damage and injuring one employee. Bahrain accused Iran of targeting civilians, while Iranian officials insisted that their operations were directed exclusively at U.S. bases and facilities used to attack Iran. Oman summoned the Iranian ambassador after reported drone strikes in Musandam and Al Batinah, describing the incidents as violations of its sovereignty. Tehran, meanwhile, warned regional governments that providing territory, logistical assistance, or military support for U.S. attacks would be regarded as participation in the war and could make the locations from which those attacks were launched legitimate targets.

The immediate center of the confrontation remains the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has announced that passage through the Strait is suspended until further notice because of what it describes as illegal U.S. military activity. Iranian forces have reportedly attacked or threatened vessels attempting to transit without Iranian authorization, including ships using the southern route near Oman. CENTCOM has rejected Iran’s position, declaring that the Strait remains open to lawful international navigation and that U.S. forces are deployed to guarantee freedom of passage.

The practical effect, however, has been a severe reduction in shipping. Marine-tracking data cited in the reports indicated that no commercial vessel publicly transmitting its location had been observed passing through the Strait for a significant period. Kpler data showed that only eight commercial vessels crossed on Sunday, compared with 21 on Saturday and 14 on Friday, while several of those ships reportedly disabled their tracking signals during transit. This suggests that, regardless of competing legal declarations from Washington and Tehran, shipping companies are treating the waterway as an active conflict zone.

President Donald Trump has now announced that the United States is reinstating the naval blockade of Iranian ports. CENTCOM said the renewed blockade would apply to vessels entering or leaving Iranian ports and coastal areas, while ships not violating the blockade would continue to receive U.S. protection in regional waters. The first phase of the blockade had been implemented between April 13 and June 18, during which CENTCOM said American forces disabled several vessels and redirected more than 100 others attempting to trade with Iran.

Trump has also declared that the Strait will remain open “with or without Iran,” described the United States as the “Guardian of the Hormuz Strait,” and proposed charging a fee equal to 20 percent of cargo value for U.S.-provided security. The International Maritime Organization responded that there is no legal basis for imposing a compulsory toll solely for passage through an international strait. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi replied sarcastically that Trump was correct that whoever guarantees secure commercial passage should be compensated, adding that Iran had always been the guardian of the Strait and would remain so, although he suggested that a 20 percent fee was excessive.

The dispute over the Strait appears to have been the immediate cause of the breakdown in negotiations. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said the recent talks in Muscat focused on arrangements under Clause Five of the memorandum, which required Iran to make its best efforts to facilitate safe, cost-free commercial passage for a limited period. Tehran appears to have interpreted that provision as recognizing a central Iranian role in managing maritime passage. Washington, by contrast, has since sought to erode Iran’s role in managing the navigation of the strait, taking steps to set up separate navigation pathways while framing these steps in line with freedom of navigation.

Baghaei accused the United States of dismantling the broader 14-point understanding and pressuring Oman not to accept Iran’s proposed arrangements. Trump offered a very different account, claiming that Iran and the United States had been close to an agreement before Iran attacked a commercial vessel with a drone. He said Iran had been prepared to make major concessions before abruptly reversing course. The conflicting narratives demonstrate that the disagreement is no longer merely about whether ships can pass, but about who has the authority to determine the conditions of passage.

The conflict has also expanded into Yemen. The internationally-recognized Yemeni government said it struck the runway at Sana’a International Airport to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing. The flight was subsequently diverted to Hodeidah. The Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out the attack, declared that the period of de-escalation had ended, and launched ballistic missiles and drones against Abha International Airport in Saudi Arabia. They also warned airlines against operating in Saudi airspace until what they call the blockade of Sana’a Airport is lifted.

This represents one of the most serious escalations between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia since the 2022 truce reduced direct hostilities. There have also been reports of small boats approaching a tanker near Yemen, raising concerns that attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea may resume. The importance of these developments extends beyond Yemen: renewed Houthi operations could place the Bab al-Mandab Strait under pressure at the same time that shipping through Hormuz is already severely disrupted. Previous Houthi threats against Red Sea shipping have demonstrated how rapidly uncertainty in that waterway can affect freight rates, insurance costs, and global energy markets.

Taken together, these developments suggest that Iran may have concluded that it faced a fundamental strategic choice. The first option was to accept the American interpretation of the post-war memorandum, an interpretation generally reflected in Trump’s public statements and subsequent U.S. actions. In Tehran’s view, that would have meant accepting not only an American role in determining the rules of passage through the Strait of Hormuz, but also major changes in the Lebanese ceasefire.

The Lebanon issue should not be reduced to Hezbollah’s operational freedom. From Iran’s perspective, the more consequential concern is that the ceasefire has not produced a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory. Instead, Israel’s continuing presence in parts of southern Lebanon risks turning a temporary military arrangement into the long-term loss or occupation of portions of Lebanese land. At the same time, many predominantly Shiite towns and villages in southern Lebanon have been destroyed or rendered uninhabitable. Accepting such an outcome would mean accepting both the continued Israeli presence and a post-war reality in which large areas of Lebanon’s Shiite south remain devastated, depopulated, or inaccessible to their residents.

The same logic applies to the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has historically regarded the Strait not simply as an international shipping route but as a central source of sovereignty, deterrence, and regional influence. An American declaration that Iran does not control the Strait, combined with a U.S.-enforced blockade of Iranian ports and a proposed American toll on passing cargo, would effectively strip Tehran of one of its most important remaining instruments of leverage. Even if commercial passage continued, Iran would have to accept that the United States—not Iran—was setting and enforcing the security rules.

Iran therefore appears to have been willing to risk the breakdown of the memorandum, and a return to war, before these arrangements became established facts. This does not necessarily mean Tehran expects to defeat the United States militarily. Rather, its decision may be based on the belief that renewed conflict now offers a better opportunity to position Iran for these evolving security arrangements than waiting several months.

Iranian decision-makers may believe the timing of the current breakdown is favorable for several reasons. First, global energy importers may not yet have fully replenished their strategic reserves or adapted their supply networks to another prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz. A renewed disruption now could therefore have a greater and faster effect on oil prices, shipping insurance, and global inflation than a similar disruption after governments and markets have had more time to prepare.

Second, Tehran may calculate that Trump remains particularly vulnerable to rising fuel prices and inflation in advance of the November midterm election. Iran may therefore believe that economic pressure generated by maritime instability can produce results more quickly than military pressure alone. The objective would not necessarily be to sustain a permanent closure of Hormuz, but to demonstrate that the United States cannot impose its interpretation of the agreement without incurring significant costs.

Third, the Houthis’ entry into the confrontation could multiply that pressure. Iran’s effort to break the air blockade of Yemen appears to have led to the renewed outbreak of hostilities. If fighting with Saudi Arabia expands and Houthi forces resume attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, Washington and its partners could face simultaneous disruptions at both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab. Hormuz affects the exit route for much of the Gulf’s oil and liquefied natural gas, while Bab al-Mandab connects the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Pressure on both chokepoints could produce far greater consequences than disruption at either one alone.

Iran may consequently believe that it has a limited window in which military and economic escalation can improve its negotiating position. Its calculation appears to be that Washington will eventually return to negotiations once the cost of securing Hormuz, defending regional bases, protecting Gulf infrastructure, reassuring commercial shipping, and containing a renewed Yemen front becomes sufficiently high.

However, this is an extremely dangerous strategy. It assumes that the United States will respond to higher costs by negotiating rather than expanding its military campaign or withdrawing altogether. It also assumes that Iran can impose meaningful economic pressure before its naval, missile, energy, and command infrastructure is severely degraded. The attacks on southern Iran, the renewed blockade, and the first U.S. combat use of sea drones show that Washington is prepared to employ new capabilities to reduce Iran’s ability to threaten shipping.

The strategy also risks further alienating regional countries. Iranian attacks on American facilities situated inside Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Jordan, Qatar, and other states may be described by Tehran as strikes against the United States, but those governments are increasingly treating them as violations of their own territory and sovereignty. Iran may therefore gain short-term military leverage while losing diplomatic space among neighboring states that could otherwise play a mediating role.

For now, it is impossible to know whether Iran’s analysis is correct. The outcome will depend on whether disruption in Hormuz becomes sustained, whether the Houthis reopen the Red Sea front, whether global energy prices rise enough to affect U.S. political calculations, and whether Washington decides that negotiations are preferable to an expanded war.

What appears clearer is that Iran did not view the emerging post-ceasefire order as a tolerable compromise. Tehran seems to have concluded that accepting Washington’s interpretation would mean acquiescing to a long-term Israeli presence on Lebanese territory, the destruction and possible long-term displacement of Shiite communities in southern Lebanon, and the loss of Iran’s effective control and leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. Faced with that choice, it appears to have selected renewed war in the hope that immediate pressure will produce a more favorable agreement later. Whether that judgment proves strategically successful or disastrously mistaken remains to be seen.

The renewed war was not triggered by a single incident. It emerged from two unresolved crises that remained in place after the agreement: Lebanon and the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, the domestic balance of power inside Iran appears to have shifted in favor of factions that opposed the agreement from the beginning and now argue that Washington and Israel used the ceasefire to consolidate military gains without fulfilling their own commitments.

On Lebanon, Israel attempted to use negotiations with the Lebanese government to avoid a full withdrawal from Lebanese territory as called for in the understanding with Iran and preserve its military freedom of action in the south. From Tehran’s perspective, Israel was trying to redefine the ceasefire so that it would stop large-scale fighting while allowing Israel to maintain occupied positions, conduct military operations, and impose new security arrangements on Lebanon.

This became a broader test of whether the United States and Israel intended to implement the agreement in good faith. Opponents of the deal inside Iran increasingly argued that Israel was using the ceasefire not to end the conflict, but to formalize the results of the war. If Israel could avoid withdrawal from Lebanon while continuing pressure on the Lebanese government, they argued, Washington might attempt to use the same strategy against Iran in the Strait of Hormuz.

The more immediate flashpoint for the breakdown of the ceasefire was the continuing struggle over control of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran interpreted the Islamabad agreement as recognizing a central Iranian role in restoring and managing commercial navigation through the strait. Washington, however, appears to have regarded the agreement as requiring Iran to guarantee unrestricted passage without imposing licensing requirements, fees, or Iranian control over shipping routes.

Oman has proposed reopening both the southern route through Omani waters and the northern route near Iran. Under the reported proposal, the southern route would operate without Iranian permission and largely according to the conditions that existed before the war. From the perspective of Oman and the United States, this arrangement would preserve freedom of navigation and prevent Iran from exercising unilateral control over the waterway.

From Iran’s perspective, however, the proposal amounted to the creation of a parallel route designed to bypass Iranian authority and reduce Tehran’s leverage over the strait. For the Iranian leadership, the ability to regulate or disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz was a significant strategic gain to emerge from the war. If commercial vessels could pass through the southern route under U.S. protection and without following Iranian procedures, Iran’s claim to control the strait would be severely weakened.

In this contested environment, Iran’s reaction was therefore predictable. It attempted to block vessels that used what it described as an unauthorized route by issuing warnings, firing on or intercepting ships, and ultimately announcing the formal closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Following the official closure announcement, commercial traffic through the strait reportedly fell to minimal levels. While the United States continues to insist that the waterway is legally and militarily open, shipping companies have little incentive to test whether passage is genuinely safe while missiles and drones are firing in the area. The practical question is therefore not only whether a route is technically open, but whether commercial operators, insurers, and crews are willing to use it.

In this sense, Iran has once again demonstrated that effective control does not necessarily require physically blocking every vessel. If the threat of attack is sufficient to deter normal commercial traffic, Tehran can impose a de facto closure even while U.S. forces declare that freedom of navigation remains guaranteed.

This has produced two directly contradictory claims. Iran says the strait is closed and that no ship can pass without complying with Iranian arrangements. U.S. Central Command says the strait remains open, that Iran does not control it, and that American forces are deployed to ensure lawful passage.

These claims cannot coexist indefinitely. Every commercial vessel that passes safely under U.S. protection strengthens Washington’s position. Every ship that turns back, is intercepted, or is attacked strengthens Iran’s claim that it controls the waterway. The strait has therefore become not merely a shipping route, but a daily test of military credibility and political authority.

Tensions in the Strait of Hormuz are the proximate cause of the collapse of the memorandum of understanding. President Donald Trump said Iran and the United States had been close to another agreement before Iran suddenly attacked another ship with a drone. While the claims should be taken with a grain of salt, President Trump asserted that Iranian negotiators had been prepared to make major concessions and that the attack came only hours later.

Iran presented a different account. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said the vessel that was fired upon had used an unauthorized route, ignored warnings and shut down its tracking systems. From Tehran’s perspective, the ship was not merely a civilian commercial vessel but part of a U.S.-backed attempt to establish a navigation route outside Iranian control.

The United States responded with a major new wave of strikes. U.S. Central Command has said approximately 140 military targets were struck in one round, and more than 300 targets had been attacked over three nights. The announced targets included missile and drone sites, coastal surveillance systems, ammunition storage facilities, communications networks, and Iranian naval capabilities. Sunday evening, CENTCOM announced that they had “began launching more strikes against Iran to continue degrading their ability to attack civilian mariners and commercial ships freely transiting the Strait of Hormuz. The Commander in Chief has directed the strikes to hold Iranian forces accountable.”

Strikes were reported across Bandar Abbas, Qeshm, Bandar Lengeh, Jask, Sirik, Chabahar, Konarak, Bushehr, Asaluyeh, Dayyer, Kangan, Khuzestan, Kerman, Lorestan, and other areas. Iranian officials reported casualties, including military personnel and civilian infrastructure workers.

Iran responded by expanding the battlefield across the region. The IRGC said it used Qadr, Emad, Kheibar Shekan, Fateh-110, and Zolfaghar ballistic missiles against U.S. targets in the Middle East. These missile types represent a mix of medium-range and short-range systems designed for attacks on fixed military infrastructure, air bases, command centers, radar installations, and logistics facilities.

The IRGC announced that it had targeted Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, describing the strike as part of the second phase of its response. According to the IRGC statement, ballistic missiles struck the base’s aircraft maintenance facilities and command-and-control center. The IRGC also said that it had intercepted and stopped a second vessel in the Strait of Hormuz and warned, using the phrase “fight, and we will fight,” that continued U.S. attacks would produce stronger retaliation.

Iran also claimed that it struck Prince Hassan Air Base in Jordan with ballistic missiles. According to the IRGC, the attack targeted a command-and-control center and hangars used by MQ-9 drones. The Guard said the strike was part of the first stage of its retaliation against the latest American attacks.

There are also unconfirmed open-source claims that a U.S. Navy MQ-4C Triton strategic reconnaissance drone may have been destroyed at the Jordanian base. Some open-source intelligence analysts say the aircraft had previously been based at Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates but was transferred to Jordan because of the vulnerability of bases closer to Iran.

Satellite imagery reportedly shows damage to a drone maintenance hangar at Prince Hassan Air Base, while Sentinel-2 imagery from July 12 showed smoke still visible over the site. Analysts who track the aircraft’s movements say the MQ-4C had been flying almost daily until July 11. They argue that if it does not return to flight operations in the following days, this may indicate that it was damaged or destroyed. However, this remains speculative. While claims concerning the aircraft should be treated as unverified, the potential loss would be significant. The MQ-4C Triton is a long-endurance maritime surveillance aircraft used to monitor large maritime areas and support naval intelligence operations. Its reported value is approximately $240 million. If confirmed, its destruction would represent one of the most important Iranian strikes on a high-value U.S. intelligence asset during the conflict.

Iranian missiles also struck or landed near targets in Kuwait. Reports indicated that three Iranian ballistic missiles landed near Shuwaikh Port in Kuwait City. Kuwaiti authorities separately reported attacks on three facilities in northern Kuwait and a drone strike on an offshore oil installation belonging to the Kuwait Oil Company. Material damage and at least one injury were reported.

Iranian media said the intended targets included U.S. missile units or military positions in Kuwait. However, strikes near a major commercial port and damage to an oil facility increased the risk that the conflict would be viewed not only as an Iran-U.S. confrontation, but as a direct threat to the security and economic infrastructure of Gulf states.

Iran also announced attacks on U.S. radar systems, Patriot batteries, ammunition depots, logistical facilities, and command infrastructure in Bahrain and Oman. In Oman, the IRGC said it struck logistical support facilities for U.S. naval forces and aircraft-carrier refueling infrastructure at Duqm.

The attack on Oman was particularly consequential because Muscat had served as a principal mediator between Iran and the United States. Only hours before the strike, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had been in Oman discussing navigation arrangements for the Strait of Hormuz. Oman condemned the attack, summoned the Iranian ambassador, and described the strikes as irresponsible violations of sovereignty and good-neighborly relations. Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, and other regional governments also condemned Iranian attacks or activated air-defense measures in response to Iranian missiles and drones.

Iran’s strategy appears to be based on the argument that regional states cannot provide bases, ports, radar coverage, logistical support, or transit routes to the United States while remaining insulated from the consequences of war. By expanding its retaliation across multiple states, Tehran is attempting to raise the regional cost of U.S. military operations. But this strategy carries a major political risk. Countries such as Oman and Qatar had previously worked to preserve the ceasefire and maintain diplomatic channels. By striking their territory, Iran risks transforming mediators into adversaries and creating a stronger regional coalition in support of U.S. military action.

The absence of Saudi Arabia from Iran’s publicly announced list of targets is also notable. Iran attacked or claimed to have attacked targets in Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Jordan, and areas connected to the United Arab Emirates, but it did not directly target Saudi Arabia. This may indicate that Tehran is deliberately preserving a political channel with Riyadh or attempting to prevent Saudi Arabia from joining the conflict more directly. Iran may also be distinguishing between countries it believes are actively supporting U.S. operations and those that have remained more cautious.

However, this distinction may not survive a prolonged war. If Saudi Arabia becomes more closely involved in U.S. military operations, maritime security, or regional air defense, pressure inside Iran to broaden the target list could increase.

The return to war also reflects an apparent change in the internal balance of power in Tehran. After the agreement, President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf defended negotiations as a necessary way to end the war and reduce economic pressure.

Following the funeral of Ali Khamenei, however, opponents of the agreement appear to have gained greater influence. Calls for revenge at the funeral; slogans against Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf, and Araghchi; and increasingly hostile criticism on state television suggest that sections of the political and security establishment now view the agreement as an unacceptable concession.

The written message attributed to Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran’s new leader, further intensified this atmosphere. In the message, he pledged that revenge for his father and others killed during the war would “certainly” be carried out. He also warned that those responsible should not expect to die peacefully. This rhetoric is important because it suggests that revenge may now be developing into a central source of political legitimacy for the new leadership. If so, restraint and compromise with the United States could become increasingly difficult to defend inside the Iranian system.

The attacks in the Strait of Hormuz may therefore serve a domestic as well as a strategic function. They allow the new leadership to demonstrate that it has not surrendered, that it will not abandon Iran’s main source of leverage, and that it is willing to impose costs on the United States.

Ghalibaf’s rhetoric has also become notably harder. He has said that the era of one-sided agreements is over, that the United States must pay a price for failing to honor its commitments, and that only those prepared for war are capable of negotiating with Washington. This shift may represent an effort by Ghalibaf to protect himself from criticism over his role in the negotiations. By emphasizing military readiness, he can argue that dialogue was never intended to replace deterrence and that responsibility for the collapse of the agreement lies with the United States.

Araghchi, by contrast, continues to emphasize mutual compliance with the Islamabad memorandum. He has accused Washington of violating the deal through new sanctions and other measures, while arguing that the only viable path remains reciprocal implementation. The difference between these positions may reflect a deeper struggle inside Tehran between officials seeking to salvage the agreement and factions that believe the diplomatic phase has ended.

New U.S. sanctions have strengthened the position of the agreement’s opponents. Washington imposed measures against individuals, exchange houses, and companies accused of financing the IRGC, evading sanctions, and transferring assets for senior Iranian officials. The United States portrayed the sanctions as a response to renewed Iranian attacks on international shipping. Tehran, however, said the sanctions violated U.S. commitments under the memorandum and demonstrated that Washington had no intention of providing meaningful economic relief.

This reinforces the argument made by hardliners: Iran provided immediate concessions, while U.S. promises remained vague, delayed, or reversible. Under this interpretation, the closure of the strait is an attempt to restore leverage that Iran surrendered during the negotiations. Iran’s current strategy appears to be based on a calculated gamble. Tehran may believe that Trump does not want a prolonged regional war, that disruption in the Strait of Hormuz will drive up energy prices, and that pressure on Gulf governments and U.S. military bases will eventually force Washington to moderate its position.

Under this calculation, Iran must demonstrate that the United States cannot simultaneously benefit from the ceasefire, impose new sanctions, establish a shipping route outside Iranian control, and attack Iranian military positions without facing substantial costs. Tehran may expect that a controlled escalation will force the United States back into talks through Qatar, Oman, or Pakistan, potentially producing concessions on sanctions relief or recognition of Iran’s role in the strait. But the gamble could fail. Trump may interpret attacks on commercial vessels, regional bases, and allied states not as bargaining pressure but as a direct challenge to U.S. military credibility. In that case, Washington may expand rather than limit its attacks.

What may come next is extremely difficult to foretell, but the continued evisceration of diplomatic agreements will make any attempt to restore peace extremely difficult. Iran, fresh off new U.S. attacks amid the late Supreme Leader’s funeral ceremonies, will view any U.S. pivot back to diplomacy with even deeper distrust. U.S. hawks will likewise paint Iran’s actions as the predictable irrationality of radicals, even if U.S. actions have helped trigger Iranian retaliation every step of the way.

While the Islamabad agreement may still be salvageable, another declaration of ceasefire is unlikely to be enough. Any durable settlement will have to address the issues that were postponed the first time: Israel’s obligations in Lebanon, the management of the Strait of Hormuz, sanctions relief, freedom of navigation, the role of coastal states, and the use of regional bases by the United States. Without agreements on these underlying disputes, any future ceasefire will remain only a temporary pause before the next round of war.

Born in Mashhad in 1939, Khamenei studied in the seminaries of Mashhad, Qom, and Najaf before emerging as one of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s closest revolutionary allies. Following the 1979 Revolution, he served in several senior positions before becoming Iran’s president in 1981, a position he held throughout most of the Iran-Iraq War. After Khomeini’s death in 1989, he was selected as Supreme Leader and remained Iran’s highest political and religious authority for nearly 37 years, exercising ultimate control over the country’s armed forces, security establishment, judiciary, and the broad direction of domestic and foreign policy.

His leadership shaped nearly every major chapter of contemporary Iranian history, including the expansion of Iran’s regional alliances, the development of its missile and nuclear programs, decades of confrontation and negotiation with the United States, repeated rounds of international sanctions, and successive domestic protest movements. For his supporters, Khamenei represented independence from foreign powers, resistance to U.S. and Israeli pressure, and the preservation of the Islamic Republic through repeated crises. He was also regarded by many of them as the architect of Iran’s military deterrence strategy: a network of missile capabilities, regional alliances, and asymmetric forces that, in their view, enabled Iran to withstand two wars within a single year against some of the world’s most powerful militaries. His critics, by contrast, associate his rule with severe political repression, restrictions on civil liberties, violent crackdowns on protests, economic mismanagement, Iran’s growing international isolation and a decline in living standards for the nation.

His death during the opening hours of the recent U.S.-Israeli military campaign therefore marked not only the end of one of the Middle East’s longest-serving rulers but also the conclusion of a defining era in the history of the Islamic Republic.

The official mourning ceremonies unfolded over nearly a week, beginning in Tehran, continuing through Qom, extending into Najaf and Karbala, and concluding with Khamenei’s burial at the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad. Alongside him, his daughter, granddaughter, daughter-in-law and son-in-law were also laid to rest following their demise in the same attack, reinforcing the government’s portrayal of the strike as a broader national tragedy rather than solely the assassination of a political leader.

Throughout the ceremonies, Iran’s senior civilian and military leadership appeared prominently alongside one another, projecting an image of institutional cohesion following the war. The visible participation of senior political leaders, military commanders and security officials reinforced the government’s message that the state’s core institutions remained functional despite the heavy losses sustained during the conflict. More importantly, only months after a war that many believed could seriously weaken—or even threaten the survival of—the Islamic Republic, the government successfully organized coordinated funeral ceremonies across multiple cities and two countries while maintaining an orderly transfer of authority. Regardless of differing estimates regarding attendance, the funeral itself became a demonstration of the state’s continuing organizational capacity.

One of the most notable features of the ceremonies, however, was the complete absence of Mojtaba Khamenei, who had succeeded his father as Supreme Leader. Although written statements attributed to him were released during the mourning period, he did not make a confirmed public appearance in Tehran, Qom, Najaf, Karbala or Mashhad. Instead, the final funeral prayer was led by Khamenei’s eldest son, Mostafa Khamenei, while his brothers Meysam and Masoud also appeared publicly. No official explanation was offered for Mojtaba’s absence. Reported injuries sustained during the February 28 attack and the continuing risk of assassination both provide plausible explanations for his absence. Nevertheless, the contrast was striking: while the Islamic Republic sought to project continuity through the funeral, the individual who had inherited its highest office remained unseen.

Perhaps the most historically remarkable aspect of the funeral was its Iraqi chapter. During the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War, Ali Khamenei served as Iran’s president while the two neighboring countries fought one of the twentieth century’s longest and bloodiest conventional wars. Four decades later, the same wartime president was received with official honors in Najaf before his coffin was carried through Najaf and Karbala, the holiest cities of Shi’a Islam. The Iraqi government declared a public holiday and senior Iraqi political and religious figures - including representatives associated with Muqtada al-Sadr, Ammar al-Hakim, and other influential Shi’a institutions - joined thousands of mourners in the ceremonies.

Such a scene would have been almost unimaginable during the war and remained difficult to envision even twenty years ago. The funeral illustrated one of the Middle East’s most remarkable geopolitical transformations: the country that had once fought an eight-year war against Iran became the site of one of the largest commemorations of the Iranian leader who had served as president during that conflict. This extraordinary reversal reflected not only the profound political changes that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, but also the deep religious, social, and political ties that have developed between the Shi’a communities of Iran and Iraq.

For Tehran, the Iraqi ceremonies demonstrated that despite the recent war and the loss of its Supreme Leader, Iran’s regional relationships had not collapsed. At the same time, they highlighted Iraq’s continuing role as a bridge between religious solidarity, national interests, and competing regional influences.

The funeral also extended well beyond Iran and Iraq. Symbolic funeral prayers, memorial gatherings, and mourning ceremonies were organized by Shi’a communities and organizations in several countries, particularly Pakistan, where some of the largest overseas commemorations took place. Additional ceremonies were reported in Lebanon, India, Bahrain, Nigeria and other countries with significant Shi’a populations. Although these events differed considerably in scale and political character, together they demonstrated that Khamenei’s death resonated beyond Iran’s borders and was viewed by many participants as an event affecting the broader Shi’a community rather than only the Iranian state.

Khamenei’s assassination also carried an important religious dimension. Although he was first and foremost Iran’s political leader, he was simultaneously regarded by many followers as one of the senior religious authorities of the Shi’a world. Consequently, many Shi’a communities interpreted his killing not simply as the death of a head of state but as a hostile act against one of the leading Shi’a clerics. This perception contributed significantly to the emotional intensity of the funeral, helping explain why Najaf and Karbala occupied such central positions in the mourning ceremonies, and reinforced the Iranian government’s decision to consistently describe Khamenei as a martyr. Through funeral rituals, carefully selected Qur’anic recitations, and ceremonies held in the holiest cities of Shi’a Islam, Iranian officials sought to place his death within a broader historical narrative of sacrifice, oppression, steadfastness, and resistance that occupies a central place in Shi’a collective memory.

The funeral simultaneously conveyed several political messages. Domestically, it was intended to reassure the public that the Islamic Republic’s institutions remained functional despite unprecedented military losses. Regionally, it demonstrated that Iran continued to enjoy meaningful relationships with important political and religious actors across the Middle East. Internationally, it projected defiance toward the United States and Israel while portraying Khamenei’s death as part of a broader struggle against foreign intervention. At the same time, the ceremonies reflected a genuine emotional response among many participants whose motivations combined religious conviction, nationalism, and anger over the foreign military campaign. State organization and authentic public mourning were not mutually exclusive; both were visible throughout the week-long ceremonies.

The funeral concluded in Mashhad, where Khamenei was buried at the Imam Reza Shrine, his birthplace and one of Shi’a Islam’s holiest sites. The final stage of the journey symbolically linked Najaf, Karbala, and Mashhad - three of the most important centers of Shi’a religious life - reinforcing the government’s effort to present Khamenei not merely as an Iranian political leader but as a figure of significance across the wider Shi’a world.

Ultimately, the funeral represented far more than a state ceremony. It became the first major test of Iran’s political order after Ali Khamenei and demonstrated that the Islamic Republic possessed considerably greater institutional resilience than many had anticipated during the war. The government successfully coordinated a complex series of ceremonies across two countries, publicly reunited its senior political and military leadership, and showcased the endurance of its regional and religious networks despite one of the greatest crises in its history.

Yet the funeral also exposed the uncertainties of the new era. Mojtaba Khamenei’s continued absence left important questions unanswered about the exercise of authority under the new leadership and the evolving balance of power among the Supreme Leader’s office, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the clerical establishment, and elected institutions. Iran continues to confront severe economic pressures, domestic political challenges, regional tensions, and an uncertain relationship with the United States and its neighbors.

In that sense, the funeral conveyed two realities simultaneously. It demonstrated that the Islamic Republic survived a conflict that many believed threatened its very existence and retained the capacity to mobilize state institutions, regional partners, and significant public support. At the same time, it marked the beginning of a new and uncertain chapter whose long-term stability will depend not on the symbolism of Ali Khamenei’s funeral, but on whether Iran’s new leadership can successfully navigate the profound domestic and international challenges that lie ahead.

President Donald Trump announced that the United States had agreed to Iran’s request to continue negotiations, but at the same time declared that the ceasefire is over, apparently referring to previous understandings including the Memorandum of Understanding.

Despite this rhetoric, additional developments suggest that neither Washington nor Tehran currently appears eager to return to a full-scale war. Reuters reported that Qatari negotiators are in Tehran, while Pakistan continues to play a central mediating role. According to Reuters and Axios, these diplomatic efforts are being coordinated with the United States and are aimed at reducing tensions and creating conditions for broader negotiations rather than allowing the conflict to escalate further.

On the military front, the pace of hostilities slowed Thursday evening. Reports from Iran indicated limited explosions near Konarak and Choghadak, while U.S. officials stated that no new American strikes were conducted overnight. Some regional media and online sources have speculated that the incidents may have involved assets or facilities linked to Bahrain or Kuwait. However, these claims remain entirely unverified. Neither government has acknowledged involvement, no independent evidence has emerged to support the allegations, and such participation would be inconsistent with the cautious approach both states have publicly maintained throughout the current crisis.

At the same time, there are also unverified reports citing an Iranian security official suggesting that Israel was responsible for the latest strikes. Israel has neither confirmed nor denied involvement, and major international news organizations have not independently verified the claim.

Iran reportedly retaliated by launching missiles toward U.S.-related targets in the region, causing no reported damage or casualties after interceptions by U.S. and regional air defense systems. Although both sides continue to exchange threats, the scale of military operations has been considerably lower than during the previous two nights.

The central strategic question, however, remains the future of the Strait of Hormuz, the proximate trigger for the ongoing escalation. Recent shipping data suggest that maritime traffic is recovering only gradually and remains well below normal levels. 18 commercial vessels reportedly transited the Strait of Hormuz on July 9, compared with 28 on July 8 and 36 on July 7, underscoring that commercial confidence remains fragile despite the reduction in military activity.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) similarly reported that oil flows through the Strait have begun to recover, contributing to an improvement in global oil demand and supply. Nevertheless, exports from Gulf producers remain significantly below pre-war levels, indicating that energy markets continue to price in substantial geopolitical risk.

Iran, meanwhile, continues to present itself as the principal guarantor of security in the Strait. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stated that shipping capacity has recovered to approximately 50 percent of pre-war levels, while emphasizing that vessels are increasingly transiting through routes designated by Iran after receiving authorization from the IRGC Navy. The statement also warned that any foreign attempt to dictate navigation routes would disrupt the gradual reopening process and could trigger further confrontation.

These developments highlight what is now the most important unresolved issue of the crisis: whether Iran will be able to maintain effective operational control over security conditions in the Strait of Hormuz after sustaining significant U.S. military strikes, or whether continued American military pressure will fundamentally reshape the balance of power in one of the world’s most strategically important maritime chokepoints.

Closely related is another unresolved question: whether Iran will resume attacks against commercial shipping. Since the large-scale U.S. strikes earlier this week, no independently confirmed attacks against merchant vessels have been reported. Nevertheless, shipping companies continue to operate cautiously, insurance premiums remain elevated, and vessel traffic remains well below normal levels. The absence of new attacks should therefore not be interpreted as evidence that the maritime crisis has been resolved.

Another notable development is President Trump’s growing emphasis on personal security threats. During funeral ceremonies for Ali Khamenei, chants calling for revenge against Trump attracted considerable attention inside and outside Iran. At the same time, The Wall Street Journal reported that Israel had shared intelligence with Washington concerning an alleged new Iranian plot targeting the U.S. president. Although these reports have not been publicly substantiated, they appear to have reinforced Trump’s harder line on Iran, with the President commenting publicly on the apparent assassination threats and noting that if anything happens to him, Iran will be bombed harder than ever before.

Inside Iran, officials continue to emphasize deterrence rather than compromise. Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr warned that any attacks on Iranian infrastructure would be met with reciprocal retaliation, while Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reiterated to Pakistan’s Army Chief that Iran remains prepared to defend itself if U.S. attacks continue. The IRGC likewise warned that further American military action could place U.S. bases throughout the region at risk.

Taken together, these developments suggest that the military confrontation may be entering a lower-intensity phase without producing a political settlement. Active diplomacy continues, military exchanges have become more limited, and neither side currently appears to seek a return to unrestricted war. Yet none of the underlying disputes that drove the latest escalation have been resolved. The future security architecture of the Strait of Hormuz, freedom of navigation, Iran’s ability to preserve its influence over the waterway, the credibility of U.S. deterrence, and the durability of ongoing negotiations all remain uncertain. For now, the decline in violence appears to represent a tactical pause rather than a strategic resolution, and the Strait of Hormuz remains the single most important indicator of whether the crisis moves back toward diplomacy or returns to military escalation.

According to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), American forces conducted two waves of strikes over two nights, targeting approximately 170 military sites across Iran. The targets reportedly included air defense systems, coastal surveillance equipment, missile and drone storage facilities, naval assets, military logistics infrastructure, and more than sixty Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fast attack boats positioned along Iran’s southern coastline. Washington stated that the operations were carried out in response to attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and were intended to further degrade Iran’s ability to threaten international maritime traffic and civilian vessels.

Iranian officials, however, argued that the campaign extended well beyond military objectives. In addition to attacks reported near Bandar Abbas, Chabahar, Bushehr, Ahvaz, Qeshm, Kharg Island, Abu Musa, Sirik, and Iranshahr, Iranian authorities accused the United States of striking civilian and dual-use infrastructure, including commercial port facilities, airport infrastructure, and railway networks. Iran’s Ministry of Health reported 14 fatalities and 78 injuries over two days of U.S. attacks, while provincial officials announced additional casualties in Sirik, Ahvaz, and Iranshahr. Tehran condemned the strikes as war crimes, arguing that they violated both the United Nations Charter and the Memorandum of Understanding that had served as the basis for ending the previous phase of hostilities.

One of the most strategically significant developments was the apparent expansion of U.S. targeting to include Iran’s railway infrastructure. Iranian authorities reported that a U.S. cruise missile struck the Aq-Takkeh Khan railway bridge in Golestan Province, damaging part of the rail corridor linking Iran with Turkmenistan and onward to Russia and Central Asia. Additional railway infrastructure near Kashmar in Razavi Khorasan Province was also reportedly hit, disrupting traffic along the important Tehran–Mashhad railway corridor.

The attack on the Aq-Takkeh Khan railway bridge may be particularly consequential. Located only about 40 kilometers from the Turkmenistan border, the railway has reportedly become, since late 2025, an increasingly important corridor for freight traffic and petrochemical exports between Iran and Russia, while also serving as a key component of Iran’s expanding eastward trade links with Central Asia.

Seen in this context, the strikes appear intended to send a broader strategic message. By targeting transportation infrastructure connected to Iran’s northern trade corridors, Washington may be signaling that the Strait of Hormuz is not the only strategic chokepoint in this confrontation. If Tehran seeks to leverage the Strait of Hormuz to pressure global energy markets, the United States can in turn threaten Iran’s alternative trade and logistics routes linking it to Russia, Turkmenistan, and the wider Eurasian region. Whether or not this was the primary objective, the strikes suggest that Washington is attempting to demonstrate that it possesses escalation options beyond the Persian Gulf and will not easily tolerate prolonged disruption of one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.

Iran responded by broadening its retaliation against U.S. military assets across the region. Iranian military statements claimed missile and drone attacks against U.S.-linked facilities in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Jordan, including Patriot missile batteries, fuel depots, satellite and early-warning infrastructure, and major American military installations. Regional governments confirmed multiple interceptions of missiles and drones, while Bahrain activated nationwide warning sirens, Kuwait announced the interception of four missiles and ten drones, and Jordan declared a heightened state of military readiness after intercepting projectiles crossing its airspace.

Equally notable is the pattern of countries that have not been targeted. Despite repeated attacks against U.S. facilities in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Jordan, the United Arab Emirates has remained largely untouched, even though it hosts significant American military assets and would ordinarily be viewed as a likely target in a wider regional confrontation. This continued restraint strengthens speculation that some form of tacit understanding, deconfliction mechanism, or quiet political arrangement may exist between Tehran and Abu Dhabi. While no public evidence confirms such an agreement, Iran’s selective targeting indicates that its retaliation remains carefully calibrated rather than indiscriminate. The UAE’s gradual rapprochement with Iran after the war may have created channels that both sides see value in preserving, even amid escalating conflict elsewhere in the region. It remains unclear whether this dynamic will last if the conflict continues.

Shipping data and industry reports indicated that tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz nearly came to a standstill, with only a handful of vessels reportedly transiting the waterway while many commercial ships disabled public tracking systems because of security concerns. The IRGC Navy simultaneously declared that it remained responsible for managing security in the Strait and warned that further U.S. military intervention would disrupt the gradual reopening of maritime traffic. Whether the Strait is formally closed or simply considered too dangerous for normal navigation, the practical effect has been the same: insurers, shipping companies, and global energy markets increasingly regard one of the world’s most important energy corridors as an active conflict zone. Oil prices responded immediately, with Brent crude rising toward $80 per barrel, reflecting renewed concerns over disruptions to global energy supplies.

President Donald Trump has attempted to frame the military campaign in a way that limits perceptions of a broader war. Despite authorizing one of the largest U.S. strike operations against Iran, he insisted that the confrontation “is not a war,” but rather an effort to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons while repeating his assertion that his administration has ended multiple wars. At the same time, Trump claimed that Iranian officials had recently contacted Washington and were “very eager” to reach an agreement, while questioning whether they could ultimately be trusted to honor one.

Taken together, Trump’s messaging appears carefully calibrated to pursue two objectives simultaneously. First, by portraying the conflict as a limited military operation rather than an open-ended war, the administration is likely seeking to reassure financial markets, regional allies, and energy traders that the United States does not intend to become entangled in another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict. Such messaging is particularly important at a moment when uncertainty surrounding the Strait of Hormuz has immediate consequences for global energy prices and financial stability. Second, Trump’s repeated references to Iran’s willingness to negotiate suggest that Washington deliberately wishes to keep diplomatic options alive even while dramatically increasing military pressure. This reflects a strategy of using military escalation to strengthen bargaining leverage rather than end the diplomatic track altogether.

Iranian officials have responded by sharply condemning both the military operations and Trump’s rhetoric. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi rejected Trump’s language, while senior Iranian officials argued that the President’s remarks had effectively narrowed the political space for renewed negotiations.

Structurally, both sides are incentivized to keep the possibility of negotiations alive. Iran continues to face severe economic pressures that cannot be truly resolved without sanctions relief, while the United States has significant reasons to avoid a prolonged regional conflict that could destabilize global energy markets amid shortages, threaten key regional partners, and require a sustained military commitment. Yet, this logic has not meant that the parties can sustain any pivot toward peace, with repeated breaches of commitments to abstain from military action.

The latest escalation demonstrates that the confrontation has evolved well beyond disputes over Iran’s nuclear program or isolated incidents involving commercial shipping. The United States appears to be signaling that if Iran threatens global maritime commerce through the Strait of Hormuz, Washington is prepared to impose costs on Iran’s broader strategic infrastructure, including transportation corridors connecting the country to Russia and Central Asia. Iran, for its part, has demonstrated both an ability to expand retaliation across multiple regional theaters and a willingness to exercise selective restraint toward certain regional actors, most notably the United Arab Emirates.

Once again, military escalation and diplomatic signaling are occurring simultaneously. For now, both Washington and Tehran are attempting to improve their negotiating positions through the use of force while avoiding actions that would make diplomacy politically impossible. Whether this strategy succeeds will depend largely on whether continued retaliation overtakes the remaining incentives for restraint and whether regional mediators - including Pakistan, Qatar, Oman, and other Gulf states - can preserve channels for dialogue before the crisis evolves into a broader regional war. Although the ceasefire framework is now under extraordinary strain, the continued signaling from both capitals suggests that it has not yet become entirely irreparable.

The immediate crisis began after three commercial vessels were reportedly attacked while transiting or approaching the Strait of Hormuz. According to maritime monitoring organizations and regional governments, the vessels included the Qatari LNG carrier Al Rekayyat, the Saudi tanker Wadiyan, and the Liberian-flagged tanker Cyprus Prosperity. Qatar and Saudi Arabia publicly attributed the attacks to Iran, while Tehran has denied responsibility. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) condemned the attacks, warning that thousands of civilian seafarers remain exposed to growing risks in one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors and calling for maximum restraint to protect international navigation.

The attacks have had an immediate impact on global shipping. Commercial tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has fallen sharply as shipping companies reassess security risks. According to shipping analytics cited by international media, only a handful of tankers transited the Strait during the day, reflecting a dramatic slowdown in commercial traffic. While navigation has not completely stopped, the decline illustrates the growing reluctance of commercial operators to enter an increasingly volatile maritime environment.

Late Tuesday, the United States canceled a waiver allowing Iran to sell oil openly and launched one of its largest military operations against Iran since the ceasefire was announced. CENTCOM stated that American forces struck more than 80 military targets across southern Iran, including air-defense systems, command-and-control facilities, coastal radar installations, anti-ship missile sites, and dozens of IRGC fast attack boats positioned around the Strait of Hormuz. According to CENTCOM, the operation was intended to reduce Iran’s ability to threaten commercial shipping following what Washington described as attacks on international vessels. President Donald Trump later said that U.S. forces had destroyed 28 Iranian boats during the operation and warned that additional strikes could follow, although that specific figure has not been independently verified.

Iranian media simultaneously reported numerous explosions across Bandar Abbas, Sirik, Qeshm, Bushehr, and Mahshahr. Tasnim News Agency reported multiple explosions around Sirik, while IRNA confirmed repeated explosions in Bandar Abbas, Qeshm, and surrounding coastal areas. Iran’s Army later announced that eight members of its Air Force and Navy were killed during the strikes in Bandar Abbas and Bushehr, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) separately confirmed the death of one of its personnel near Mahshahr.

The revocation of the temporary sanctions waiver that had allowed Iran to resume limited oil exports under the memorandum of understanding is arguably just as consequential. The waiver had temporarily permitted Iran to export crude oil, petroleum products, and petrochemicals while repatriating foreign currency revenues through the Central Bank of Iran. Although originally expected to remain in place for two months, the U.S. Treasury shortened the arrangement following the attacks on commercial shipping, while allowing transactions already underway to conclude by July 17. U.S. officials described the agreement as performance-based, arguing that Iran would benefit economically only if it complied with its commitments and refrained from threatening international navigation.

Tehran strongly rejected Washington’s narrative, arguing that the United States - not Iran - had repeatedly violated the memorandum before the latest military exchanges. Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi argued that revoking the temporary oil-export waiver constituted a “flagrant violation” of Article 10 of the agreement, while the U.S. military strikes represented serious violations of Articles 1 and 2. He further asserted that continued Israeli military operations in Lebanon, supported by Washington, together with repeated American threats against Iran, had already breached the agreement several times during the preceding weeks. Iran’s Foreign Ministry similarly condemned the restoration of oil sanctions as evidence of “bad faith, instability, and the unreliability of the U.S. government,” warning that Washington would bear responsibility for the consequences of repeatedly violating the memorandum.

Parliament Speaker and Iran’s lead negotiator Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf delivered one of Tehran’s strongest political responses, declaring that “the era of bullying and extortion is over” and insisting that “we do not back down, and we do not retreat.” Qalibaf - who has been criticized by some hardliners for his role in brokering the agreement - argued that the United States had violated the memorandum by interfering with Iran’s maritime arrangements in the Strait of Hormuz, restoring oil sanctions, launching military strikes against southern Iran, and allowing continued Israeli military operations in Lebanon. According to Qalibaf, these actions demonstrated that Washington expected Iran to continue implementing the agreement while abandoning its own obligations. He therefore portrayed Iran’s military actions as responses to repeated American violations rather than the initial escalation.

President Masoud Pezeshkian echoed this position. In a statement posted on X, he accused the United States of continuing its longstanding policy of “breaking the rules, bullying competitors, creating obstacles, and cheating,” adding that Iran “will not accept such behavior and will firmly defend its rights.” His statement framed Iran’s military response as an act of national self-defense rather than an attempt to widen the conflict.

The dispute over the Strait of Hormuz has become the central issue underlying the renewed confrontation. Iranian officials argue that the memorandum recognized Tehran’s authority to manage future navigation arrangements through the Strait and maintain maritime safety. According to Iran, commercial vessels should use the Iranian-designated shipping corridor, while ships using alternative routes near Oman or disabling or manipulating their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders create navigational hazards and undermine agreed maritime arrangements. After Oman discussed establishing a temporary alternative shipping corridor, seemingly at the behest of Washington, Iranian officials warned that only the Iranian-designated route should be considered safe, indicating that vessels ignoring those arrangements could face enforcement measures.

As tensions escalated further, Iranian officials and state media issued increasingly forceful warnings regarding Tehran’s future response. Iranian media, citing informed security sources, reported that Iran had adopted a new military doctrine under which any future U.S. strike would immediately trigger the complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz and retaliation against at least two enemy targets for every Iranian target struck. Iranian military officials also warned that any country assisting future U.S. military operations against Iran could itself become a legitimate military target. Separately, Ebrahim Rezaei, spokesperson for the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said that withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and reconsidering Iran’s nuclear doctrine could be considered if Iran faced what officials described as an existential threat following another U.S. attack. He added that Iran would respond to any renewed U.S. military action “with all its capabilities.”

Iran subsequently announced missile and drone strikes against 85 U.S.-related military targets in Bahrain and Kuwait Tuesday evening, including facilities associated with the U.S. Fifth Fleet, Port Salman, and Ali Al Salem Air Base. Kuwait reported intercepting ballistic missiles and drones, while Bahrain activated air-raid warning systems. Iran also claimed to have shot down an American MQ-9 Reaper drone, although the full extent of damage remains unconfirmed.

President Donald Trump delivered mixed signals about the future of the conflict. Speaking earlier today, President Trump warned that the United States was prepared to conduct additional strikes against Iran if necessary and stating that he no longer wished to negotiate with Tehran, he also said he did not expect the war to resume on a prolonged basis, telling reporters that “I don’t think the war is going to start again” and that “whatever happens will happen very quickly.” At the same time, U.S. officials indicated that additional military operations against Iranian targets remain under consideration should hostilities continue.

The confrontation has also strained relations between Iran and several Gulf states. Qatar summoned Iran’s chargé d’affaires and delivered a formal diplomatic protest after its LNG carrier was targeted, describing the incident as a serious violation of international maritime safety, a direct threat to global energy security, and a clear breach of international law. Saudi Arabia similarly condemned the reported attack on its tanker. Iran responded by urging Qatar not to take actions inconsistent with the memorandum while insisting that Tehran remained committed to ensuring maritime safety under navigation arrangements coordinated with Iran.

Financial markets reacted immediately to the renewed conflict. Brent crude oil prices rose by more than 5 percent, while major U.S. stock indexes declined and European markets experienced sharp losses. Because roughly one-fifth of global oil and LNG trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, even limited disruptions immediately affect global energy prices, shipping costs, insurance premiums, and financial markets.

The latest escalation has placed the ceasefire framework under extraordinary pressure, but it has not necessarily eliminated the possibility of diplomacy. Washington and Tehran continue to accuse one another of violating the memorandum, yet both also frame their military and economic actions as responses to the other side’s alleged breaches, rather than formally withdrawing from the agreement itself. Meanwhile, regional mediators—including Qatar and other countries involved in facilitating the original understanding—continue efforts to prevent the current crisis from evolving into a sustained regional war. Whether the ceasefire can ultimately survive will likely depend on whether both sides choose continued military escalation or return to negotiations in the days ahead. For now, protecting civilian shipping, preserving freedom of navigation, avoiding direct confrontation between U.S. and Iranian forces, and sustaining diplomatic engagement remain essential to preventing a wider and potentially far more destructive regional conflict.

According to U.S. officials, Iran fired at least two missiles toward commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz on Monday and a third on Tuesday morning, causing significant damage to the vessels but without casualties. UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that one of the vessels was struck east of Lima, Oman, on its port side by an unidentified projectile, causing a fire.

Reuters later reported that one of the damaged vessels was a Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG) carrier. According to three informed sources, the crew was evacuated after the ship transmitted a distress signal following the strike. Reuters also reported that the vessel had suffered significant damage and was at risk of explosion, raising the stakes of the incident far beyond a routine maritime security episode. It marked the first reported attack on a Qatari LNG carrier since the start of the U.S.-Israel-Iran war. Qatar, alongside Oman and Pakistan, has played an important intermediary role in communications between Tehran and Washington and sent senior officials to participate in the funeral ceremony for the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The diplomatic fallout was immediate. Qatar condemned the attack on its LNG carrier and formally held Iran legally responsible. Majed Al Ansari, spokesperson for Qatar’s Foreign Ministry, described the targeting of the Qatari vessel as “an unacceptable attack on the safety and security of international navigation” and said Doha considers Iran fully legally responsible for the attack and for any damages or consequences arising from it. Tehran had not publicly responded to Qatar’s accusation at the time of writing. Reuters also reported that a Saudi tanker was damaged off the coast of Oman, although the exact circumstances remain under investigation.

The U.S. has subsequently moved to revoke the general license allowing Iran to sell oil and petroleum-based products. According to a senior U.S. official, “As President Trump and the administration have repeatedly affirmed, the MOU in effect with Iran is entirely performance-based. Iran will only reap benefits if they exhibit good behavior. Iran’s actions in the Strait were wholly unacceptable to the United States and will be met with consequences. Our negotiators continue to work in good faith towards a final deal.” Yet, this is a highly consequential move and may trigger further Iranian retaliation, particularly given past American steps to renege on sanctions relief obligations in past agreements.

The attacks occurred amid a deepening dispute over who has the authority to regulate maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran insists that vessels should use the navigation corridor designated by Tehran, while a separate southern route closer to Omani waters is supported by Washington and some international shipping interests. Tehran views that southern corridor as a red line, arguing that it violates the “Iranian arrangements” it believes are embedded in the June 18 Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding.

This dispute reflects a broader clash over the interpretation of the MOU. Iran’s interpretation is that the memorandum effectively recognizes Tehran’s central role in controlling and managing security arrangements in the Strait of Hormuz. In this reading, the lifting of the U.S.-backed maritime blockade and the regulation of shipping lanes must occur within an Iranian-defined framework. By contrast, Oman’s initiative, supported by the United States, appears to seek a more internationalized or alternative navigation arrangement that reduces reliance on Iranian-designated routes. This has turned the southern route near Oman into one of Tehran’s clearest postwar red lines.

Reflecting that position, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, a member of Iran’s parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, warned that “any action in the Strait of Hormuz without coordination with Iran is doomed to fail.” He added that decisions regarding a change in the governing regime of the Strait had been made at the “highest levels of the system” and would be implemented. Boroujerdi also said Iran’s Parliament is pursuing legislation on the “management of the Strait of Hormuz,” signaling an attempt to formalize Iran’s claim to a more direct role in regulating passage through the waterway.

The maritime crisis has also intersected with escalating political threats. Before the latest attack, President Donald Trump warned that the United States would either reach an agreement with Iran or “finish the job,” while threatening that U.S. forces could target Iran’s bridges, power grid, and other critical infrastructure if diplomacy fails. Although these remarks preceded the attack on the Qatari LNG carrier, they contributed to the coercive atmosphere surrounding the negotiations.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi responded by saying that final negotiations cannot begin as long as threats against Iran continue. Referring to Article 13 of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, Araghchi said the provision is clear: final-status talks will not begin while Iran remains under threat. He called on Washington to honor its signature and said neither the Iranian people nor Iran’s armed forces are intimidated by threats.

This creates a dangerous diplomatic and military test. Iran is certain to respond to the revocation of its sanctions relief, while the U.S. may contemplate further steps including military strikes on Iranian soil. A vicious cycle could easily take hold that threatens the MOU as a whole.

The conflict is no longer simply about whether ships can pass through the Strait, but about sovereignty, maritime governance, and Iran’s desire to preserve the Strait of Hormuz as one of its most important bargaining chips in negotiations with Washington. Oman’s southern corridor initiative, therefore, has become more than a technical navigation proposal; it has become a challenge to Iran’s leverage.

The attacks have already begun affecting global energy markets. Oil prices rose more than 2%, tanker freight rates climbed, and commercial shipping companies began reassessing transit through the Strait as concerns over maritime security intensified.

The crisis now combines threats to global energy security, competing interpretations of the June 18 MOU, regional diplomatic fallout with Qatar, and uncertainty over whether Iran or the United States will respond militarily. Without urgent deconfliction, clearer maritime rules, and a renewed diplomatic channel, conflict in the Strait Hormuz could quickly transform a fragile postwar arrangement into a broader regional crisis.

Earlier this year, international attention returned to Parsipur’s literary legacy when the English translation of her celebrated novel Women Without Men was included on the longlist for the 2026 International Booker Prize. The recognition served as a reminder that although Parsipur spent much of her life marginalized by political authorities in Iran, her work ultimately transcended national boundaries and became part of the global literary canon.

Born in Tehran in February 1946 and raised partly in Khorramshahr, Parsipur grew up in a household where books and intellectual curiosity occupied a central place. She later recalled that from adolescence onward, writing became the defining purpose of her life. Her literary talent emerged early, with her first published short story appearing while she was still a teenager.

After moving to Tehran for higher education, Parsipur studied social sciences while pursuing an increasingly serious literary career. She briefly married acclaimed filmmaker Nasser Taghvai, but later reflected that neither of them was suited for conventional family life. The marriage ended after several years, and Parsipur devoted herself almost entirely to literature and intellectual work.

Long before the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Parsipur had already demonstrated a willingness to challenge political authority. In 1974, following the execution of dissident intellectuals Khosrow Golsorkhi and Keramat Daneshian, she resigned from her position at Iran’s national television organization in protest against arbitrary arrests and executions. Although she rejected ideological labels and did not align herself with organized political movements, she believed that defending individual liberty and human dignity was a personal responsibility.

Her commitment to independent thought came at a significant personal cost. During the final years of the Pahlavi monarchy, she was detained by the security services and imprisoned for 54 days without formal charges or trial. Although she was eventually released, the experience profoundly shaped her understanding of political repression and state power.

Following a period of depression and economic hardship, Parsipur traveled to France to continue her studies. Before leaving Iran, however, she completed her novel The Dog and the Long Winter, one of the earliest major novels written by an Iranian woman in the modern era. The work explored the social and emotional realities of middle-class Iranian life and helped establish Parsipur as an important literary figure.

During the revolutionary upheavals of 1978 and 1979, Parsipur remained skeptical of political absolutism and collective certainty. Even while interviewing revolutionary figures in France, she maintained a critical distance from political movements and insisted on preserving individual moral judgment. Nevertheless, she decided to return to Iran after the revolution, believing that a writer’s identity could only fully emerge within her own society and language.

That decision would dramatically alter the course of her life. In the early years of the Islamic Republic, amid widespread political repression, Parsipur was arrested and imprisoned for more than four years. The psychological effects of imprisonment remained with her throughout her life, but the experience also became an important source of literary inspiration.

One of the works that emerged from this period was Touba and the Meaning of Night, widely regarded as one of the masterpieces of modern Persian literature. Drawing partly on the life of her grandmother, the novel traced the experiences of an Iranian woman across decades of political and social transformation. Upon publication, the novel achieved extraordinary popularity and established Parsipur as one of Iran’s most significant contemporary writers.

Her international reputation, however, rests most prominently on Women Without Men, a novel that combined magical realism, social criticism, and feminist themes to explore the lives of five Iranian women confronting various forms of oppression and exclusion. Through its rich symbolism and innovative narrative structure, the novel challenged conventional understandings of gender, sexuality, and power in Iranian society.

The book’s success also triggered one of the most difficult periods of Parsipur’s life. Religious conservatives launched a coordinated campaign against both the novel and its author. The book was banned, publishers abandoned her work, and Parsipur was arrested once again. Eventually, she was effectively barred from publishing in Iran. Previously published books were censored, altered, or withdrawn from circulation altogether, forcing her into a second and ultimately permanent exile.

After emigrating to the United States, Parsipur continued writing despite financial hardship and personal struggles. In exile, she remained intellectually active through literature, translation, radio programs, podcasts, and her support for younger generations of Iranian writers and artists. Although she lived thousands of miles from Iran, she never ceased to engage with Iranian society, culture, and politics.

Throughout her years abroad, Parsipur repeatedly expressed a desire to return to Iran but concluded that economic realities, health concerns, and the country’s restrictive social environment made such a return impossible. Her reflections on exile often combined personal sorrow with broader observations about the social and economic difficulties faced by ordinary Iranians.

Parsipur’s literary legacy reached a new international audience in 2009, when Iranian-American artist and filmmaker Shirin Neshat adapted Women Without Men into an acclaimed feature film. The film, which included an appearance by Parsipur herself, won the Silver Lion for Best Director at the Venice Film Festival and introduced her work to audiences around the world.

One of Parsipur’s final public interventions reflected the same independent spirit that had characterized her entire life. In a video statement released during the recent military conflict involving Iran, she strongly opposed foreign military intervention, arguing that freedom could not be imposed from outside. She declared:

“How can a people become free through the attack of two countries on another country? I strongly oppose this attack. I am deeply angered that the people of Iran are being killed in the streets and under the rain of missiles. I do not believe this will help Iran. I call upon the United States and Israel to stop attacking Iran. Freedom cannot be given to Iran from outside. The people of Iran themselves must win their own freedom.”

Shahrnush Parsipur spent her life resisting easy categorizations and refusing political patronage. She was imprisoned under both monarchy and republic, censored by both secular and religious authorities, and lived much of her life in exile. Yet through literature and through the example of her own life, she remained steadfast in defending the values of freedom, dignity, and intellectual independence that defined her extraordinary legacy.

The National Iranian American Council (NIAC) mourns the passing of Shahrnush Parsipur, whose life and work embodied the enduring struggle for freedom of expression, intellectual independence, and human dignity. Parsipur’s extraordinary literary contributions helped shape not only modern Iranian literature, but also the cultural and political consciousness of generations of Iranians and Iranian Americans. Her unwavering commitment to speaking truth to power—whether confronting authoritarianism, censorship, or war—will remain an inspiration to all who believe in justice and freedom. We extend our deepest condolences to her family, friends, colleagues, readers, and admirers around the world, as well as to the broader Iranian-American community, which proudly embraced her as one of its most distinguished cultural voices. Her words, courage, and humanity will continue to resonate long after her passing.

The flight was historic not simply because it was a direct connection between Iran and Houthi-controlled Yemen, but because it appears to have been the first publicly acknowledged international flight into Sana’a outside the Saudi-led coalition’s framework since the coalition intervention began in 2015. Its significance therefore extends well beyond aviation or humanitarian access and touches directly on questions of sovereignty, regional influence, deterrence, and the emerging security order in the Middle East.

From the perspective of the Houthis (Ansar Allah) and Iran, the flight represents an effort to challenge what they describe as a long-standing blockade that has isolated millions of Yemenis living in Houthi-controlled territories. The Sana’a airport was also heavily bombed by Israel amid regional tensions in May 2025, further diminishing air-related transport and travel.

Houthi officials stated that the aircraft transported patients, wounded civilians, and stranded Yemenis and characterized Saudi efforts to prevent the landing as a continuation of policies that have contributed to Yemen’s humanitarian crisis. They have argued that reopening regular flights between Sana’a and Tehran is both a humanitarian necessity and an assertion of their political legitimacy as the de facto governing authority over much of northern and western Yemen.

For Tehran, the operation also carries broader strategic significance. Since the recent regional war, Iran has sought to demonstrate that the “Axis of Resistance” remains operational and capable of maintaining strategic depth across the region. Reestablishing direct access to Sana’a would strengthen Iran’s ties with one of its most important regional partners while signaling that Tehran remains capable of projecting influence despite years of sanctions, military pressure, and diplomatic isolation. From this perspective, the flight was not merely a logistical operation but also a political statement about Iran’s continuing regional role.

At the same time, the internationally recognized Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia view the same development through a fundamentally different strategic lens. Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council convened an emergency meeting immediately after the flight and condemned it as a violation of Yemeni sovereignty, arguing that only the internationally-recognized government possesses the legal authority to regulate the country’s airspace and international transportation links. Saudi-backed Yemeni officials further alleged that the flight may have transported Iranian advisers and personnel, although independent confirmation of these claims remains unavailable.

For Saudi Arabia, the issue extends beyond Yemen itself. Since launching its intervention in 2015, Riyadh has viewed limiting Iranian influence on the Arabian Peninsula as a central national security objective. The prospect of regular direct flights between Iran and Houthi-controlled Yemen raises concerns in Riyadh that Tehran could establish a more permanent logistical, political, or military presence near Saudi Arabia’s southern border and adjacent to the strategically vital Red Sea corridor. Saudi officials and coalition representatives therefore see the flight not as an isolated humanitarian initiative but as a potential challenge to the regional security architecture that has existed for more than a decade.

The strategic importance of the issue is amplified by geography. The Houthis control Sana’a, the port of Hodeidah, and much of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline, placing them near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. For Iran and its allies, maintaining influence in Yemen provides strategic leverage over a second critical international shipping route. For Saudi Arabia, Gulf states, Israel, and the United States, preventing any single adversarial power from consolidating control over these corridors remains a core security objective.

The timing of the flight also carries symbolic significance. It occurred on the same day that Saudi representatives traveled to Tehran to participate in funeral ceremonies for former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, highlighting the complex reality of contemporary Middle Eastern diplomacy: regional rivals are simultaneously pursuing diplomatic engagement and strategic competition.

The immediate danger is that both sides may interpret restraint as weakness. The Houthis have warned that future attempts to prevent flights into Sana’a could result in attacks on Saudi airports and critical infrastructure, while the Saudi-led coalition has threatened to respond with “unprecedented force” to any threats against Saudi territory or Yemeni sovereignty. Such mutual deterrence dynamics have repeatedly escalated into broader conflicts throughout the region.

From a policy perspective, the challenge is not simply determining which side’s legal or political claims are stronger, but preventing Yemen from becoming the catalyst for another regional confrontation. A sustainable approach would likely require acknowledging the legitimate interests and concerns of all parties: humanitarian access and political recognition concerns raised by the Houthis and Iran; sovereignty and security concerns raised by the internationally-recognized Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia; and broader international concerns regarding regional stability and maritime security.

One potential path forward could involve internationally monitored civilian air corridors into Sana’a, including independent inspections of passengers and cargo, transparent reporting mechanisms, and renewed diplomatic engagement on a broader political settlement in Yemen. Such arrangements would not resolve the underlying political conflict, but they could reduce the risk that disputes over access, sovereignty, and influence trigger another cycle of regional escalation.

Ultimately, the dispute over a single flight between Tehran and Sana’a reflects a larger question confronting the Middle East after the recent war: whether the region’s emerging order will be shaped primarily through competition and deterrence, or through negotiated arrangements that accommodate the core security interests of rival regional powers. The answer to that question may determine not only the future of Yemen, but the trajectory of the broader Middle East for years to come.

In Tehran, the main procession began at the Mosalla and was planned to continue for more than 10 hours along a roughly 10-kilometer route to Azadi Square. Authorities imposed extensive traffic restrictions in Tehran, Qom, and Mashhad, while state media emphasized images of vast crowds, red flags, and chants calling for “revenge” against the United States and Israel. The coffins of Khamenei and four members of his family who were killed alongside him in the February 28 strikes were transported on a specially designed ceremonial vehicle and accompanied by large crowds carrying portraits, religious symbols, and anti-American and anti-Israeli slogans.

Despite extraordinary official claims regarding attendance, there remains no independent assessment capable of verifying the size of the crowd. Iranian officials estimated participation between 12 and 20 million, while government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani suggested that attendance exceeded 15 million people. Such figures should be treated with caution. Nevertheless, regardless of the precise numbers, the Islamic Republic appears to have succeeded in achieving one of its principal political objectives: projecting an image of mass domestic support, political continuity, and national resilience. The funeral demonstrated that the government continues to possess a substantial and highly mobilizable social base, capable of producing large-scale public displays of loyalty and support.

This message appears to have been recognized even by some of the Islamic Republic’s principal adversaries. Speaking to Axios, U.S. President Donald Trump said he was surprised by scenes of mourning during the funeral ceremonies. “I was surprised to see some Iranians crying,” he said, adding that he had believed that “people hated Khamenei.” Trump then suggested that the displays of grief might not have been genuine, remarking: “Maybe those tears were not real.”

Similarly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged that, despite his belief that most Iranians oppose the Islamic Republic, the regime still retains a significant social base. “Iran is a country of about 90 million people. Around 80 percent of them hate this regime and would like to see it destroyed. But even so, there are still several million people — a minority — that they can bring into the streets,” Netanyahu stated. Referring to funeral chants of “Death to America,” “Death to Trump,” and “Death to Netanyahu,” he argued that these demonstrators represented “the face of the minority that has taken power and has held the talented people of Iran hostage.” While both leaders questioned the representativeness or authenticity of the mourning scenes, their remarks also implicitly acknowledged that the Islamic Republic was able to stage a substantial and politically significant display of public support.

The ceremonies also highlighted the emerging post-Khamenei leadership structure. Mojtaba Khamenei, who has assumed leadership of the Islamic Republic, was notably absent from the funeral prayer for his father and several family members, even as his brothers Mostafa, Meysam, and Masoud Khamenei appeared in the front row. Shortly afterward, however, a decree attributed to Mojtaba reappointed Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei as head of the judiciary, signaling an effort to project institutional continuity despite his public absence. Speculation regarding Mojtaba’s absence has been fueled by reports that he was seriously wounded in the same attack that killed his father and remains under heavy security protection.

A major political controversy surrounding the funeral was the absence of Iran’s former presidents and other former senior officials. None of Iran’s former presidents attended the official memorial service, and according to criticism raised by Mohammad-Ali Abtahi - former chief of staff to President Mohammad Khatami - they were not formally invited. Abtahi argued that the funeral represented the “most important historical opportunity to demonstrate national cohesion” and criticized organizers for failing to invite former presidents, parliament speakers, ministers, and other political, cultural, and social figures, including individuals who had publicly disagreed with Khamenei during his lifetime. According to Abtahi, such participation could have projected a stronger image of national unity and political reconciliation.

Foreign participation gave the funeral a significant diplomatic dimension. Iranian officials claimed that representatives from nearly 100 countries attended the ceremonies, including at least eight heads of state or government and twelve parliamentary speakers. Senior representatives arrived from Pakistan, Iraq, Tajikistan, Armenia, Russia, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, China, India, Afghanistan, and several Iran-aligned non-state groups. The simultaneous presence of representatives of the Taliban government, the Afghan National Resistance Front, and the Fatemiyoun Brigade illustrated Tehran’s effort to maintain multiple channels of influence within Afghanistan. Delegations from Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi militias, and other members of the so-called “Axis of Resistance” also participated prominently.

One of the most striking and controversial aspects of the ceremonies was the reported recitation of different Quranic verses for different foreign delegations and political figures as they approached Khamenei’s coffin. For the Saudi delegation, organizers reportedly selected Verse 13 of Surah Al-Imran, which describes a battle between believers fighting in the path of God and unbelievers. Observers interpreted this as a symbolic message regarding regional competition and the Islamic Republic’s self-perception as a victorious and divinely-supported actor succeeding despite being outnumbered. For Turkey, organizers reportedly recited Verse 95 of Surah An-Nisa, emphasizing the superiority of those who struggle and fight over those who remain behind. This was interpreted by some observers as a criticism of Ankara’s cautious and shifting regional policies. For Qatar, verses from Surah Al-Fath were reportedly selected, emphasizing forgiveness, divine favor, and the completion of God’s blessing, reflecting Tehran’s relatively positive view of Qatar’s diplomatic and mediating role. For Pakistan, organizers reportedly chose Verse 80 of Surah Al-Isra, which refers to entering and departing with truthfulness. Some observers interpreted this as a signal regarding Islamabad’s role as a mediator between Iran and the United States.

One of the most controversial recitations concerned the family of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, including Hassan Khomeini. For this delegation, organizers reportedly selected Verse 95 of Surah An-Nisa, the same verse contrasting those who remain seated with those who engage in struggle and sacrifice. According to reports, Hassan and other members of the Khomeini family left the platform after hearing the verse, apparently interpreting it as a pointed political message rather than a neutral religious recitation. The incident triggered widespread discussion and criticism within Iran.

For Hamas, the selected verse reportedly praised those who had remained faithful to their covenant with God, including those who had achieved martyrdom and those still awaiting it. For Hezbollah, organizers reportedly recited the verse: “Do not weaken and do not grieve; you will be superior if you are believers,” a clear message of encouragement and continued support. For Ansar Allah (the Houthis), the selected verses reportedly praised steadfast believers who do not weaken in the face of adversity. For Iraq, organizers reportedly selected a verse emphasizing faith without doubt and steadfast commitment, which was interpreted as encouragement to maintain alignment with Tehran and the resistance axis.

These selective Quranic recitations generated criticism among reformist and moderate political figures. Javad Emam, spokesperson for the Reform Front, argued that the Quran should serve as a source of mercy, empathy, and national unity, rather than as an instrument for distinguishing insiders from outsiders. He warned that if reports regarding the intentional selection of verses were correct, such practices would undermine rather than strengthen national cohesion.

The funeral also unfolded against the backdrop of a fragile ceasefire and temporarily suspended U.S.-Iran negotiations. President Trump stated that both sides had agreed to delay negotiations until the funeral ceremonies had concluded. At the same time, both Washington and Tehran continued to signal that a return to military conflict remained possible if negotiations collapsed.

Overall, Khamenei’s funeral became a defining post-war political event for the Islamic Republic. The government used it simultaneously to project mourning, revenge, political continuity, diplomatic relevance, regional influence, and domestic legitimacy. Yet the absence of Mojtaba Khamenei from public ceremonies, the exclusion of former presidents and senior officials, criticism from figures such as Abtahi and Javad Emam, and the controversial use of Quranic verses all suggest that beneath the carefully managed image of unity, Iran’s post-Khamenei political order remains marked by unresolved questions regarding legitimacy, factional balance, and the future direction of the Islamic Republic.

According to official announcements and reports from regional media, the funeral process will begin with public ceremonies in Tehran, followed by commemorative events in the holy city of Qom, before extending into Iraq with ceremonies planned in both Najaf and Karbala. The final burial is expected to take place in Mashhad, one of Shiite Islam’s holiest cities and Khamenei’s birthplace. By organizing processions across Tehran, Qom, Najaf, Karbala, and Mashhad, the Islamic Republic appears to be transforming the funeral into a carefully choreographed political operation aimed at projecting continuity, managing succession, and reaffirming Iran’s regional influence at a moment of significant uncertainty.

The decision to hold funeral ceremonies in both Iran and Iraq represents an unprecedented effort to frame Khamenei not only as the leader of the Islamic Republic but also as a transnational Shiite religious and political figure whose influence extends beyond Iran’s borders. The extension of the ceremonies into Iraq’s Shiite holy cities of Najaf and Karbala is especially significant, reinforcing Khamenei’s image as a symbol of the broader “Axis of Resistance.” Reports indicate that Iraqi authorities, shrine administrations, and political groups affiliated with Iran have been coordinating closely with Tehran to facilitate ceremonies expected to attract millions of participants. Beyond the symbolic dimension, the ceremonies also provide Tehran with an opportunity to publicly demonstrate the depth of its political, religious, and security networks across the region.

The scale of the logistical and security preparations appears extraordinary. Significantly, primary responsibility for organizing and securing the ceremonies has been assigned to the Tehran-based Mohammad Rasoulallah Corps of the IRGC, while authorities have reportedly established a dedicated urban corridor through central Tehran to manage the anticipated flow of millions of mourners. Iranian authorities have reportedly mobilized the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Basij militia, law enforcement forces, intelligence agencies, and extensive crowd-control infrastructure. Temporary airspace restrictions have been announced around major cities involved in the ceremonies, while security officials have publicly warned that any external military action during the mourning period would receive a severe response. These measures suggest that the state views the funeral not only as a ceremonial event but also as a major domestic security operation and a strategic messaging exercise.

Inside Iran, the funeral serves an even more immediate political purpose: stabilizing the post-Khamenei order. Massive state funerals in the Islamic Republic have historically functioned as moments of political consolidation. Comparisons with the funeral of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989 are inevitable. That funeral drew millions of participants but also descended into scenes of disorder and chaos, illustrating both the mobilizing power of revolutionary symbolism and the risks associated with leadership transition. This time, the authorities appear determined to avoid any perception of instability or uncertainty.

Officials have described the planned ceremonies as a “historic funeral” intended to demonstrate national unity and the resilience of the Islamic Republic following months of political uncertainty and regional conflict. Iranian officials and state media have increasingly referred to the event as the “Funeral of the Century,” reflecting the extent to which the political establishment views the ceremonies as a defining moment for the post-Khamenei order. Organizers have publicly estimated that between 12 and 20 million people could participate in various stages of the funeral processions, figures that, if realized, would place the ceremonies among the largest public gatherings in modern Iranian history. State media have reportedly prepared extensive domestic and international coverage, while religious institutions and government agencies have been tasked with mobilizing public participation on a scale comparable to, or even exceeding, Khomeini’s funeral in 1989.

The presence of foreign delegations from countries such as Russia, China, Pakistan, India, Afghanistan’s Taliban government, and several regional allies further reinforces Tehran’s effort to portray the Islamic Republic as internationally connected and politically resilient despite war, sanctions, and diplomatic isolation. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif is expected to attend the funeral ceremonies in Tehran, highlighting Pakistan’s increasingly important role as a regional interlocutor and mediator in recent U.S.-Iran diplomacy. India has announced that a delegation led by Bihar Governor Syed Ata Hasnain and Minister of State for External Affairs Pabitra Margherita will represent New Delhi at the official ceremonies, which the Indian government described as reflecting the longstanding historical and people-to-people ties between the two countries.

Meanwhile, senior representatives of Afghanistan’s Taliban government, including Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Ghani Baradar and Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, are also expected to participate in the funeral ceremonies. Reports further indicate that Iranian authorities have issued thousands of free short-term visas to Afghan citizens to facilitate attendance. Russia is likewise expected to be represented by a senior envoy of President Vladimir Putin, while Chinese officials have also announced high-level participation. The breadth of international attendance underscores the geopolitical significance that major regional and non-Western powers continue to attach to Iran during this sensitive transition period and supports Tehran’s broader effort to project continuity, regional influence, and international legitimacy.

Politically, the funeral also serves as a mechanism to reinforce the legitimacy of the new leadership. The ceremonies provide an opportunity for the political establishment to present succession not as a contested or fragile process, but as an orderly and institutionalized transfer of authority within a stable revolutionary system.

For the Islamic Republic, the central objective appears to be transforming grief into political mobilization. By filling streets, shrines, and state media broadcasts with images of mass mourning and public participation, the authorities can attempt to transform Khamenei’s death into a renewed pledge of loyalty to the political system itself. Officials have announced plans for forty days of nationwide commemorative and religious ceremonies, followed by additional events extending through the first anniversary of Khamenei’s burial. This suggests that the leadership views the funeral not as a single event, but as the beginning of a prolonged process of political mobilization, symbolic consolidation, and legitimacy-building.

Ultimately, Khamenei’s funeral should be understood as a defining political moment for the Islamic Republic. It represents a comprehensive effort to manage the narrative of succession, demonstrate political continuity, project regional influence, prevent domestic instability, and signal resilience to both internal and external audiences. Whether this effort succeeds will depend not only on the scale of public participation and international attention, but also on whether Iran’s post-Khamenei leadership can transform a carefully orchestrated political spectacle into lasting political authority.

According to reports from Kurdish human rights organizations and Iranian media, several armed confrontations have taken place in the provinces of West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and Kermanshah. In clashes near Mahabad, Baneh, and Marivan, at least three Iranian security personnel and four Kurdish fighters were reportedly killed. Kurdish sources described the incidents as armed engagements between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and members of Kurdish opposition groups, while Iranian authorities characterized them as operations against “terrorist and separatist elements.”

At the same time, Iranian state-affiliated media reported a series of targeted attacks against local security personnel in Kermanshah Province. In one of the deadliest incidents, armed assailants attacked the homes of local IRGC members in Paveh, killing two Basij and IRGC-affiliated personnel, Borhan Krisani and Khaled Khaledinia, and injuring several others. Iranian officials described the attack as a “terrorist operation” and vowed retaliation.

The violence has not been confined to Iranian territory. In recent weeks, Iranian drone strikes targeted camps and headquarters of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, reportedly involving nearly twenty separate drone attacks. These strikes continued even after the reduction in direct hostilities between Iran, Israel, and the United States, highlighting Tehran’s ongoing concern about Kurdish armed groups operating beyond its borders.

The renewed security focus on Kurdish groups must also be understood within the broader context of the recent Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict. During the war, reports emerged suggesting that some American and Israeli policymakers had considered the possibility of opening a Kurdish ground front against the Islamic Republic. Although such plans never materialized, their existence appears to have reinforced Tehran’s longstanding fears regarding Kurdish opposition groups and cross-border insurgency.

U.S. President Donald Trump publicly fueled these concerns with a series of controversial statements. Trump initially suggested that armed action by Iranian Kurdish groups against Tehran would be “fantastic,” although he later stated that he had opposed efforts to involve Kurdish forces directly in the conflict. He subsequently claimed that weapons had been transferred to anti-government groups through Kurdish channels but that Kurdish actors had ultimately failed to act as expected. These claims have not been independently verified. Trump also made broader allegations regarding mass killings carried out by Iranian authorities during the conflict, allegations that remain disputed and difficult to independently confirm.

Taken together, these developments suggest that the recent violence in western Iran is not merely a localized security challenge. Rather, it reflects Iran’s growing concern that Kurdish opposition groups could become a critical vulnerability in any future regional conflict. The combination of cross-border military operations, targeted assassinations, armed clashes, and allegations of foreign involvement has once again pushed the Kurdish issue to the forefront of Iran’s national security agenda.

More broadly, the recent escalation illustrates how the experience of the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict has reinforced longstanding concerns within the Iranian security establishment regarding the potential role of ethnic and regional opposition groups in future conflicts. Whether justified or not, these concerns appear to be shaping Tehran’s post-war security strategy and contributing to an increasingly securitized approach toward Iran’s western border regions.

While state broadcaster IRIB later claimed that the interview had merely been divided into two parts, the reaction from parliament, the specific portions that were removed, and the broader political context suggest that the interruption reflected a deeper struggle over political legitimacy, strategic narrative, and the distribution of power within Iran’s post-war political order.

The portions of the interview that aired publicly reveal that Ghalibaf was pursuing several political objectives simultaneously. He sought to present the recent agreement with the United States as a strategic victory rather than a compromise, demonstrate that Iran entered negotiations from a position of military strength, defend the economic provisions of the agreement, including sanctions relief and access to frozen assets, establish himself as the principal political figure capable of managing both war and diplomacy, and frame the agreement as fully consistent with the strategic guidance of the Supreme Leader.

Perhaps most importantly, Ghalibaf appeared to be attempting to construct a political narrative in which pragmatism, negotiation, and economic relief were not signs of weakness but evidence of Iranian strength and strategic success.

The interview was interrupted precisely as Ghalibaf began discussing one of the most politically sensitive aspects of the agreement: the mechanisms governing oil exports, frozen assets, and humanitarian trade channels. According to portions of the interview later published by media outlets close to parliament, Ghalibaf stated:

“They do not want to admit that this memorandum opened the way for OFAC authorization. This is the power of the Islamic Republic. Be proud of it and stand by it. This document is America’s defeat.”

This statement was politically significant for several reasons. First, it implicitly acknowledged ongoing coordination through U.S. sanctions licensing mechanisms. For years, hardline factions have portrayed sanctions relief arrangements as capitulation or dependency. By openly describing OFAC authorization as a diplomatic achievement, Ghalibaf challenged a narrative long promoted by ideological opponents of negotiations.

Second, he reportedly referenced arrangements negotiated during the Raisi administration. Several reports suggest that Ghalibaf was explaining that mechanisms allowing humanitarian purchases using frozen Iranian assets had already been accepted under former President Ebrahim Raisi’s government. This directly undermines efforts by some factions to portray the current agreement as an unprecedented concession by President Pezeshkian’s administration and instead suggests significant continuity between the negotiating approaches of the two administrations.

Third, Ghalibaf appeared to be attempting to claim political ownership of the agreement itself. By declaring the memorandum a “defeat of America,” he was not merely defending the agreement; he was defining its political and historical meaning. That interpretation directly challenged other political actors seeking either to discredit the agreement or claim credit for it themselves.

The reaction from parliament’s media center was unusually forceful. Parliament publicly stated that the interview had been delivered to IRIB more than two hours before broadcast, that no coordination had occurred regarding the removal of sections, and that approximately twenty minutes of material had been omitted. According to parliament’s statement, the deleted sections included discussions of frozen assets, IAEA inspections, reconstruction financing, strategic messaging from the Supreme Leader, and the implementation mechanisms of the agreement.

Such a public confrontation between parliament and state television is extremely rare and suggests that the dispute extended well beyond routine editorial decisions.

Although IRIB officially denied censorship and stated that the interview would continue in a second installment, many observers interpreted the interruption differently. Within Iranian political circles, IRIB is widely viewed not simply as a media organization but as an institution reflecting broader ideological and political alignments within the Islamic Republic. In particular, many analysts regard the current leadership of IRIB under Payman Jebelli and Vahid Jalili—the brother of former presidential candidate Saeed Jalili and one of the principal architects of the broadcaster’s ideological direction—as politically aligned with the broader hardline and Paydari-oriented camp that has been among the strongest critics of negotiations with the United States.

As a result, some observers interpreted the interruption of Ghalibaf’s interview not merely as an editorial decision, but as a manifestation of the growing political struggle between the more pragmatic coalition surrounding President Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf, and the ideological current associated with Saeed Jalili and his allies. Whether this interpretation is fully accurate remains contested, but the episode has reinforced perceptions that control over the state’s media apparatus has become an increasingly important arena in Iran’s broader post-war political struggle.

The controversy surrounding Ghalibaf’s interview should also be understood within the context of other recent political developments, including the public statement issued by dozens of members of the Assembly of Experts and the subsequent mobilization of support for that statement. While these events may appear unrelated when viewed individually, together they suggest that the current political contest in Iran extends beyond disagreements over the recent agreement itself. Rather, they reflect a broader struggle over political authority, strategic direction, and who has the legitimacy to interpret and implement the Supreme Leader’s vision in Iran’s post-war environment.

The most important aspect of the controversy is that the dispute does not appear to be primarily ideological. All major factions involved continue to support the political system itself. The conflict instead concerns who has the authority to interpret the Supreme Leader’s strategic decisions, who deserves credit for preventing military defeat, who should oversee the implementation of the agreement, and ultimately who will shape Iran’s post-war political order.

Viewed in this broader context, the dispute over Ghalibaf’s interview represents not an isolated media controversy, but another manifestation of an ongoing competition among different centers of power seeking to shape the future of the Islamic Republic. The controversy surrounding the interview, the competing narratives regarding the agreement, the public intervention by members of the Assembly of Experts, and the increasingly visible divisions within state institutions all suggest that Iran is entering a period in which questions of authority, legitimacy, and political succession are becoming increasingly difficult to manage behind closed doors.

The interruption of Ghalibaf’s interview was significant not because twenty minutes of television were removed, but because the incident publicly exposed divisions that are usually managed privately. The controversy suggests that the Supreme Leader is currently attempting to maintain strategic ambiguity, preserving flexibility under two possible future scenarios: successful implementation of the agreement and gradual normalization, or collapse of diplomacy and a return to military confrontation.

Ultimately, the dispute over Ghalibaf’s interview may prove to be less about television censorship and more about the unresolved question now confronting the Islamic Republic: who will define the meaning of victory, compromise, and political legitimacy in Iran’s emerging post-war order.

The most significant manifestation of these disagreements emerged on June 27, when 63 of the 88 members of Iran’s Assembly of Experts issued an unprecedented statement calling for retaliation for the killing of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The statement described U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as individuals whose killing could constitute a religious obligation for Muslims who have access to them. The signatories also demanded that Iranian negotiators strictly adhere to what they described as the Supreme Leader’s “red lines,” insisted that Iran’s nuclear rights remain outside the scope of negotiations with Washington, and criticized Tehran’s decision to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, describing it as a strategic mistake.

The statement quickly received support from conservative circles. According to Mehr News Agency, more than 25,000 individuals, including university professors, seminary scholars, and political elites, signed a petition endorsing the Assembly members’ position. However, less than twenty-four hours later, the Secretariat of the Assembly of Experts issued an extraordinary public response, describing the statement as “unconventional” and “without precedent.” The Secretariat emphasized that official positions of the Assembly have traditionally been issued only through formal institutional procedures, either through plenary sessions or through statements approved by the chairman, leadership board, or Secretariat itself.

This unprecedented public disagreement between the Assembly’s leadership and a substantial majority of its members revealed significant institutional divisions within one of the Islamic Republic’s highest political bodies. At the same time, the Secretariat’s own statement contained criticism of the government’s negotiating approach, arguing that Iran should not have agreed to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and should not have permitted Iran’s nuclear program to become part of negotiations with the United States. These positions appear to contradict the framework of the agreement that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has reportedly approved in principle.

Simultaneously, President Masoud Pezeshkian traveled to the religious center of Qom, where he met with senior clerics and religious authorities. During these meetings, he warned about what he described as efforts by domestic and foreign actors to undermine national unity and disrupt the implementation of the agreement. In subsequent public statements, Pezeshkian repeatedly emphasized that the negotiations were conducted with the full knowledge and approval of the Supreme Leader, insisting that the agreement had undergone extensive review by expert, security, and political institutions and had received strong support from the Supreme National Security Council.

The political controversy intensified further following the publication of a written message attributed to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, in which he reportedly stated that he had “in principle preferred a different approach” but had nevertheless approved the agreement after accepting the judgment of President Pezeshkian and the Supreme National Security Council. This statement immediately became the subject of competing interpretations. Opponents of the agreement argued that the Supreme Leader had personally opposed the negotiations and that the negotiating team had ignored his preferences. Supporters of the agreement, however, argued that the statement demonstrated the institutional nature of decision-making within the Islamic Republic and reflected the Supreme Leader’s willingness to defer to collective expert judgment.

The government subsequently launched an unusually public effort to defend the legitimacy of the agreement. President Pezeshkian declared that all stages of the negotiations had been conducted with “full and continuous coordination” with the Supreme Leader, emphasizing that the agreement was approved through Iran’s official institutional procedures. He also stressed that Iran’s obligations under the agreement remained conditional upon reciprocal American compliance, stating publicly that “if the American side remains committed to the agreement, we will also fulfill our obligations.”

Perhaps the most significant intervention came from Mohammad Jafar Ghaempanah, the Executive Deputy to the President, who publicly disclosed details of the Supreme National Security Council meeting that approved the agreement. According to Ghaempanah, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei ordered that a special meeting of the Supreme National Security Council be convened with the participation of senior military commanders and instructed that the agreement should be accepted if three-quarters of participants voted in favor. Ghaempanah revealed that the meeting included the President, the Speaker of Parliament, the Chief Justice, senior military commanders, the Foreign Minister, the Interior Minister, representatives of the Supreme Leader, and other senior officials, and that all participants except one voted in favor of approving the agreement.

Ghaempanah explicitly rejected efforts to portray the agreement as contrary to the Supreme Leader’s wishes, arguing that the Supreme Leader’s statement that he had “another opinion” should not be interpreted as opposition. Instead, he argued that the statement demonstrated the existence of a “chain of governance” within the Islamic Republic and reflected a system in which difficult national security decisions are made through collective institutional mechanisms rather than through individual preferences alone.

Despite these efforts, criticism from conservative factions has continued to intensify. Mahmoud Nabavian, a parliamentarian closely associated with the Paydari Front, publicly disclosed portions of what he claimed was a confidential letter from the Supreme Leader instructing negotiators not to discuss nuclear issues with the United States. Nabavian and other hardline figures subsequently accused the negotiating team of violating the Supreme Leader’s guidance and called for the suspension of negotiations. He later declared that any decision that contradicts the Supreme Leader’s personal preference constitutes not a national interest but a national harm.

Additional pressure emerged from a public letter signed by approximately 2,000 university professors and seminary scholars, which called for a halt to negotiations and accused the negotiating team of deviating from the Supreme Leader’s instructions. The signatories demanded that Iranian officials refrain from further negotiations until the United States fully implemented key provisions of the agreement.

The growing divisions have also become increasingly visible within conservative media outlets traditionally aligned with the Islamic Republic. The newspaper Javan, which is closely associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), warned that continued opposition to negotiations could harm national interests and argued that if the agreement failed, “the entire nation would bear the costs.” Javan also rejected claims that negotiations represented a betrayal of the former Supreme Leader’s legacy and criticized certain state television programs for contributing to domestic polarization.

At the same time, the newspaper Kayhan, whose editor is appointed directly by the Supreme Leader, expressed concern about increasingly hostile disputes among conservative factions. Without explicitly naming individuals, Kayhan appeared to refer to growing tensions between supporters of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili, warning that disagreements among revolutionary forces had crossed traditional political red lines and were creating an artificial political polarization within the governing establishment.

Underlying many of these political disputes are significant strategic and economic considerations. Several government officials have acknowledged publicly that the American maritime blockade imposed after the ceasefire created economic pressures that were in some respects more severe than traditional sanctions. Mohsen Zanganeh, a member of parliament’s budget committee, stated that the American maritime blockade and the prospect of a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz created strategic and economic pressures exceeding those experienced during the forty-day war itself.

Government officials have increasingly argued that ending the maritime blockade, restoring commercial navigation, and stabilizing the Iranian economy constituted urgent national security priorities that justified compromise. According to this interpretation, practical strategic calculations played a more significant role in the decision to accept the agreement than purely ideological considerations.

Taken together, these developments suggest that the ongoing political struggle surrounding the Iran-U.S. agreement is no longer simply a disagreement over negotiations with Washington. Rather, it has evolved into a broader debate over the nature of authority, legitimacy, and decision-making within Iran’s post-war political system.

While all major political factions continue to affirm loyalty to the Islamic Republic and to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, they increasingly disagree over who possesses the authority to interpret the Supreme Leader’s intentions, define national interests, and determine the strategic direction of the state. The repeated efforts by government officials, senior clerics, military figures, and conservative media organizations to explain, reinterpret, or defend the Supreme Leader’s position suggest that the central issue is no longer ideological disagreement but rather competing claims to political legitimacy and institutional authority.

The ultimate significance of the current political dispute extends beyond the Iran-U.S. agreement itself. The outcome of the agreement may determine the future distribution of power within the Islamic Republic, strengthening either pragmatic institutional actors or hardline ideological factions. In this context, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appears to be deliberately positioning himself between both camps, allowing negotiations to proceed while simultaneously distancing himself from full ownership of the process. This strategy allows him to preserve his authority regardless of whether the agreement succeeds or whether Iran ultimately returns to confrontation with the United States.

Over the past week, a series of incidents involving commercial shipping in and around the Strait of Hormuz have triggered renewed military exchanges between Iran and the United States, raising concerns that the implementation of the post-war agreement may prove considerably more difficult than initially anticipated. According to U.S. Central Command, Iranian forces targeted commercial vessels operating near the Strait, including the Singapore-flagged vessel Ever Lovely and the Panama-flagged tanker Kiku. In response, the United States conducted strikes against Iranian military infrastructure, including coastal surveillance facilities, communications systems, air defense positions, drone storage sites, and mine-laying capabilities.

Iran rejected the American characterization of these incidents and argued that the U.S. strikes constituted a violation of the ceasefire agreement. Iranian officials have maintained that the incidents resulted from attempts to challenge Iran’s authority over maritime arrangements established under the post-war memorandum of understanding. The subsequent exchange of attacks—including Iranian strikes against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait and additional American military operations against Iranian targets—demonstrated the continued fragility of the current ceasefire.

At the same time, both governments have continued to pursue diplomacy. President Donald Trump announced that senior American and Iranian officials would meet in Doha, Qatar, while the White House confirmed that Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner would participate in discussions alongside parallel technical negotiations. Although Iranian officials initially denied reports of a scheduled meeting, subsequent statements suggested that negotiations regarding implementation of the memorandum remain ongoing.

From Tehran’s perspective, the most important strategic gain emerging from the war was neither territorial nor military, but rather the preservation—and perhaps strengthening—of its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s ability to influence maritime traffic through one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints remains its most powerful instrument of pressure against both the United States and the global economy.

Indeed, throughout the conflict, the Strait of Hormuz represented one of the greatest operational and strategic challenges facing the United States and Israel. Despite overwhelming military superiority, neither country succeeded in eliminating Iran’s capacity to disrupt commercial shipping, increase global energy prices, and impose uncertainty on international markets. The persistent vulnerability of maritime commerce to Iranian military pressure demonstrated that Tehran retained the ability to impose substantial economic costs despite suffering significant military losses elsewhere.

In this sense, Iran’s post-war bargaining position appears to derive largely from its continuing influence over the Strait of Hormuz. While Iran suffered significant military setbacks during the conflict, its ability to maintain leverage over a critical global chokepoint may have emerged as its principal source of post-war strategic influence.

The current tensions between Tehran and Washington appear to reflect fundamentally different visions regarding the future administration and security arrangements governing the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials have argued that, according to the understandings reached during the ceasefire negotiations, Tehran has primary responsibility for managing maritime traffic and restoring normal operations in the Strait, particularly during the initial implementation period. Iranian officials have justified this position by citing demining operations, military stabilization requirements, and sovereign rights over the waterway.

The United States, by contrast, appears interested in developing or expanding alternative maritime corridors closer to the Omani coastline. Such arrangements would significantly reduce Iran’s ability to exercise strategic leverage over international shipping while preserving freedom of navigation for commercial vessels. From Washington’s perspective, reducing Iran’s ability to disrupt global shipping has become both a strategic necessity and a long-term objective. From Tehran’s perspective, however, such efforts threaten to undermine what may be its most important strategic achievement of the war.

The dispute over maritime routes has therefore become far more than a technical disagreement over shipping management. It has evolved into a broader struggle over the strategic balance established by the conflict itself.

Recent developments may suggest that Iran has achieved at least partial success in asserting its position. Following Iranian warnings and attacks against vessels using routes closer to the Omani coast, commercial traffic through those corridors appears to have slowed significantly. Maritime data indicate that vessel traffic through the Strait declined sharply over the course of several days, while a significant percentage of ships reportedly disabled their identification transponders while operating in the region.

At the same time, the successful transit of the French-operated CMA CGM vessel Galapagos through the route designated by Iran represented an important symbolic and operational development. Although it remains unclear whether major shipping companies will permanently alter their operational practices, recent events suggest that some commercial operators may increasingly choose accommodation over confrontation when navigating the Strait.

Despite recent attacks involving Bahrain and Kuwait, there is little evidence that Gulf Arab states are prepared to play a major independent role in the current confrontation. Throughout the conflict, Gulf governments largely avoided direct military involvement and instead relied heavily on American military capabilities and security guarantees. Their primary interest remains preserving regional stability, protecting energy exports, and avoiding becoming the principal battleground of a broader U.S.-Iran conflict.

The upcoming negotiations between Iran and the United States in Doha, alongside parallel discussions between Iran and Oman regarding the future administration of the Strait of Hormuz, may therefore prove to be the most consequential component of the post-war diplomatic process.

Recent military exchanges suggest that the implementation of the post-war memorandum will be significantly more difficult than many observers initially anticipated. The events of recent days have demonstrated that the United States remains both willing and strategically compelled to reduce—or at least substantially constrain—Iran’s ability to use the Strait of Hormuz as a source of geopolitical leverage. At the same time, Iran appears equally determined to preserve what has emerged as its most important strategic asset and bargaining chip following the war.

The dispute over the Strait of Hormuz is therefore not simply a disagreement over maritime administration or shipping routes. Rather, it reflects a broader struggle over the strategic balance that emerged from the conflict itself. Recent military confrontations suggest that the practical boundaries of the ceasefire agreement—and the competing interpretations of its provisions—may ultimately be determined not only through diplomatic negotiations, but also through calibrated military pressure and strategic signaling.

The path forward is therefore likely to be difficult and uncertain. The central challenge facing both Washington and Tehran is no longer simply implementing a ceasefire agreement, but determining whether a new strategic equilibrium can emerge from the conflict. The fundamental question is whether the United States and Iran can ultimately reach a sustainable balance between America’s determination to reduce Iran’s leverage over one of the world’s most important waterways and Iran’s determination to preserve what it increasingly views as its principal post-war strategic achievement.

Although news of her death only became public in recent days, Azar Azima had in fact passed away more than a month earlier, on May 10, 2026 (20 Ordibehesht 1405), in her hometown of Isfahan. She was laid to rest in Bagh-e Rezvan Cemetery, but her passing went largely unnoticed amid the upheaval of war and widespread internet disruptions that engulfed Iran during that period. The delayed announcement of her death has itself become a poignant reminder of how conflict and crisis can overshadow even the passing of a nation’s treasured cultural figures.

Azarmidokht Azima Serajpour, who later adopted the artistic name Azar Azima, was born in Isfahan on December 12, 1927 (21 Azar 1306) according to official records. However, she repeatedly explained that her birth certificate did not reflect her actual age. As she recounted in later years, it was common practice in parts of Iran during that period to record girls as older than they were in order to facilitate earlier marriage. “In those days, girls’ ages were often recorded as older so they could marry earlier.” Based on her own account, Azar Azima was 93 years old, rather than 98, at the time of her death.

Azar Azima began her professional career with Radio Iran in 1954, entering the cultural scene at a pivotal moment when radio was rapidly emerging as Iran’s most influential platform for artistic expression. Her first recorded work was composed by the renowned musician Abolhassan Saba, with lyrics by Abolhassan Varzi, placing her immediately among the leading artistic circles of her era.

She is perhaps best remembered as one of the earliest vocalists to perform in the historic Golha radio programs, widely regarded as one of the most significant cultural institutions in twentieth-century Iran. Azar Azima appeared in the inaugural episode of Yek Shakheh Gol (A Single Flower), accompanied by the violin of Abolhassan Saba and the santur of Faramarz Payvar, two towering figures of Persian classical music. Her participation in these pioneering broadcasts helped establish the artistic standards that would define the Golha programs for decades.

Music historians and scholars have frequently highlighted the distinctive qualities of Azar Azima’s voice, describing it as warm, expressive, and unusually rich in tone. Trained by masters such as Abolhassan Saba and collaborating with many of the foremost musicians of her generation, she represented a vital bridge between traditional Persian vocal traditions and the emerging professional culture of modern radio performance.

Beyond her contributions to Persian classical music, Azar Azima also played an important role in preserving regional musical traditions. She is widely recognized as the first prominent female vocalist from Isfahan to achieve national recognition, performing not only classical repertoire but also local folk songs that were subsequently preserved in the archives of Iranian radio and the Golha collection.

Azar Azima’s personal life was also deeply intertwined with Iran’s artistic history. She was married to the late Morteza Hannaneh, one of Iran’s most influential composers, conductors, and pioneers of modern orchestral music. Among her best-known performances is “Rah-e Shiraz,” recorded with the Farabi Orchestra under Hannaneh’s direction. Their collaboration reflected a broader artistic partnership that contributed significantly to the evolution of modern Iranian musical expression during the mid-twentieth century.

Unlike many of her contemporaries, Azar Azima gradually withdrew from professional performance in the late 1950s and chose a life largely outside the public spotlight. As a result, much of her artistic legacy has been preserved through archival recordings rather than continued public appearances. Yet her contributions remained deeply embedded in the collective memory of Iranian music and broadcasting.

The passing of Azar Azima represents more than the loss of a celebrated singer. It symbolizes the gradual disappearance of a generation of artists who established the foundations of modern Iranian musical culture during the formative decades of radio broadcasting. Through her voice, her collaborations, and her pioneering role in the earliest Golha programs, Azar Azima helped preserve and transmit the rich traditions of Persian music to future generations. As Iran’s artistic community reflects on her life and legacy, Azar Azima will be remembered not only as a gifted vocalist, but also as one of the last surviving witnesses to a remarkable era in Iran’s cultural history.

At the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), we join in mourning the loss of Azar Azima and recognize her enduring contribution to Iran’s artistic and cultural heritage. At a time when war, political upheaval, and communication blackouts can obscure even the passing of some of a nation’s most treasured cultural figures, it becomes all the more important to remember and honor the artists who helped shape Iran’s collective memory. Azar Azima’s voice—preserved through the recordings of the Golha era and the musical traditions she helped sustain—remains part of a shared cultural heritage that transcends borders and generations. We extend our deepest condolences to her family, friends, colleagues, and the countless listeners and admirers whose lives were touched by her artistry. May her memory endure, and may her music continue to inspire future generations of Iranians around the world.

Born in 1925, Fouchécour emerged as a leading figure in French-Iranian studies during the postwar period, following in the intellectual tradition established by renowned scholars such as Gilbert Lazard. He taught Persian language and literature at the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (INALCO) in Paris and trained several generations of French and international scholars of Persian studies. His academic career was closely associated with the development of modern Iranian studies in France and Europe, and his influence extended far beyond the classroom.

Fouchécour is perhaps best known internationally for producing the first complete and extensively annotated French translation of the Divan of Hafez, a monumental scholarly achievement that remains one of the most authoritative translations of the Persian poet into a European language. His translation sought not merely to render Hafez’s poetry into French, but to convey the intellectual, mystical, historical, and linguistic complexity of one of the greatest figures of Persian literature.

His contributions extended far beyond Hafez. In 2017, Fouchécour published a landmark French translation of the Maqālāt-e Shams-e Tabrizi (Discourses of Shams of Tabriz), one of the most challenging and philosophically rich texts in Persian mystical literature. The work was widely praised by both Iranian and French scholars for its precision, clarity, and depth of cultural understanding.

Throughout his career, Fouchécour played a central institutional role in the development of Iranian studies. He served as the director of the French Institute of Iranian Studies in Tehran during the 1970s, helping to strengthen scholarly exchanges between France and Iran during a critical period in the history of both countries. He also founded and directed Abstracta Iranica, one of the most important bibliographical and scholarly review publications in the field of Iranian studies, and authored dozens of articles and books on Persian literature, ethics, poetry, and intellectual history.

His lifelong contributions received significant recognition in both France and Iran. In 2007, he was honored by the Mahmud Afshar Foundation for his services to Persian language and literature, and in 2019 he was elected an honorary member of the Academy of Persian Language and Literature of Iran. Iranian scholars repeatedly acknowledged his unique role in preserving and transmitting Persian literary heritage to French-speaking audiences.

More broadly, Charles-Henri de Fouchécour belonged to a generation of scholars who viewed Persian civilization not as an object of exotic curiosity, but as one of the world’s great literary and intellectual traditions. His scholarship reflected a deep respect for the Persian language and an enduring commitment to intellectual exchange across cultures. At a time when many academic disciplines have become increasingly specialized, Fouchécour represented an older tradition of humanistic scholarship characterized by linguistic mastery, historical depth, and cultural empathy.

The passing of Charles-Henri de Fouchécour marks the loss of a scholar whose work helped preserve, interpret, and transmit some of the greatest achievements of Persian civilization to audiences around the world. His translations, research, and teaching will continue to serve as a bridge between Iranian and European intellectual traditions for generations to come.

At NIAC, we mourn the passing of Charles-Henri de Fouchécour and extend our heartfelt condolences to his family, colleagues, students, and all those whose lives were touched by his scholarship. His lifelong dedication to Persian language, literature, and culture helped strengthen intellectual and cultural ties between Iran and the world, leaving behind a legacy that will continue to inspire scholars and admirers of Persian civilization for generations to come.

The first major incident occurred on June 14, 2026, when Iran’s Banking Coordination Council confirmed that a cyberattack had targeted the shared communications infrastructure used by Bank Melli, Bank Tejarat, Bank Saderat, and the Export Development Bank of Iran. Authorities stated that no customer data had been compromised but acknowledged that banking services experienced significant disruptions. Recovery efforts reportedly required several days.

A second major cyber incident occurred on June 23, 2026, when Iran’s state-owned Informatics Services Corporation (ISC) announced that cyberattacks had disrupted card-based banking services at Bank Melli, Bank Saderat, and Bank Tejarat. In response, ISC temporarily suspended portions of the affected card networks to prevent unauthorized access and protect customer assets. The disruptions affected ATM services, point-of-sale terminals, mobile banking applications, and card transactions, causing widespread interruptions for customers across the country.

In the days that followed, Iranian media outlets and customers reported disruptions affecting additional banks, including Bank Mellat, Bank Pasargad, Bank Sepah, Bank Keshavarzi, Bank Resalat, and the Development Cooperative Bank. Although authorities announced that many services had been restored, customers continued to report problems with mobile banking applications, internet banking platforms, and interbank transfer systems.

The recent incidents have highlighted a longstanding structural vulnerability in Iran’s financial sector: the heavy dependence of multiple banks on centralized infrastructure providers. In particular, the Informatics Services Corporation, which is partly owned by the Central Bank of Iran, operates critical financial infrastructure, including SHETAB, Iran’s national interbank card network, and SHAPARAK, the country’s electronic payment network. As a result, disruptions affecting shared infrastructure can quickly cascade throughout the broader banking sector.

Iranian parliamentarian Meysam Zohourian, a member of the parliament’s Economic Commission, stated that the precise source and technical nature of the attacks had not yet been determined and that replacing hardware components had not fully resolved the disruptions. He also criticized the concentration of critical banking services within institutions linked to the Central Bank, arguing that this structure may increase systemic vulnerabilities.

The consequences of these disruptions have extended beyond the banks directly affected. Customers have reported difficulties accessing deposits, conducting business transactions, processing interbank transfers, and meeting contractual obligations. Increased demand on unaffected institutions has reportedly produced temporary service disruptions elsewhere in the banking system, illustrating the degree of interconnectedness within Iran’s financial sector.

The current disruptions should also be understood within the broader context of regional cyber competition. During the 2025 Iran-Israel conflict, cyber operations targeted multiple elements of Iran’s critical infrastructure, including financial institutions. The cyberattack against Bank Sepah, which was claimed by the group Predatory Sparrow, demonstrated that banking infrastructure has become an increasingly important target in regional cyber conflict.

While there is currently no public evidence of an imminent large-scale attack on Iran’s financial system, the repeated disruptions experienced in recent weeks suggest that the risk of future cyber operations against Iranian banking infrastructure remains elevated. The recent incidents underscore the growing importance of cyber resilience for civilian financial systems and illustrate how cyber conflict can impose substantial costs on ordinary citizens even in the absence of direct military confrontation. As regional tensions persist and cyber capabilities become increasingly integrated into state competition, the resilience of civilian financial infrastructure is likely to become an increasingly important component of both national security and regional stability.