Although news of her death only became public in recent days, Azar Azima had in fact passed away more than a month earlier, on May 10, 2026 (20 Ordibehesht 1405), in her hometown of Isfahan. She was laid to rest in Bagh-e Rezvan Cemetery, but her passing went largely unnoticed amid the upheaval of war and widespread internet disruptions that engulfed Iran during that period. The delayed announcement of her death has itself become a poignant reminder of how conflict and crisis can overshadow even the passing of a nation’s treasured cultural figures.

Azarmidokht Azima Serajpour, who later adopted the artistic name Azar Azima, was born in Isfahan on December 12, 1927 (21 Azar 1306) according to official records. However, she repeatedly explained that her birth certificate did not reflect her actual age. As she recounted in later years, it was common practice in parts of Iran during that period to record girls as older than they were in order to facilitate earlier marriage. “In those days, girls’ ages were often recorded as older so they could marry earlier.” Based on her own account, Azar Azima was 93 years old, rather than 98, at the time of her death.

Azar Azima began her professional career with Radio Iran in 1954, entering the cultural scene at a pivotal moment when radio was rapidly emerging as Iran’s most influential platform for artistic expression. Her first recorded work was composed by the renowned musician Abolhassan Saba, with lyrics by Abolhassan Varzi, placing her immediately among the leading artistic circles of her era.

She is perhaps best remembered as one of the earliest vocalists to perform in the historic Golha radio programs, widely regarded as one of the most significant cultural institutions in twentieth-century Iran. Azar Azima appeared in the inaugural episode of Yek Shakheh Gol (A Single Flower), accompanied by the violin of Abolhassan Saba and the santur of Faramarz Payvar, two towering figures of Persian classical music. Her participation in these pioneering broadcasts helped establish the artistic standards that would define the Golha programs for decades.

Music historians and scholars have frequently highlighted the distinctive qualities of Azar Azima’s voice, describing it as warm, expressive, and unusually rich in tone. Trained by masters such as Abolhassan Saba and collaborating with many of the foremost musicians of her generation, she represented a vital bridge between traditional Persian vocal traditions and the emerging professional culture of modern radio performance.

Beyond her contributions to Persian classical music, Azar Azima also played an important role in preserving regional musical traditions. She is widely recognized as the first prominent female vocalist from Isfahan to achieve national recognition, performing not only classical repertoire but also local folk songs that were subsequently preserved in the archives of Iranian radio and the Golha collection.

Azar Azima’s personal life was also deeply intertwined with Iran’s artistic history. She was married to the late Morteza Hannaneh, one of Iran’s most influential composers, conductors, and pioneers of modern orchestral music. Among her best-known performances is “Rah-e Shiraz,” recorded with the Farabi Orchestra under Hannaneh’s direction. Their collaboration reflected a broader artistic partnership that contributed significantly to the evolution of modern Iranian musical expression during the mid-twentieth century.

Unlike many of her contemporaries, Azar Azima gradually withdrew from professional performance in the late 1950s and chose a life largely outside the public spotlight. As a result, much of her artistic legacy has been preserved through archival recordings rather than continued public appearances. Yet her contributions remained deeply embedded in the collective memory of Iranian music and broadcasting.

The passing of Azar Azima represents more than the loss of a celebrated singer. It symbolizes the gradual disappearance of a generation of artists who established the foundations of modern Iranian musical culture during the formative decades of radio broadcasting. Through her voice, her collaborations, and her pioneering role in the earliest Golha programs, Azar Azima helped preserve and transmit the rich traditions of Persian music to future generations. As Iran’s artistic community reflects on her life and legacy, Azar Azima will be remembered not only as a gifted vocalist, but also as one of the last surviving witnesses to a remarkable era in Iran’s cultural history.

At the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), we join in mourning the loss of Azar Azima and recognize her enduring contribution to Iran’s artistic and cultural heritage. At a time when war, political upheaval, and communication blackouts can obscure even the passing of some of a nation’s most treasured cultural figures, it becomes all the more important to remember and honor the artists who helped shape Iran’s collective memory. Azar Azima’s voice—preserved through the recordings of the Golha era and the musical traditions she helped sustain—remains part of a shared cultural heritage that transcends borders and generations. We extend our deepest condolences to her family, friends, colleagues, and the countless listeners and admirers whose lives were touched by her artistry. May her memory endure, and may her music continue to inspire future generations of Iranians around the world.

Born in 1925, Fouchécour emerged as a leading figure in French-Iranian studies during the postwar period, following in the intellectual tradition established by renowned scholars such as Gilbert Lazard. He taught Persian language and literature at the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (INALCO) in Paris and trained several generations of French and international scholars of Persian studies. His academic career was closely associated with the development of modern Iranian studies in France and Europe, and his influence extended far beyond the classroom.

Fouchécour is perhaps best known internationally for producing the first complete and extensively annotated French translation of the Divan of Hafez, a monumental scholarly achievement that remains one of the most authoritative translations of the Persian poet into a European language. His translation sought not merely to render Hafez’s poetry into French, but to convey the intellectual, mystical, historical, and linguistic complexity of one of the greatest figures of Persian literature.

His contributions extended far beyond Hafez. In 2017, Fouchécour published a landmark French translation of the Maqālāt-e Shams-e Tabrizi (Discourses of Shams of Tabriz), one of the most challenging and philosophically rich texts in Persian mystical literature. The work was widely praised by both Iranian and French scholars for its precision, clarity, and depth of cultural understanding.

Throughout his career, Fouchécour played a central institutional role in the development of Iranian studies. He served as the director of the French Institute of Iranian Studies in Tehran during the 1970s, helping to strengthen scholarly exchanges between France and Iran during a critical period in the history of both countries. He also founded and directed Abstracta Iranica, one of the most important bibliographical and scholarly review publications in the field of Iranian studies, and authored dozens of articles and books on Persian literature, ethics, poetry, and intellectual history.

His lifelong contributions received significant recognition in both France and Iran. In 2007, he was honored by the Mahmud Afshar Foundation for his services to Persian language and literature, and in 2019 he was elected an honorary member of the Academy of Persian Language and Literature of Iran. Iranian scholars repeatedly acknowledged his unique role in preserving and transmitting Persian literary heritage to French-speaking audiences.

More broadly, Charles-Henri de Fouchécour belonged to a generation of scholars who viewed Persian civilization not as an object of exotic curiosity, but as one of the world’s great literary and intellectual traditions. His scholarship reflected a deep respect for the Persian language and an enduring commitment to intellectual exchange across cultures. At a time when many academic disciplines have become increasingly specialized, Fouchécour represented an older tradition of humanistic scholarship characterized by linguistic mastery, historical depth, and cultural empathy.

The passing of Charles-Henri de Fouchécour marks the loss of a scholar whose work helped preserve, interpret, and transmit some of the greatest achievements of Persian civilization to audiences around the world. His translations, research, and teaching will continue to serve as a bridge between Iranian and European intellectual traditions for generations to come.

At NIAC, we mourn the passing of Charles-Henri de Fouchécour and extend our heartfelt condolences to his family, colleagues, students, and all those whose lives were touched by his scholarship. His lifelong dedication to Persian language, literature, and culture helped strengthen intellectual and cultural ties between Iran and the world, leaving behind a legacy that will continue to inspire scholars and admirers of Persian civilization for generations to come.

The first major incident occurred on June 14, 2026, when Iran’s Banking Coordination Council confirmed that a cyberattack had targeted the shared communications infrastructure used by Bank Melli, Bank Tejarat, Bank Saderat, and the Export Development Bank of Iran. Authorities stated that no customer data had been compromised but acknowledged that banking services experienced significant disruptions. Recovery efforts reportedly required several days.

A second major cyber incident occurred on June 23, 2026, when Iran’s state-owned Informatics Services Corporation (ISC) announced that cyberattacks had disrupted card-based banking services at Bank Melli, Bank Saderat, and Bank Tejarat. In response, ISC temporarily suspended portions of the affected card networks to prevent unauthorized access and protect customer assets. The disruptions affected ATM services, point-of-sale terminals, mobile banking applications, and card transactions, causing widespread interruptions for customers across the country.

In the days that followed, Iranian media outlets and customers reported disruptions affecting additional banks, including Bank Mellat, Bank Pasargad, Bank Sepah, Bank Keshavarzi, Bank Resalat, and the Development Cooperative Bank. Although authorities announced that many services had been restored, customers continued to report problems with mobile banking applications, internet banking platforms, and interbank transfer systems.

The recent incidents have highlighted a longstanding structural vulnerability in Iran’s financial sector: the heavy dependence of multiple banks on centralized infrastructure providers. In particular, the Informatics Services Corporation, which is partly owned by the Central Bank of Iran, operates critical financial infrastructure, including SHETAB, Iran’s national interbank card network, and SHAPARAK, the country’s electronic payment network. As a result, disruptions affecting shared infrastructure can quickly cascade throughout the broader banking sector.

Iranian parliamentarian Meysam Zohourian, a member of the parliament’s Economic Commission, stated that the precise source and technical nature of the attacks had not yet been determined and that replacing hardware components had not fully resolved the disruptions. He also criticized the concentration of critical banking services within institutions linked to the Central Bank, arguing that this structure may increase systemic vulnerabilities.

The consequences of these disruptions have extended beyond the banks directly affected. Customers have reported difficulties accessing deposits, conducting business transactions, processing interbank transfers, and meeting contractual obligations. Increased demand on unaffected institutions has reportedly produced temporary service disruptions elsewhere in the banking system, illustrating the degree of interconnectedness within Iran’s financial sector.

The current disruptions should also be understood within the broader context of regional cyber competition. During the 2025 Iran-Israel conflict, cyber operations targeted multiple elements of Iran’s critical infrastructure, including financial institutions. The cyberattack against Bank Sepah, which was claimed by the group Predatory Sparrow, demonstrated that banking infrastructure has become an increasingly important target in regional cyber conflict.

While there is currently no public evidence of an imminent large-scale attack on Iran’s financial system, the repeated disruptions experienced in recent weeks suggest that the risk of future cyber operations against Iranian banking infrastructure remains elevated. The recent incidents underscore the growing importance of cyber resilience for civilian financial systems and illustrate how cyber conflict can impose substantial costs on ordinary citizens even in the absence of direct military confrontation. As regional tensions persist and cyber capabilities become increasingly integrated into state competition, the resilience of civilian financial infrastructure is likely to become an increasingly important component of both national security and regional stability.

According to the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), a Singapore-flagged container ship, reportedly the Ever Lovely, was struck by a projectile while transiting near the Strait of Hormuz off the coast of Oman. Maritime security assessments described the incident as a likely attack that damaged the vessel but caused no casualties or environmental damage. Authorities continue to investigate the incident, and responsibility has not been conclusively established. U.S. officials reportedly told Reuters that Iran fired on the vessel, while Tehran had not publicly accepted responsibility at the time of writing.

The reported attack occurred shortly after Iranian authorities warned vessels against using routes not approved by Tehran, which altered the routes of several vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz. That timing has heightened concern among shipping companies and regional governments, although no direct causal link has been publicly established.

The security incident had immediate operational consequences. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), which had begun coordinating the evacuation of more than 11,000 stranded merchant mariners and hundreds of commercial vessels trapped in the Gulf since the outbreak of the war, announced that it was temporarily suspending its operation. IMO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez explained that although the attacked vessel had not been participating in the organization’s evacuation effort, the incident required a reassessment of security guarantees before additional vessels could proceed. The suspension marked the first major interruption to post-war maritime normalization efforts and underscored the fragility of the security arrangements established under the memorandum.

Although the memorandum ended active hostilities and allowed for more intensive diplomatic negotiations, it left unresolved one of the region’s most sensitive strategic issues: who will effectively manage navigation through the Strait of Hormuz after the war. While both Washington and Tehran agree that the waterway should remain open, they appear to hold fundamentally different interpretations of how that objective should be achieved.

Under the memorandum, Iran agreed to facilitate the safe passage of commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz during the initial 60-day implementation period without imposing transit fees. In tandem, the U.S. halted its own blockade of the Strait. At the same time, Iranian officials and influential figures close to the negotiating team have made clear that they do not view the agreement as a return to the pre-war status quo. Instead, Tehran appears to be presenting the post-war period as the beginning of a new security and management framework for one of the world’s most strategically important waterways.

Iran’s interpretation is already colliding with the views of the United States, Gulf Arab states, international shipping bodies, and commercial operators. The result is a fast-moving dispute that combines legal claims, military warnings, regional diplomacy, global energy concerns, and continued risks to civilian shipping.

Immediately after negotiations concluded in Switzerland, Iranian parliamentary speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, accompanied by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, traveled to Muscat to meet with Sultan Haitham bin Tariq and Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi. Following the meetings, Iran and Oman issued a joint statement affirming their commitment to keeping the Strait of Hormuz open and safe for international navigation while simultaneously emphasizing their sovereignty and sovereign rights over their territorial waters.

Notably, the two countries announced plans to establish a joint committee to determine the future management of the Strait and the fees that may be charged for navigation-related services after the initial 60-day transition period. Oman also announced a temporary maritime corridor designed to facilitate commercial shipping and support the evacuation of thousands of merchant mariners stranded in the Gulf since the outbreak of the war.

From Tehran’s perspective, this arrangement appears to reflect a new post-war security architecture in which Iran and Oman would assume a greater role in managing maritime traffic while formally preserving freedom of navigation. Washington, however, has disputed that Iran could impose tolls and otherwise restrict international shipping in the arrangement being negotiated.

The situation escalated after the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy issued a sharply worded statement rejecting what it described as the unauthorized announcement of a new navigation route through the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC declared that only routes approved by the Islamic Republic of Iran are authorized, warning that vessels using alternative corridors would not be recognized under Iran’s security arrangements. According to the statement, ships should coordinate with Iranian authorities through designated communication channels before entering the Strait. The IRGC described any routes announced without Iran’s approval as “unacceptable” and “extremely dangerous.”

Iranian officials have repeatedly emphasized that “the management of the Strait of Hormuz will not return to pre-war conditions,” arguing that the security environment fundamentally changed after the conflict. Some Iranian media outlets also reported that vessels using unauthorized routes could lose safe-passage guarantees and insurance protections under the new framework. Those claims have not been independently verified, but they reflect the broader Iranian effort to signal that shipping companies must take Tehran’s proposed rules seriously.

The dispute was further intensified by comments from Mehdi Mohammadi, an adviser to Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who described the Strait of Hormuz as “the heart of the confrontation” between Iran and its adversaries. Mohammadi argued that the issue of Hormuz is not a temporary technical dispute over shipping routes, but a central component of the post-war order that Iran believes emerged from the memorandum. In his remarks, he suggested that Tehran views the new arrangements as a strategic gain that must be preserved and expanded.

According to Mohammadi, Iran’s policy toward the Strait is built around several principles: generating revenue from the Strait, requiring vessels to use Iran-approved routes, denying passage to ships that Iran considers a threat to its security, and preserving the option of closing the Strait again if necessary. Most notably, he argued that Iran - not outside powers - would determine which passage qualifies as “innocent” and which vessels threaten Iranian security. He also described the policy as permanent, saying Tehran had “fought,” “negotiated,” “written the memorandum,” and “implemented” it on this basis.

These remarks are significant because they indicate that influential figures close to Iran’s negotiating team view the memorandum not merely as a ceasefire mechanism, but as a framework for establishing a more prominent Iranian role in the future security architecture of the Strait of Hormuz. This interpretation directly clashes with the U.S. and Gulf Arab position that the Strait should remain open under existing international navigation rules, without unilateral restrictions or new transit fees.

Iran’s position has immediately generated concern among Gulf Arab states, with many governments asserting that commercial shipping should continue under existing international maritime rules rather than new unilateral arrangements established after the war. The United Arab Emirates warned against what presidential adviser Anwar Gargash described as attempts to impose new geopolitical realities in the Strait, arguing that such actions would create new sources of regional instability rather than lasting peace. Separately, Bahrain publicly welcomed Oman’s temporary maritime corridor and reaffirmed support for maintaining internationally recognized navigation procedures.

The issue quickly became one of the principal topics during the Gulf Cooperation Council ministerial meeting attended by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. During his tour, Secretary of State Marco Rubio repeatedly argued that no country has the right to impose tolls, transit charges, mandatory routing requirements, or other restrictions on commercial vessels passing through an international waterway. Rubio warned that accepting such a precedent in the Strait of Hormuz could encourage similar claims elsewhere in the world, undermining the legal framework governing global maritime commerce.

At the center of the disagreement is a longstanding legal dispute. The United States and most maritime powers consider the Strait of Hormuz an international strait governed by transit-passage rules under international law. Iran, however, argues that all navigable channels pass through the territorial waters of Iran and Oman, giving the two coastal states greater authority to regulate navigation. Although this disagreement predates the recent conflict, it has become significantly more consequential because it now directly affects implementation of the memorandum.

The Strait of Hormuz has now emerged as another major implementation test of the Iran-U.S. memorandum. While the agreement ended active hostilities, it left unresolved competing visions over who will shape the future security and governance of one of the world’s most important waterways. Whether the parties can bridge these differences during the 60-day implementation period will be a key indicator of whether the memorandum can evolve from a ceasefire into a durable regional agreement.

This transformation is visible across much of Iran’s political spectrum. Senior officials, reformists, pragmatic conservatives, economists, and even some traditionally anti-American commentators increasingly acknowledge that the war has altered Iran’s strategic environment. While disagreements remain over the scope of engagement with Washington and the level of trust that should be placed in the United States, the dominant question is no longer whether diplomacy should continue, but how it should be managed.

One of the clearest indicators of this shift has been the emergence of an unusually coordinated official narrative. President Masoud Pezeshkian, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Judiciary Chief Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei, and Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati have all delivered variations of the same message: the memorandum was approved through Iran’s established decision-making institutions, negotiations do not constitute surrender to the United States, and domestic political divisions should not weaken Iran’s negotiating position.

President Pezeshkian provided the strongest institutional defense of the agreement by revealing that more than 90 percent of participants in the Supreme National Security Council initially supported the memorandum and, after further deliberations, all members ultimately voted in favor despite limited disagreements. His remarks framed the agreement not as the project of a single administration but as the outcome of a broad consensus within Iran’s national security establishment.

Ghalibaf sought to counter domestic criticism by dismissing President Donald Trump’s repeated claim that Iran would use its unfrozen assets to purchase American agricultural products. He characterized Trump’s comments as messaging aimed at domestic American audiences and sarcastically remarked that the United States could keep its “GMO soybeans, broken promises, and trash talks.” His broader argument, however, was that Iran alone would determine how its released assets are spent and had accepted no externally imposed purchasing obligations.

Judiciary Chief Mohseni-Ejei similarly argued that “negotiation in no way means surrender to the United States,” while urging politicians and media figures to avoid rhetoric that could create the appearance of deep internal divisions at a sensitive moment in the diplomatic process.

Beyond official institutions, some influential conservative voices have also begun defending diplomacy from a position of strategic realism rather than ideological moderation. Among the most prominent has been conservative journalist Vahid Ashtari, who argued that Iran’s recent experience demonstrated the limits of prolonged confrontation. While criticizing the government’s communication strategy, Ashtari maintained that the Iranian public deserves an honest assessment of the country’s military, economic and strategic constraints rather than slogans detached from reality. He pointed to the economic costs of the recent conflict, pressures on Iran’s oil exports, and the limitations of sustained escalation with the United States. His comments are particularly notable because they defend diplomacy not from a reformist perspective, but from within conservative political thought based on a calculation of Iran’s national interests.

Economic debates have undergone an equally significant transformation. Trump’s assertion that Iran would purchase American agricultural products with its released assets quickly became one of the most discussed political controversies inside Iran. Yet the debate revealed that disagreements were increasingly centered on economic strategy rather than ideological opposition to engagement with the United States.

Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati emphasized that the memorandum contains no provision obligating Iran to purchase American agricultural goods. He explained that the first tranche of released assets remains governed by the humanitarian framework negotiated during the Biden administration, while future released funds could finance a broader range of non-sanctioned imports. At the same time, Hemmati argued that if American products offer better prices or quality, rejecting them solely for ideological reasons would not serve Iran’s national interests.

Several economists went even further. Economist Sadegh Hosseini argued that purchasing American agricultural products such as corn, soybeans, and wheat could actually strengthen diplomacy by creating economic stakeholders within the United States who would benefit from stable bilateral relations. In his view, import decisions should be guided by price, quality, and national economic interests, not ideology.

Political analyst Ali Afshari similarly noted that Iran has continued importing American medicines, medical equipment, chemicals, and limited food products even during periods of maximum sanctions. According to Afshari, trade with the United States should not be treated as an ideological taboo but evaluated according to the interests of Iranian consumers and the broader economy.

The same logic had been advanced even before the current memorandum. Economist Hadi Kahalzadeh, writing for the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft months earlier, argued that any durable U.S.–Iran agreement should deliberately include mutually beneficial commercial incentives. He suggested that expanding American exports in sectors such as agriculture, civil aviation, and automobiles would create influential constituencies inside the United States with an economic interest in preserving diplomacy, making future agreements more politically sustainable in both countries.

However, not everyone in Iran is open to expanding trade with the United States. Former Deputy Culture Minister Mohammad Ali Ramin argued that importing American agricultural products would expose Iranians to genetically-modified food and even characterized such imports as a form of biological warfare. His criticism focused on what he claimed Washington wanted rather than on the memorandum itself, acknowledging that no such obligation appears in the agreement.

The Reform Front of Iran, meanwhile, offered one of the strongest endorsements of the memorandum. The coalition praised President Pezeshkian and the negotiating team for reducing tensions and protecting Iran’s national interests while arguing that the agreement should become the starting point for broader economic reforms, expanded international trade, greater foreign investment, and Iran’s gradual reintegration into the global economy. It also warned that deep mistrust between Tehran and Washington, regional actors seeking to sabotage diplomacy and domestic political interests benefiting from continued confrontation remain the principal threats to the agreement’s success.

Opposition within the conservative camp has not disappeared, but its character has changed. Mohammad Javad Larijani has emerged as one of the most prominent skeptical voices regarding the government’s management of the negotiations. Rather than rejecting diplomacy outright, Larijani has repeatedly emphasized that decisions concerning war, peace and negotiations belong exclusively to the Supreme Leader and that the government possesses no independent mandate beyond implementing his directives. His criticism therefore reflects an effort to reinforce the Leader’s constitutional authority over foreign policy rather than a wholesale rejection of the memorandum itself.

Perhaps one of the most revealing developments has been the changing nature of public discourse surrounding the agreement. BBC Persian journalist Siavash Ardalan observed that two political camps which ordinarily stand at opposite ends of Iran’s political spectrum - the hardline domestic opponents of the memorandum, particularly figures and supporters close to the Paydari Front, and segments of the regime-change opposition abroad - have increasingly begun using remarkably similar rhetoric to attack the agreement.

Ardalan pointed to the controversy surrounding President Trump’s claim that Iran would use part of its released assets to purchase American agricultural products, despite repeated denials by Iranian officials that any such commitment exists. According to him, both camps quickly transformed the allegation into a political weapon. Hardline supporters mocked the agreement with slogans such as “We gave up the Strait [of Hormuz] to get animal feed,” while focusing on claims that American agricultural products are genetically-modified and could endanger public health. At the same time, segments of the regime-change opposition - many of whom had long argued that sanctions relief would never improve the lives of ordinary Iranians - responded with nearly identical sarcasm, declaring “You gave away Khamenei and got animal feed—is this your great victory?”

As Ardalan noted, the language employed by these otherwise hostile political camps has become so similar that it is sometimes difficult to determine from social media alone which side a particular sarcastic remark originates from. The convergence is not rooted in shared political objectives but in a common effort to discredit the memorandum by exploiting the same narrative.

With negotiations toward a possible broaderr deal underway, political competition is increasingly centered on how the agreement should be interpreted, implemented, defended, and translated into tangible economic and strategic gains. The most significant development, therefore, is not simply the weakening of ideological resistance to negotiations. Rather, it is the emergence of a broad coalition - including senior state institutions, reformists, pragmatic conservatives, and prominent economists - that increasingly views diplomacy and selective international economic engagement as practical instruments for advancing Iran’s national interests in the post-war environment. Even critics who remain skeptical of aspects of the agreement now frame their objections largely around questions of authority, implementation, or strategy rather than outright opposition to negotiations themselves. That shift marks one of the clearest indicators yet that Iran’s domestic conversation has moved from debating whether to negotiate to debating how to make diplomacy work.

For years, debates over Iran policy in Washington centered on sanctions, nuclear restrictions, military deterrence, and regional conflicts. Today, however, President Donald Trump is increasingly presenting diplomacy with Iran through a different lens: as an economic opportunity for the United States.

The clearest indication came with the publication of OFAC General License X, which authorizes, through August 21, 2026, the production, transportation, delivery, and sale of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products, and petrochemicals. The authorization also covers related services including banking, insurance, shipping, and logistics. Most notably, the license permits the importation of Iranian-origin oil and petrochemical products into the United States and allows associated dollar-denominated transactions. While temporary and tied to ongoing negotiations, the measure represents the most meaningful opening for Iran’s energy sector since the current conflict began, and the broadest opening of primary sanctions on Iran - which prohibit most direct U.S.-Iran trade - in decades.

For Iran, the waiver offers access to badly needed export revenues and creates an opportunity to reconnect with global energy markets. For Washington, it helps reduce pressure on oil prices while creating leverage to encourage continued compliance with the diplomatic process. The temporary nature of the authorization ensures that both sides retain incentives to keep negotiations moving forward.

The economic dimension of the talks became even more apparent in Trump’s public comments about how Iranian assets set to be released under the memorandum of understanding could be used. Rather than focusing solely on nuclear issues or regional security, Trump repeatedly highlighted potential Iranian purchases of American agricultural products, particularly corn, soybeans and wheat, emphasizing the benefits for American farmers.

What makes this noteworthy is that Iran’s response has not been outright rejection. Central Bank Governor Abdolnasser Hemmati stated that if American products are competitively priced and offer suitable quality, “there is no obstacle” to purchasing them. At the same time, he rejected suggestions that Washington would dictate how Iranian assets are spent. Iran’s position appears to be straightforward: Tehran may purchase American goods, but based on its own economic needs rather than political conditions imposed by the United States.

In practice, the disagreement may be smaller than public rhetoric suggests. Iran already imports substantial quantities of agricultural commodities, animal feed, and other basic goods, and has a history of importing many goods from the United States that are not blocked by U.S. sanctions. Redirecting part of its purchases toward American suppliers would not necessarily require a major shift from Tehran. The first $6 billion tranche of released assets is already governed by the framework negotiated during the Biden administration in 2023, which limited expenditures primarily to humanitarian goods such as food and medicine.

More importantly, Iranian officials have indicated that future released assets would not be restricted solely to basic goods. According to Hemmati, additional funds could be used for a broader range of non-sanctioned purchases. This potentially creates a much larger commercial space than the initial humanitarian framework.

The reported $300 billion reconstruction and economic development initiative could further expand that opportunity. Although details remain limited, reconstruction projects, infrastructure investments, technology transfers, and industrial development could eventually create opportunities for international companies, including American firms if political conditions permit.

Some Iranian policymakers have long argued that tying American economic interests to a diplomatic agreement can strengthen its durability. The logic is simple: if influential economic actors inside the United States benefit from engagement with Iran, they become stakeholders in preserving diplomatic progress. Trump’s emphasis on exports, agriculture, and commercial opportunities suggests that a similar calculation may now be emerging in Washington. Some of Trump’s early, major criticisms of the 2015 deal negotiated under President Obama stem from his belief that other countries benefited far more from the sanctions lifting than the United States.

Yet this remains politically sensitive inside Iran. For many opponents of the agreement, particularly hardline factions, expanding economic ties with the United States remains deeply controversial. Those sensitivities have only intensified following the recent war and the deaths of senior Iranian military commanders, government officials, soldiers, and civilians. Even among supporters of diplomacy, normalization with the United States remains a difficult and emotionally charged subject.

At the same time, the biggest threat to the emerging economic opening may sensitivities or the nuclear file, but Lebanon. The memorandum reportedly requires an end to military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. Yet Israeli officials continue to insist that Israeli forces will remain in parts of southern Lebanon and retain freedom of military action. Reports of deadly incidents following the ceasefire underscore how fragile the situation remains.

The issue appears to be receiving direct attention from the White House. When asked about Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s insistence that Israeli forces would not leave southern Lebanon, Trump declined to discuss specifics but signaled confidence that the matter would be resolved, stating: “This problem will be solved. I’m a problem solver.” Although Trump provided no details, the comment suggests that the administration recognizes continued tensions in Lebanon as a potential threat to the broader diplomatic process. This may help explain why negotiators reportedly created a dedicated conflict-control mechanism involving Qatar and Pakistan to monitor compliance and reduce the risk of renewed escalation.

Important questions also remain regarding nuclear inspections. U.S. officials have suggested that Iran agreed to allow the return of IAEA inspectors, while Iranian officials insist that no new nuclear commitments have been accepted beyond existing safeguards obligations. This discrepancy will likely be addressed by the technical working groups established during the negotiations and remains one of the most important unresolved issues.

Nevertheless, the negotiations have already produced something that previous rounds of diplomacy largely lacked: a significant economic incentive structure for both sides. Iran seeks access to energy markets, frozen assets, and reconstruction funding. The United States sees potential benefits in lower energy prices, expanded exports, and greater regional stability. Gulf states seek secure shipping lanes and reduced tensions.

These incentives do not eliminate the substantial political and security disputes that remain. But they do provide both sides with reasons to continue talking rather than returning immediately to confrontation. The ultimate significance of the Switzerland talks may therefore lie not only in what they achieved diplomatically, but in the possibility that economic interests are beginning to reinforce diplomacy itself. After years in which “maximum pressure” defined the relationship, the most durable foundation for a future agreement may ultimately be the prospect of mutual economic benefit.

Nabavian further claimed that Khamenei had opposed negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program unless Iran’s enrichment rights were explicitly recognized and had warned that the negotiations taking place in Pakistan had deviated significantly from the conditions that originally justified them. He argued that the memorandum ultimately differed from what the leadership had envisioned and suggested that Khamenei had serious reservations about both the process and the outcome.

The reaction was immediate and extraordinary. State television abruptly cut the live broadcast before Nabavian finished his remarks. Hours later, IRIB issued a statement describing his comments as an improper disclosure of classified materials and warned that the matter could be subject to legal prosecution. The broadcaster subsequently accepted the resignation of a senior network manager and announced disciplinary measures against those responsible for the program.

The severity of the response was striking. Iranian state television has often served as a platform for critics of negotiations with the United States, including many figures associated with the Paydari Front. Nabavian himself had repeatedly appeared on television in recent months criticizing the negotiations and portraying the memorandum as a step toward turning Iran into an American “colony.” The decision to interrupt the program and publicly threaten legal action suggests that authorities viewed his comments as crossing a political red line.

The backlash extended well beyond state television. Saeed Ajorlou, a member of the negotiating team’s media apparatus and a close ally of Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, accused Nabavian of deliberately distorting confidential texts. Other political figures criticized him for selectively presenting excerpts from a much larger body of correspondence. Journalist Sadegh Hosseini called for greater accountability over repeated leaks of sensitive information, while former presidential adviser Hesameddin Ashena argued that if the documents were genuinely classified at the highest level, the law clearly defined the consequences of unauthorized disclosure. Even some conservative figures criticized Nabavian, arguing that his partial disclosures undermined institutional order and were designed to defend previous claims that the agreement amounted to Iranian surrender.

Yet the significance of the episode extends beyond questions of classified information. At its core, the controversy reflects an emerging struggle over how the public should understand the Iran–U.S. agreement and the role of the country’s leadership in approving it.

In a written statement attributed to Mojtaba Khamenei following the announcement of the memorandum, the Supreme Leader stated that he had “another opinion” regarding the agreement but ultimately permitted it to move forward after President Masoud Pezeshkian accepted responsibility for implementing it. Many observers interpreted the statement as an effort to create some political distance between the leadership and the agreement while preserving institutional unity and allowing diplomacy to proceed.

Nabavian’s intervention appeared designed to push that interpretation much further. By selectively quoting what he described as confidential communications, he sought to portray Khamenei not merely as cautious about the agreement but as fundamentally dissatisfied with many of its core elements. In effect, Nabavian attempted to strengthen the narrative advanced by hardline opponents that the memorandum represented a deviation from the leadership’s preferred strategy and was being pursued despite significant reservations at the highest levels.

By contrast, President Masoud Pezeshkian has offered a very different account of how the agreement was reached. Speaking at a national governance conference following the announcement of the memorandum, Pezeshkian described the agreement as the product of months of negotiations, consultations, and institutional review. He argued that if fully implemented, the memorandum could become a historic achievement for Iran, help resolve many of the country’s challenges, and create a new political and economic reality for both Iran and the broader Middle East.

Most significantly, Pezeshkian disclosed that more than 90 percent of participants in the Supreme National Security Council supported the agreement. According to the president, after extensive discussions, all members ultimately voted in favor of moving forward, although some limited disagreements remained. While he did not identify dissenting figures, his remarks offered one of the clearest indications yet that the agreement enjoys overwhelming support among Iran’s senior national security leadership.

Pezeshkian also emphasized the roles played by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, the negotiating team, and the Supreme National Security Council. He praised the cooperation among the executive, legislative, judicial, and military institutions and argued that this unity had strengthened Iran’s position. Perhaps most importantly, Pezeshkian explicitly credited Mojtaba Khamenei for making the agreement possible. He stated that negotiators would not retreat from the framework established by the Supreme Leader and argued that the authorities and guidance provided by him were indispensable to achieving the breakthrough. According to Pezeshkian, without the Supreme Leader’s support and guidance, the agreement would not have been possible.

These remarks stand in sharp contrast to the narrative advanced by Nabavian and other hardline opponents of the memorandum. Whereas Nabavian sought to portray the leadership as deeply dissatisfied with the negotiations, Pezeshkian presented the process as one that received overwhelming support from the country’s most important decision-making institutions and ultimately from the Supreme Leader himself.

The broader political context is equally important. Since the announcement of the memorandum, figures associated with the Paydari Front and other ideological factions have mounted a sustained campaign against the agreement. Nabavian has been among the most vocal critics, describing the memorandum as a path toward Iranian dependence on the United States and warning that it compromises national sovereignty. His opposition is consistent with a long record of resistance to engagement with Washington, opposition to Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-recommended reforms, and support for confrontational regional policies.

The controversy also highlights the increasingly isolated position of the agreement’s most vocal opponents. Despite significant criticism from hardline networks, the political system moved swiftly against Nabavian following his televised remarks. State television interrupted the broadcast, accepted a senior resignation, threatened legal action, and publicly distanced itself from his claims. Such a coordinated response suggests that key institutions are seeking to protect the agreement from internal sabotage and prevent disputes over the leadership’s position from undermining its implementation.

Viewed in this broader context, the Nabavian affair reveals that the primary political struggle is no longer over whether the Iran–U.S. memorandum should exist. The agreement has already secured support from President Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Araghchi, Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf, the Supreme National Security Council, and ultimately the Supreme Leader. Instead, the emerging battle is over how the agreement will be interpreted, who will claim ownership of it, and who will bear responsibility if it succeeds or fails.

The episode therefore represents one of the clearest indications yet that a relatively small but highly organized hardline faction continues to resist the agreement and is attempting to frame it as a departure from the leadership’s preferred course. At the same time, the reaction from state institutions suggests that the Iranian establishment has largely coalesced around the memorandum and is determined to prevent opponents from using the authority of the Supreme Leader to undermine a diplomatic initiative that now appears central to the state’s post-war strategy.

At the opening of the talks, Vice President JD Vance described the meeting as “historic”, saying its purpose was to “turn a new page” and begin “a new chapter” in relations with the Iranian people. Vance said Washington was seeking a broader transformation in the region based on stability and peace, and framed the negotiations as an opportunity to move beyond decades of confrontation.

Vance was joined by Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, underscoring the degree to which the talks were being handled by figures close to Trump’s inner circle rather than treated as a routine diplomatic engagement. Their presence suggested that the administration viewed the Switzerland track as a high-priority initiative with potentially transformative implications.

However, moments after Vance’s remarks, Trump posted on Truth Social that Iran must immediately stop its allied forces in Lebanon from “causing trouble,” warning that if it did not, the United States would strike again “even harder.” The post created immediate tension. Iranian media reported that Tehran’s delegation formally complained to the American side and paused the talks for internal consultations.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who led the Iranian delegation, responded sharply, saying Iran did not take American threats seriously and warning that Iran’s armed forces were prepared to respond if necessary. Iranian officials also avoided appearing in a joint photo or handshake ceremony with the American delegation, reflecting sensitivity to domestic political pressures in Tehran.

Despite the disruption, the negotiations continued and produced several concrete outcomes. Qatar and Pakistan issued a joint statement describing the first day of talks as “positive and constructive” and announcing that the parties had made “encouraging progress.” The agreements outlined include:

• A roadmap to reach a final agreement within 60 days;

• The immediate continuation of technical negotiations;

• The creation of a High-Level Committee to oversee implementation and political coordination;

• The establishment of a direct communication channel between Iran and the United States; and

• The creation of a conflict-control mechanism focused on Lebanon.

The newly established High-Level Committee will supervise working groups on nuclear issues, sanctions relief, implementation, monitoring, and dispute resolution, providing a structured framework for advancing the memorandum of understanding. The establishment of a direct communication channel is intended to prevent incidents and misunderstandings in the Strait of Hormuz and ensure the safe passage of commercial shipping. This issue had become increasingly urgent following Iranian threats to close the waterway amid disputes over Lebanon.

Lebanon Emerges as the Central Challenge

As could be predicted following President Trump’s remarks, Lebanon appears to remain the most difficult issue in the negotiations. Under the memorandum of understanding, Iran, the United States, and their respective allies are expected to support an immediate and permanent end to military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. However, Israel has insisted that its forces will remain in a security buffer zone in southern Lebanon, while Iran and Hezbollah have rejected any continued Israeli presence.

To address this challenge, the parties agreed to establish a Lebanon Conflict-Control Mechanism, facilitated by Qatar and Pakistan, to monitor compliance with the ceasefire and reduce the risk of renewed escalation. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei described the mechanism as a way to ensure that the memorandum is actually implemented rather than merely signed. He emphasized the principle of “commitment for commitment” and said Iran would monitor compliance continuously.

At the same time, unconfirmed reports suggest that Egypt and Saudi Arabia may be promoting a framework under which Israel would withdraw from southern Lebanon while Hezbollah would retain its weapons but commit not to use them. Such a formula would effectively postpone the contentious issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament while prioritizing a sustainable ceasefire. However, these reports remain unverified and should be treated cautiously.

Progress on Sanctions and Frozen Assets

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi described the negotiations as having produced “significant progress.”

According to Araghchi:

• Restrictions on Iran’s oil and petrochemical exports have been suspended;

• The naval blockade has been lifted;

• Some frozen Iranian assets have been released;

• A reconstruction and economic development initiative for Iran has begun; and

• Significant progress has been made toward ending the conflict in Lebanon.

Iranian economic officials also announced that $12 billion in frozen Iranian assets could be released in two phases, with $6 billion released initially and another $6 billion later. Meanwhile, Hamid Bord, head of the National Iranian Oil Company and a member of Iran’s negotiating team, said discussions on lifting oil sanctions were pursued aggressively. He reported that Iranian vessels had already begun using previously restricted routes and that a substantial volume of oil exports had resumed.

Regional Support for the Negotiations

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif described the negotiations as “successful,” citing the 60-day roadmap, technical talks, and the creation of implementation mechanisms as evidence of meaningful progress. The diplomatic process also received regional backing. On June 21, the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey met in Cairo to discuss regional developments and efforts to reduce tensions, including the U.S.–Iran memorandum of understanding.

Participants included:

• Faisal bin Farhan (Saudi Arabia)

• Mohammad Ishaq Dar (Pakistan)

• Badr Abdelatty (Egypt)

• Hakan Fidan (Turkey)

According to official statements, the ministers discussed Pakistan’s mediation efforts, developments in Lebanon, regional stability, and the need to preserve the diplomatic track. They emphasized continued coordination to reduce tensions and restore security throughout the region. The significance of these consultations is that the Switzerland process has evolved beyond a purely bilateral U.S.–Iran negotiation. It now encompasses Lebanon, sanctions relief, Gulf security, oil exports, maritime navigation, and broader regional stability.

Israeli Opposition and Continuing Risks

The talks continue to face substantial resistance from Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated that Israel would remain in its security buffer zone in southern Lebanon “as long as necessary.” He also declared that no political development would alter his commitment to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz similarly stated that Israeli forces would remain in southern Lebanon and retain full freedom of action against perceived threats. On the other side, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem rejected any Israeli military presence inside Lebanon, while IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani warned that Israel would face additional losses if it refused to withdraw.

These competing positions illustrate why Lebanon has become the first major test of the Switzerland framework. Success in reducing tensions there could reinforce the broader diplomatic process, while failure could empower opponents of diplomacy across the region.

A Fragile but Significant Breakthrough

The negotiations did not produce a final agreement, and substantial obstacles remain. Nuclear restrictions, sanctions relief, implementation mechanisms, Lebanon, regional security issues, and domestic political opposition in both countries all remain unresolved.

Nevertheless, the talks produced a framework that did not exist before:

• A 60-day roadmap toward a final agreement;

• A High-Level Committee overseeing implementation;

• Technical working groups;

• A direct Hormuz communication channel;

• A Lebanon conflict-control mechanism;

• Movement on sanctions relief; and

• Progress on frozen assets.

Most importantly, the talks demonstrated that both sides remain committed to pursuing diplomacy despite significant political pressure and recurring crises. For that reason, Vance’s description of the meeting as “historic” may ultimately prove accurate. The Switzerland negotiations represent the most serious attempt in years to move the United States and Iran from military confrontation toward a structured diplomatic process. The breakthrough remains fragile, but it has established a framework that could, if sustained, reshape regional dynamics and potentially open a new chapter in U.S.–Iran relations.

“As a matter of principle, I held a different view. However, based on the commitment made by the President, in his capacity as head of the Supreme National Security Council, on behalf of himself and the other members, and his explicit acceptance of responsibility for the matter, I authorized it.”

This formulation is significant for several reasons. First, Khamenei makes a point of stating that he personally preferred a different course of action. Rather than presenting the agreement as his own strategic choice, he emphasizes that he approved it despite his reservations. This allows him to maintain distance from the policy while still permitting it to move forward. Most importantly, he publicly stated that he had “a different view” and only approved the deal after receiving assurances from President Pezeshkian and the Supreme National Security Council.

Second, he explicitly places responsibility on President Masoud Pezeshkian and the Supreme National Security Council. The statement highlights that Pezeshkian “accepted responsibility” for the agreement before receiving authorization.

By emphasizing that Pezeshkian “accepted responsibility,” Khamenei appears to be assigning political ownership of the agreement to the government rather than to himself. This approach appears intended to address two distinct audiences. The first audience consists of hardline supporters, conservative activists, and segments of the political base that rallied behind the leadership during more than one hundred days of war. Many within these circles remain deeply skeptical of negotiations with the United States. By stressing that he initially opposed the agreement, Khamenei reassures hardline supporters that he has not abandoned the ideological principles of resistance and that the deal should not be interpreted as a personal endorsement of rapprochement with Washington.

The second audience is the broader political establishment. If the memorandum ultimately fails, if negotiations collapse, or if Washington is perceived to violate its commitments, the political responsibility will fall primarily on the government and President Pezeshkian rather than on the Supreme Leader himself. In effect, Khamenei has approved the process while insulating his own political capital from its outcome. The reactions that followed the statement suggest that many officials recognized the potential for this interpretation and sought to counter it.

President Pezeshkian’s response focused heavily on the Supreme Leader’s support for diplomacy. He described the statement as a “roadmap” for protecting Iran’s national interests and emphasized that the government and the Supreme National Security Council remain committed to implementing the Leader’s guidance. Pezeshkian’s response sought to frame the negotiations as a system-wide decision endorsed by the Supreme Leader rather than a personal initiative of his administration.

The President’s communications office reinforced this message, arguing that the Leader’s authorization for negotiations constituted a valuable asset for the negotiating team and rejecting suggestions of disagreement among the leadership.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf adopted a notably different tone. Rather than emphasizing diplomacy, he framed the agreement through an ideological and confrontational lens. His response was filled with references to “the front of monotheism,” “the front of falsehood,” “resistance,” “struggle,” and keeping “our hands on the trigger.” He argued that diplomacy itself should be viewed as another battlefield in the broader struggle against adversaries.

The contrast between Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf is revealing. Pezeshkian emphasized governance, diplomacy, and national interests. Ghalibaf emphasized resistance, confrontation, and ideological struggle. While both support the agreement, they appear to be speaking to different audiences.

Pezeshkian is focused on reassuring the broader public and demonstrating that diplomacy can deliver results. Ghalibaf is focused on reassuring hardline constituencies that the agreement does not represent an ideological retreat. Statements from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Supreme National Security Council Secretariat, and conservative cleric Ahmad Alamolhoda followed a similar pattern.

All publicly endorsed the negotiations while simultaneously stressing distrust of the United States, preserving the achievements of the war, and maintaining readiness for military retaliation if the agreement is violated. This messaging appears designed to preserve unity within the political system while preventing backlash from hardline factions.

Taken together, Khamenei’s message can best be understood as a form of conditional and cautious support. He did not block the agreement. He authorized it. But he also made clear that it was not his preferred course of action. This distinction is politically important. By endorsing the negotiations while distancing himself from ownership of them, Khamenei preserves support among hardline constituencies while shifting responsibility for the agreement’s success or failure toward the government.

At the same time, the statement elevated Pezeshkian’s political standing. In recent weeks, the growing visibility of figures such as Ali Larijani and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in the negotiation process had led some observers to conclude that the president had been sidelined. Instead, Khamenei repeatedly emphasized Pezeshkian’s role as both President and Chairman of the Supreme National Security Council, effectively placing him at the center of the process.

The most important political message of the statement, therefore, may not have been directed at Washington at all. It was directed at Iran’s domestic political landscape. The negotiations will proceed. The Supreme Leader has authorized them. But the political ownership - and potentially the political liability - belongs primarily to President Pezeshkian and his government.

Unlike the debates surrounding the 2015 nuclear deal, the emerging divide is no longer simply between reformists who support engagement and conservatives who oppose it. Instead, many influential conservative figures, state-affiliated media outlets, establishment insiders, academics, journalists, and civil society voices have endorsed the agreement as a means of consolidating Iran’s wartime gains and avoiding further destruction. At the same time, a smaller but vocal hardline faction continues to warn against trusting the United States and making concessions at the negotiating table.

The Iranian press offers perhaps the clearest illustration of this shift. Reformist newspaper Shargh ran the headline “The War Is Over”, framing the agreement as an opportunity to transition from military confrontation to diplomacy. In an editorial titled “The Difficult Road Ahead,” the paper argued that the agreement is intended primarily to create space for the next phase of negotiations rather than resolve all outstanding disputes. Shargh emphasized that issues such as Iran’s missile program and regional allies are not included in the current framework and that the agreement is focused on ending hostilities, lifting economic pressure, and creating a pathway toward a comprehensive settlement.

Etemad similarly welcomed the agreement under the headline “The First Day of Understanding”, publishing the full text of the memorandum and describing it as the beginning of a new phase rather than the end of the process. The newspaper highlighted provisions calling for a permanent end to military operations across all fronts, including Lebanon, mutual respect for sovereignty, and a commitment to negotiate a final agreement within sixty days.

Sazandegi offered one of the strongest endorsements, featuring the headline “A Major Step Forward” and presenting the agreement as an opportunity for economic recovery, reconstruction, and Iran’s reintegration into international diplomacy. Ettelaat likewise embraced the diplomatic opening, warning that “those who benefit from war want war to continue.” The paper argued that sanctions profiteers, political opportunists, and those invested in perpetual confrontation should not be allowed to derail a chance for peace.

Perhaps the most noteworthy position came from Javan, a newspaper closely associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Rather than criticizing negotiations, Javan argued that diplomacy should be viewed as a continuation of the battlefield. The paper wrote that “negotiation can be like war and a continuation of it,” criticizing those who reject all forms of diplomacy and arguing that governments can fight and negotiate simultaneously. Javan insisted that diplomacy should not automatically be equated with surrender and warned against portraying every agreement either as a complete victory or a betrayal.

By contrast, Kayhan has remained deeply skeptical. Its headline — “The Enemy Was Defeated on the Battlefield; Beware the Loopholes of the Agreement” — encapsulates its position. Editor Hossein Shariatmadari argues that the conflict between Iran and the United States is fundamentally ideological and existential. While not rejecting the end of the war itself, he insists that Iran must not surrender the achievements secured through military resistance. Shariatmadari warned that Washington’s long-term objective remains weakening the Islamic Republic and argued that Iran’s armed forces must remain fully prepared even if a final agreement is reached.

What is particularly notable is that support for the agreement extends beyond political elites and into civil society, academia, and the broader intellectual sphere. Emad Baghi, one of Iran’s most prominent human rights advocates, described the agreement as a “win-win negotiation.” While arguing that the war itself could and should have been avoided, Baghi maintained that Iran’s ability to withstand pressure from major world powers and emerge with an agreement represented a source of national pride. More importantly, he suggested that the agreement offers a lesson for domestic politics: if Iran and the United States can move beyond decades of hostility and negotiate, then political actors within Iran should likewise embrace dialogue rather than exclusion. He argued that differing viewpoints should be heard rather than criminalized and called for a less polarized political environment.

Reformist sociologist and political commentator Mohammadreza Jalaipour linked the agreement to a broader process of political moderation and consensus-building inside the Iranian system. He argued that the agreement would not have been possible without the election of President Masoud Pezeshkian, the more pragmatic leadership of Parliament under Ghalibaf, years of reformist efforts to build consensus, and what he described as the successful synergy between the battlefield, diplomacy, public mobilization, and state institutions. In Jalaipour’s view, the agreement represents the culmination of a political strategy that rejected both radical confrontation and political despair.

Notably, support for the agreement has also emerged from long-time critics of the Islamic Republic. Ali Afshari, a prominent democracy advocate and former student activist, described the understanding as “a victory for Iran as a country and an ancient nation.” While emphasizing that the struggle for democracy remains unresolved, Afshari argued that ending the war was an essential first step and urged Iranians to focus on social cohesion, economic recovery, and realistic political reform rather than either triumphalism or cynicism.

Legal scholar and attorney Bahmani Ghajar used the agreement to call for national reconciliation. Describing the agreement as a major military, political, and diplomatic achievement, he urged authorities to accompany it with a general amnesty for political prisoners and detainees. Ghajar argued that rebuilding the country after the war requires the participation of all Iranians and that national unity should be strengthened through forgiveness and inclusion.

Retired university professor Yadollah Karimpour offered one of the most detailed public defenses of the agreement. He argued that the central question facing critics is whether they genuinely preferred the continuation of war and destruction to a diplomatic opening. Karimpour contended that even an imperfect agreement shifts both countries from a military phase to a diplomatic phase, making a return to war significantly more costly. He further argued that the agreement creates breathing room for society and the economy, weakens the influence of those who profit from perpetual crisis, and provides a framework for distinguishing genuine supporters of peace from advocates of continued confrontation. Summarizing his position, Karimpour wrote that “even the worst peace agreements are usually more effective than the best and most justifiable wars.”

Outside formal political institutions, several prominent journalists and analysts have also publicly welcomed the agreement. Ahmad Zeidabadi wrote that “the darkness of war has passed and a new tomorrow has arrived,” calling for reconciliation, forgiveness, and national healing after months of conflict. Conservative commentator Mohammad Mohajeri argued that if diplomacy succeeds in ending the war, “the business of sanctions profiteers and war profiteers will come to an end,” reflecting broader frustration with ideological opposition to negotiations.

Several notable former officials from varied political backgrounds have also expressed support for the agreement. Former President Hassan Rouhani described the agreement as a major national achievement and urged Iranians to protect it from sabotage. He warned that Israel would likely attempt to undermine the diplomatic opening, just as it sought to destroy previous agreements, and stressed that the coming sixty days would be critical for securing a lasting settlement. Rouhani wrote that “the achievement of the preliminary understanding must be protected” and emphasized that national unity would be essential for reaching a final agreement.

Former President Mohammad Khatami similarly endorsed the agreement w hile emphasizing caution. In a widely circulated statement, he argued that “this is not the end of the crisis, but the beginning of a difficult and lengthy road toward overcoming it and opening a horizon of life free from war.” Khatami praised the military, the negotiating team, and national institutions while stressing that the ultimate objective should be lasting peace and regional stability.

Former First Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri described the agreement as “a major achievement in ending a costly war” and called on all political and civil currents to support it. He argued that the agreement could open a new chapter for addressing Iran’s economic and social challenges and provide an opportunity for reconstruction and development.

Notable pragmatic centrists also supported the agreement. Mohsen Hashemi, chairman of the central council of the Executives of Construction Party, argued that if the agreement is accompanied by realism and national consensus, it could become “the beginning of a new era of stability, development, and reconstruction of Iran’s national power.” He also called for a reassessment of Iran’s economic relationships with China and Russia and argued that Tehran should use any diplomatic opening to pursue more balanced international partnerships. Hossein Marashi, secretary-general of the Executives of Construction Party, declared that “the time has come for all political currents, including critics of the negotiations, to join the nation and welcome the agreement.” Marashi urged political factions to focus on reconstruction, economic growth, and improving living conditions rather than prolonging political disputes.

One of the most politically significant endorsements came from Seyyed Hassan Khomeini, grandson of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and a figure often viewed as a bridge between establishment and reformist currents. In a speech defending both the agreement and the role of Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Khomeini argued that “the collective wisdom of the Islamic Republic has concluded that action must be taken today.” He urged Iranians to trust the decisions of senior officials and warned that “we may not succeed through consensus, but we will certainly fail through division.”

Khomeini explicitly defended Ghalibaf, describing him as “a war commander, the brother of a martyr, and one of the Islamic Republic’s first-rate managers.” He stressed that Ghalibaf was serving in a key decision-making and negotiating role and argued that “attacking and undermining senior decision-makers serves no purpose.” Significantly, Khomeini emphasized that major decisions regarding negotiations and diplomacy are being taken under the supervision and approval of the country’s highest leadership, directly challenging hardline efforts to portray negotiators as acting independently or irresponsibly.

Support for the agreement has also emerged from within Parliament and the broader conservative establishment. Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a member of Parliament’s National Security Committee, stated plainly that “we must move toward peace with the United States.” He criticized hardline opponents of diplomacy and argued that if they stop creating obstacles, Iran can successfully reach a durable agreement.

Alaeddin Boroujerdi, another member of the National Security Committee, described the fourteen-point memorandum as an agreement that “serves Iran’s interests to a significant degree.” He argued that the United States had been forced into negotiations by military and economic pressure and pointed to the easing of restrictions on Iranian shipping as an early sign that the agreement was already producing tangible benefits.

Mahmoud Vaezi, former chief of staff to President Rouhani, defended the agreement as one negotiated “from a position of strength” and approved by all major institutions of the state. Former MP Jalal Rashidi Koochi directly challenged hardline criticisms after the agreement became public, asking: “Which part of this agreement turns Iran into an American colony?” He criticized accusations that negotiators had betrayed national interests and argued that many of the attacks were politically motivated rather than substantive.

Meanwhile, Saeed Ajorlou, a member of the negotiating team’s media operation, described the agreement as a “step-by-step” framework that preserves Iran’s leverage and includes mechanisms for reversibility. He argued that the United States had accepted obligations exceeding those undertaken by Iran and characterized the current moment as “the season for securing national interests.”

Despite the breadth of support, opposition has not disappeared. The strongest criticism continues to come from figures associated with the Paydari Front and hardline media outlets. Mahmoud Nabavian, Amirhossein Sabeti, Hamid Rasai, and Qasem Ravanbakhsh have all warned that Iran risks squandering military gains through diplomacy. Ravanbakhsh summarized this view by declaring: “Victory in diplomacy is a gift; just do not turn the victories of resistance into defeat.” Hardline critics generally argue that Iran’s achievements on the battlefield - including preventing regime change, preserving territorial integrity, and demonstrating military deterrence - should not be traded away in negotiations whose final outcomes remain uncertain.

Yet even among critics, an important distinction has emerged. Most opponents are not openly advocating a return to war. Rather, they argue that diplomacy must proceed only under conditions that preserve what they view as Iran’s strategic gains. This marks a notable departure from previous periods when opposition to negotiations was often more categorical.

Overall, the debate surrounding the U.S.–Iran agreement reveals a political landscape far more complex than the one that existed during the nuclear negotiations a decade ago. Support for diplomacy now extends beyond reformists and moderates to include influential conservative figures, establishment insiders, security officials, newspapers aligned with state institutions, academics, civil society leaders, and even some long-time critics of the Islamic Republic. The principal divide is no longer between reformists and conservatives, but between those who view diplomacy as the next chapter in the defense of the homeland and those who see negotiations as a potential threat to the gains achieved through resistance.

For now, supporters of the agreement appear to hold the upper hand. From Khatami and Rouhani to Seyyed Hassan Khomeini, from Shargh and Etemad to Javan and parts of the conservative establishment, from human rights advocates like Emad Baghi to democracy activists like Ali Afshari, a remarkably broad coalition has emerged around the idea that Iran should use the current opening to secure peace, reduce economic pressure, and begin rebuilding after war. Whether that coalition can hold together through the next sixty days of negotiations may determine not only the fate of the agreement itself, but also the future direction of Iranian politics.

According to the published text, the 14-point MOU commits the United States, Iran, and their allies to an immediate and permanent end to military operations across all fronts, including Lebanon. The parties pledge not to initiate attacks against one another, refrain from threats or the use of force, and negotiate a final agreement within 60 days. The agreement also outlines the lifting of the U.S. naval blockade on Iran, the restoration of commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, the eventual return of U.S. military deployments to pre-war levels, a $300 billion reconstruction and development initiative for Iran, sanctions relief, and commitments regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including a pledge that Iran will never acquire nuclear weapons and cooperation on diluting enriched uranium under IAEA supervision.

The diplomatic significance of the agreement has been underscored by reports that President Donald Trump and President Masoud Pezeshkian may personally attend the signing ceremony in Switzerland. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei confirmed that such a meeting remains under consideration, while Trump has indicated that he may remain in Europe to participate in the ceremony. If realized, such a meeting would represent the highest-level direct contact between Iranian and American since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Iranian leaders have largely portrayed the agreement as a strategic success. President Masoud Pezeshkian described the MOU as an opportunity to address many of Iran’s economic and political challenges, arguing that its full implementation could “create a different world” for both Iran and the Middle East. He praised the negotiating team and credited months of diplomacy and coordination for making the breakthrough possible.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who has played a central role in the negotiations, has advanced an even broader defense of the agreement. According to Ghalibaf, military victories only acquire lasting value when they are translated into legally and politically binding achievements. He argued that battlefield successes achieved during the war would have limited historical or practical significance if they were not converted into formal agreements that secure tangible gains.

Ghalibaf has repeatedly rejected the argument that diplomacy represents a retreat from military resistance. Instead, he has portrayed the MOU as the direct result of Iran’s battlefield leverage. Referring to developments during the negotiations, he claimed that issues that had remained unresolved for weeks were settled within hours after military actions changed the negotiating environment. He specifically pointed to provisions concerning Lebanon and the lifting of the naval blockade as examples of outcomes that would have been difficult to achieve through military action alone. In his telling, diplomacy succeeded because it was backed by military strength.

At the same time, Ghalibaf emphasized Iran’s profound distrust of the United States, stating that Iranian negotiators entered the talks fully aware of Washington’s history toward Iran but sought to negotiate from a position of strength rather than weakness. He argued that the agreement demonstrates how military power and diplomacy can work together, with force creating leverage and negotiations converting that leverage into lasting political gains. In one of his most notable formulations, he argued that “victories on the battlefield have no lasting value unless they are recorded in a political and legal document.”

Senior Iranian officials have also increasingly highlighted the economic rationale for the agreement. Ghalibaf argued that Iran must now focus on reducing pressure on ordinary citizens, rebuilding the country after the war, and creating conditions for economic recovery and development. Supporters of the agreement have framed it as an effort to transform military resilience into sanctions relief, investment, reconstruction, and long-term stability.

This position has received substantial institutional support. Iran’s Supreme National Security Council confirmed that the MOU was finalized after months of difficult negotiations and described it as a major achievement. Meanwhile, 261 members of parliament issued a statement backing the negotiating team, warning against efforts to divide the public and undermine diplomacy through rumors and political agitation.

Support for the agreement has also come from outside the current administration. Former President Mohammad Khatami, the most prominent figure associated with Iran’s moderate and reformist political camp, welcomed the agreement and described it as a courageous step toward a durable settlement. Khatami called on both supporters and critics of the Islamic Republic to back the negotiating process, reflecting the broader view among moderates and reformists that diplomacy offers the best opportunity to reduce tensions, ease economic pressure, and reintegrate Iran into the international economy.

President Donald Trump has likewise projected confidence regarding the agreement. In recent remarks, Trump stated that the MOU achieves “everything we intended to achieve—and more.” He argued that continuing the war through additional bombing campaigns would not have produced better results and suggested that prolonged conflict would have risked severe economic consequences for both the region and global markets. Trump emphasized that without the agreement, the Strait of Hormuz might have remained closed and the conflict could have continued for months or even years.

Trump repeatedly emphasized that the agreement could facilitate Iran’s reintegration into the global economy if Tehran complies with its commitments. He suggested that Gulf Arab states could play an important role in future investment and reconstruction efforts and acknowledged the scale of economic damage suffered during the conflict. He also stated that world leaders have broadly welcomed the agreement and indicated that financial restrictions on Iran could eventually be eased as part of a broader settlement.

Perhaps most notably, Trump appeared to distance himself from some of the maximalist positions advocated by anti-Iran voices in Washington and Israel. Discussing conventional missile capabilities, he argued that Iran could not realistically be expected to possess no defensive capabilities while neighboring countries maintained significant missile arsenals. He suggested that discussions regarding conventional missiles should occur within a broader regional framework rather than through unilateral restrictions on Iran.

Trump also issued unusually direct criticism of Israeli actions in Lebanon. While reaffirming support for Israel’s security, he argued that Israeli forces could exercise greater restraint and warned that unnecessary escalation could jeopardize the diplomatic process. Referring to Israeli strikes in Beirut, he suggested that entire residential buildings should not be destroyed in response to limited provocations. He stated that Israel “can do better” in dealing with Hezbollah and openly criticized attacks that risk undermining the agreement.

At the same time, Trump repeatedly warned that the agreement remains conditional. He stated that if Iran failed to comply with its commitments, military action could resume. While emphasizing his preference for diplomacy, he made clear that Washington views compliance as essential for moving toward a final agreement.

The strongest opposition to the MOU has come from Israel and some of its supporters in Washington.Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has explicitly rejected calls for a withdrawal from southern Lebanon, insisting that Israeli forces will remain in security zones for as long as necessary. Opposition extends well beyond Netanyahu. National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir declared that Israel is not bound by the agreement and rejected any arrangement that limits Israeli military freedom of action. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich criticized the agreement as a strategic mistake and argued that pressure on Iran should continue. Opposition politicians including Benny Gantz and Yair Golan likewise condemned the deal, describing it as a strategic setback that risks empowering Iran while restricting Israeli options. Across much of Israel’s political spectrum, concerns center on the perception that the agreement could provide Iran with economic relief while leaving core regional disputes unresolved.

Iran has repeatedly warned that continued Israeli military operations in Lebanon could jeopardize the agreement. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that any future Israeli attack on Lebanon or continued occupation of Lebanese territory would be viewed as a violation of the understanding reached between Tehran and Washington.

These concerns intensified after Israel continued strikes in southern Lebanon despite Trump’s public criticism. Araghchi argued that the end of hostilities in Lebanon is inseparable from the broader end of the war and insisted that any final settlement must address both military operations and territorial occupation.

Although support for the agreement appears to dominate among senior decision-makers in Iran, a vocal group of hardline opponents has mobilized against it. Small protests have been reported in Tehran and Mashhad, organized primarily by activists and figures associated with the ultraconservative Paydari Front. Demonstrators chanted slogans against both Abbas Araghchi and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, accusing them of compromising Iran’s interests. Some protesters went further, calling for Araghchi’s execution and portraying the negotiations as a surrender to the United States.

Among the most prominent critics has been Mahmoud Nabavian, a member of parliament and a leading figure associated with the Paydari Front, who claimed that the agreement would effectively turn Iran into “a colony of America.” Nabavian argued that Tehran would immediately reopen the Strait of Hormuz while receiving no concrete guarantees regarding sanctions relief or the release of frozen assets. He also criticized provisions related to enriched uranium, questioned whether the agreement adequately protects Iran’s national interests, and compared it unfavorably to the JCPOA.

Another prominent critic is Amirhossein Sabeti, a member of parliament from Tehran and one of the most outspoken hardline voices in the legislature. Sabeti described the MOU as weaker than the nuclear deal and argued that it would neither produce meaningful economic benefits nor guarantee long-term security. He accused supporters of misunderstanding the intentions of Iran’s adversaries and argued that Iran should prepare for future conflict rather than rely on negotiations.

Opposition to the agreement has also extended into parliament itself. Hardline lawmakers, including Sabeti and Hamid Rasaee, promoted a gathering and protest campaign against the negotiations. Organizers initially claimed that 16 members of parliament had participated in the anti-agreement meeting. However, the claim quickly became controversial when several lawmakers whose names had been listed publicly denied attending, highlighting both the existence of organized parliamentary opposition and its limited scale within the legislature.

The contrast between the hardline opposition led by Nabavian, Sabeti, and Rasaee and the support expressed by moderates such as Khatami underscores one of the central political dynamics surrounding the MOU. While a vocal minority continues to portray the agreement as a strategic retreat, much of Iran’s political establishment - including senior state institutions, a large majority of parliament, and prominent moderate figures - has rallied behind the effort to translate military gains into a diplomatic settlement.

Taken together, the statements of Trump, Ghalibaf, Pezeshkian, Araghchi, and other senior officials suggest that the principal decision-makers in both Washington and Tehran currently view diplomacy as preferable to continued conflict. Both governments appear eager to present the agreement as a success to domestic audiences: Iranian officials emphasize sovereignty, resistance, economic recovery, and the conversion of military gains into political achievements, while Trump portrays the MOU as a more effective alternative to endless military escalation.

At the same time, powerful opponents remain determined to derail the process. Israeli leaders continue to reject key provisions relating to Lebanon. American hawks remain skeptical of sanctions relief and engagement with Tehran. A minority but highly vocal bloc of Iranian hardliners, including several members of parliament associated with the Paydari Front, continues to denounce the agreement as a strategic retreat and a repeat of what they view as the failures of the JCPOA.

As a result, the MOU has generated both genuine hope and significant resistance. The public positions of senior leaders on both sides indicate that a final agreement is now conceivable in a way that seemed impossible only weeks ago. Yet those same statements also reveal how fragile the process remains. The coming weeks - particularly the formal signing ceremony in Switzerland, negotiations toward a final agreement, and developments in Lebanon - will determine whether the MOU becomes the foundation of a durable settlement or collapses under pressure from domestic and regional spoilers.

The reality is that the agreement has real promise for both Americans and Iranians alike, and is far better than continuing to pursue a war that never should have been waged in the first place and was hemorrhaging American power and sapping the purchasing power of the American public. An offer of serious sanctions relief was always going to be part of an end to the war when it became clear that the war was not going to be the cakewalk sold by its backers. Having made the wrong decision to enter the war, it is entirely reasonable for President Trump to use key U.S. leverage in the form of sanctions relief to secure its end and even get some key nuclear concessions along the way.

The core terms of the agreement are either mutually beneficial or have significant upside, even the ones being decried, denounced and misportrayed.

Opening the Strait of Hormuz and ending the U.S. naval blockade will mean gas prices in the U.S. will fall down after spiking considerably. The U.S. was likely facing an even worse crisis in the months to come after emergency measures to tap the nation’s strategic oil reserve kept gas prices below $5/gallon, but lowered the reserve to its lowest level in more than 40 years. Despite this, Americans have spent a whopping $60 billion of their own money on inflated gas prices alone, and are now contending with the biggest spike in inflation since the post-pandemic economy under President Biden. Continuing on in a fruitless war or in search of slightly better terms would mean more economic suffering here at home, which is not what the American people signed up for.

The economic relief made available for Iran is a genuine concession, yet it is one that will have benefits for the beleaguered people of Iran who suffered under hyperinflation triggered by “maximum pressure” since 2018 before bombs ripped apart their country. The net result of the sanctions campaign was the decimation of Iran’s middle class, with millions falling into poverty, even as the Islamic Republic became more repressive. This was a devastating blow to Iran’s organic, grassroots movement for change as countless Iranians had to focus on survival rather than the hard, uncertain path of organizing a sustainable movement for political change. The future they would face without some form of economic recovery is akin to what Iraqis faced after their country was devastated in the first Persian Gulf war, and would be just as hostile to political evolution.

The net result of releasing Iranian frozen assets and waiving oil sanctions as envisioned in the Memorandum of Understanding is likely to be an improving Iranian economy and a stabilization of the currency. Yet given the extent of the damage during the war, Iran is in a far deeper economic hole than what such relief can cover. This makes the major financing plan - envisioned to cover as much as $300 billion - so important. Even before the war, Iran needed major economic investment to repair its poor energy infrastructure, which led to regular power outages in the summer and energy conservation in the winter. Now add to these costs needed investments to rebuild the destruction of energy infrastructure, residences, schools and hospitals, and it is little surprise that this was a key concession to convince Iran to end the war. Providing such funding will put more pressure on the Iranian government to direct it to true needs, and may make Iran more interdependent - and less likely to attack - many of its neighbors.

For those in Washington, the key question to ask is whether this deal is better than the status quo ante. Given the abject failure of the war and the mounting costs on U.S. security, all with Israel escalating and risking another return to full-blown conflict in recent days, the clear answer is yes.

No deal was possible that didn’t factor in Iran’s own tumultuous politics. The negotiators of the deal - including Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf - are being berated in hardliner rallies in Tehran for supposedly betraying the nation. In the eyes of the organizers and the participants, diplomacy is a path for fools who want to open the nation to attack, as was demonstrated in June 2025 and February of this year. For them, it has been hard Iranian power in the form of missiles and drones, not negotiations, that restored Iranian security after years of setbacks. These voices aren’t fringe cranks - they are a real constituency and a key base of the Islamic Republic’s remaining support.

Iranian decisionmakers did not have an incentive to back down until real sanctions relief was on the table. They figured, likely correctly, that Iran could outlast the U.S. in a war of attrition with its own national survival on the line, and demonstrated repeatedly that they had more missiles and drones to deploy. They got part of the sanctions relief they sought in the Memorandum of Understanding, and will likely only get more if they part with a significant part of their nuclear leverage in the negotiations to follow. This will likely entail retrieving and downblending the uranium stockpile that has been buried in bombed-out nuclear facilities around the country, restoring international inspections and making commitments to sharply limit its nuclear ambitions. Yet even a renewed commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons now or in the future under the new Supreme Leader is a notable development that can be built upon.

Time will tell if this memorandum can survive the caustic politics in Washington and Tehran that have accompanied any lessening of tensions between the U.S. and Iran, and ultimately deliver relief that is sorely needed. There is real risk baked into the pivot away from war, and the expected application of the ceasefire to Lebanon will be fiercely resisted by Israel and many Israel-aligned voices in the United States. Yet, what has been started is not a threat to American security, it is a threat to the Washington mindset that any U.S.-Iran outcome is ultimately zero-sum and that Iran’s gain is an American loss. The U.S. will benefit if our nation moves off the path of war with Iran. That will be accomplished by the memorandum and the steps that it entails.

The twenty-three athletes representing Iran’s national team in the 2026 FIFA World Cup spent their lives chasing the shared dream of representing their nation at the highest level of international competition. Yet the months preceding the team’s travel to the United States underscored just how complicated and difficult this tournament was going to be for the Iranian national team. Recent months saw not just a major protest movement and crackdown in Iran, but a war that killed thousands of Iranians and triggered global economic consequences, which was the subject of high-stakes negotiations up until the very moment the team prepared to step on American soil to play in the home of the largest Iranian diaspora community on Earth.

After all of this, along with unprecedented visa restrictions, the team’s 2–2 draw against New Zealand Monday night was electric, with Team Melli coming from behind twice to draw, a reminder of why football remains the world’s game.

Yet, some of what happened off the field cast a shadow over the competition, which should have been all about the triumph of sport to transcend conflict.

Start with what most people in the stadium seemed to understand. The vast majority of fans at SoFi Stadium on Monday—over 70,000 in attendance—came to watch football. Many, including supporters of the Iranian national team, carry deep grievances against Tehran’s government. Some waved pre-revolutionary flags. Some booed the national anthem. These can be real and legitimate expressions of pain and protest. And yet, when the match began, the overwhelming majority cheered for Team Melli, because most people are capable of separating the worst actions of a government from the players representing their country.

That basic distinction held for most in attendance. However, it did not hold for everyone. A small but highly disruptive group of supporters of Iran’s deposed monarchy used the occasion to harass, intimidate, and even physically attack fellow Iranians for the simple act of watching a soccer match. Video footage from the stands shows a physical altercation by Pahlavist agitators and an older man holding an Islamic Republic flag. Whatever one thinks of the government that adopted the current national flag, assaulting an old man over the flag at a World Cup match crosses a clear line. The Associated Press reported that protesters snatched an official Iran flag from a fan, trampling and tearing it while others spat on it. One fan, Aida Ashouri, recounts that both she and her friend were grabbed and scratched by Pahlavi supporters who opposed their support of the national team, prompting Mexican fans to intervene and come to their defense.

A separate clip shows a less-heated confrontation, with a calm supporter of the team with the current flag confronted by an opponent of the government, who was then denounced by another individual herself. Outside the stadium, reporters noted that protesters chanted “President Trump, finish the job,” openly calling for renewed military strikes on Iran as fans walked in. When the dust has barely settled from a war that has killed thousands of civilians, bombed universities, water treatment plants, and elementary schools and the ink is barely dry on an agreement to end it, that kind of messaging goes beyond protest and into explicit advocacy for violence.

Online, the discourse has also hit new lows. One Iranian player celebrated his goal with a version of a popular celebration, widely used by some of the games most popular players, including from Brazil, England and the United States. In desperation to serve her own pro-war, anti-Iranian agenda, Laura Loomer derided the Iranians as “freaks” and bemoaned that they were granted entry to the country. Others echoed her and tried to claim it was a violent gesture toward spectators. Yet the video tells a different story: it is a player celebrating a goal on the world’s biggest stage using the same celebration as Neymar, Vinicius, and Phil Foden. That’s it.

This kind of behavior can be traced to a loud minority of the Iranian American community who support war. They are entitled to their opinions, and even to protest, but the escalation into physical violence was a shameful and outrageous display that should be widely condemned. The Iranian diaspora has more in common, yet political grievances are tarnishing what should be a shared communal experience and actively endangering members of the community - over a sport. We should be better than what was on display in Los Angeles last night.

Meanwhile, the players themselves—actual Iranians representing their country at the highest level—have faced conditions unlike those of any other team in the tournament.

ESPN reported that players described U.S. visa policies as creating “a lot of tension,” and Iran’s fan ticket allocation was revoked entirely, leaving thousands of supporters who had already booked travel unable to attend. Although all 31 players eventually received visas, their issuance was only after a considerable delay that disrupted their preparation for the tournament, forcing them to train in Tijuana, Mexico instead of Arizona as originally planned. Eleven members of the traveling party were denied entry, including federation president Mehdi Taj.

Players described being held for five hours in immigration controls before their opener, which any athlete can tell you is far from ideal when preparing for a match at any level. Adding insult to injury, the team wasn’t even allowed to stay overnight after their match, but instead was forced to leave the United States and return to their base camp in Tijuana, Mexico - an absurd requirement unheard of in international competition, which further denied the team proper recovery. Coach Amir Ghalenoei told reporters that officials denied the team adequate recovery time before sending them back across the border. Captain Mehdi Taremi captured the strain: “It’s supposed to be… tomorrow morning recovery, then we fly to Tijuana, then we return to [Los Angeles] again. But now, right now, we have to go back.” According to Taremi, the situation the team faces is a “disaster.” and BBC both reported Taremi calling the situation a “disaster.”

These are athletes who have trained their entire lives for this stage. They are not politicians. They are not policymakers. They are footballers and they should be allowed to do their job.

As an Iranian American civil society organization, NIAC will stand by basic standards of decency which should not be controversial: no one should be attacked for cheering their country on at the world cup. No one should be mobbed in the stands. Athletes should not be recast as enemy combatants over a goal celebration. The overwhelming majority of people—Iranian and non-Iranian alike—already understand this. It is worth saying clearly. The violent fringe does not represent the diaspora, but their outrageous behavior puts many in our community at risk and - regrettably - besmirches the reputation of our community on a global stage. We can, and must, do better.

Thankfully, those actions do not reflect the spirit of the game that filled SoFi Stadium on Monday night, when 70,000 voices roared for Team Melli and, if only for 90 minutes, it felt like a home for humanity.

Let them play.

Today, for the first time in months, there is reason for cautious optimism. According to statements from Iranian officials, Pakistani mediators, and President Trump, the parties have reached a framework that would permanently halt military operations across all fronts, including Lebanon, end the U.S. naval blockade of Iran, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and launch a new round of negotiations aimed at reaching a comprehensive nuclear and sanctions focused agreement.

According to details reported by Iranian media, the memorandum includes an immediate and permanent end to military operations, the lifting of the naval blockade imposed during the war, the reopening of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, partial sanctions relief, the release of frozen Iranian funds, and a 60-day process to negotiate a final agreement. Iranian officials have stated that future negotiations would focus primarily on nuclear issues, sanctions relief, and economic reconstruction. Reports on the precise terms remain incomplete and some provisions have yet to be independently confirmed. Even Iranian officials urged caution regarding speculation over the agreement’s details in the days leading up to its announcement.

If implemented, however, the framework could provide the basis for a broader agreement that reduces tensions, restores economic activity, and prevents a return to war. The significance of the agreement extends beyond its specific terms. After months of military confrontation, both sides have effectively acknowledged a reality that history has repeatedly demonstrated: military force can inflict enormous damage, but it rarely resolves the underlying political disputes that drive conflict. Ultimately, the parties returned to the negotiating table because diplomacy remained the only viable path to a sustainable outcome.

Perhaps the most sobering lesson of this conflict is how close the parties may already have been to a diplomatic breakthrough before the war began. In the weeks leading up to the conflict, Oman was actively mediating between Washington and Tehran. Oman’s Foreign Minister, Badr Albusaidi, traveled to Washington and met with Vice President JD Vance as part of a diplomatic effort to bridge remaining differences between the two sides. In public interviews, Albusaidi expressed optimism that an agreement was within reach and emphasized that there was no alternative to diplomacy. Omani officials argued that meaningful progress had already been achieved and that communication channels between Washington and Tehran remained open.

At the time, discussions focused primarily on guaranteeing that Iran would never acquire a nuclear weapon while providing a framework for sanctions relief and broader de-escalation. Reports suggested that Iran had signaled willingness to accept significant constraints and monitoring measures regarding its nuclear program. Diplomatic channels remained active, mediators were engaged, and a negotiated outcome appeared possible.

Yet despite this progress, the United States chose a military path. President Trump initially framed the war as a war to topple the Iranian government and prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. The opening phase of the war targeted senior figures within Iran’s military and political establishment, beginning with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Over the course of the conflict, a number of additional high-ranking Iranian military commanders and government officials were killed. Yet, the Iranian government proved durable and unleashed volleys of missiles and drones at surrounding countries, including many that were cooperating with the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran, and blocked the Strait of Hormuz. The equation suddenly changed from a quick and speedy operation to topple an injured adversary to finding a way out of a costly war that could not be won on the cheap. While goals started lofty, the bar for an end to the war was quickly lowered in Washington.

At various moments during the war, President Trump suggested that Iran’s political future could look very different after the conflict and has argued at various points that a regime change has occurred, even though this argument was strained by the fact that Ali Khamenei was quickly replaced by his son, Mojtaba. Reports also emerged that Kurdish groups were being viewed by some policymakers as potential partners in attacking inside of Iran, and Trump later indicated that the United States had provided arms to Kurdish actors who had not held up their end of the apparent bargain.

The result was one of the most dangerous and costly confrontations in recent Middle Eastern history. And yet, after more than one hundred days of fighting, enormous destruction across Iran, substantial costs to the United States and its partners, disruptions to global trade and energy markets, and repeated fears of regional escalation, the diplomatic destination looks remarkably familiar. The emerging agreement appears centered on the same core nuclear issue that was already under discussion before the war.

Meanwhile, Iran continues to reject negotiations over its missile program and its regional alliances, including Hezbollah and other non-state actors. According to reports regarding the emerging framework, these issues have been explicitly excluded from the current negotiations. Instead, future talks are expected to focus on nuclear arrangements, sanctions relief, implementation mechanisms, and economic recovery.

In a striking irony, some of the most important issues now being addressed, including the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the restoration of maritime commerce, were not the central disputes before the war. They became major international concerns only because the conflict itself created them.

The path to this agreement was far from smooth, and perhaps no actor worked harder to prevent it from materializing than Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Throughout the negotiations, Netanyahu repeatedly argued against diplomatic engagement with Iran and favored a strategy of continued military pressure. In the final hours before the agreement was reached, Israel’s strike on Beirut’s southern suburbs threatened to derail the negotiations entirely. Coming at a moment when diplomats were reportedly closing the remaining gaps between Washington and Tehran, the attack was widely viewed by Iranian officials - and even President Trump, himself - as a deliberate provocation designed to jeopardize the diplomatic process and force a return to escalation.

It did not work—this time. The agreement was finalized despite these efforts, but the political incentives that drove them have not disappeared. Netanyahu and much of the Israeli political establishment continues to view a U.S.-Iran diplomatic opening as contrary to their nation’s strategic vision for the region. Netanyahu has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to challenge American diplomatic initiatives toward Iran, including under the Obama administration and now under President Trump. His motivation to keep pressure on Iran and prevent a broader U.S.-Iran rapprochement is unlikely to disappear simply because an agreement has been signed.

President Trump recognized the danger in real time. His unusually sharp public criticism of Israel’s Beirut strike reflected an understanding that a single act of escalation could destroy months of diplomatic work. By publicly stating that the attack “should not have happened” and urging all sides to step back from confrontation, Trump helped prevent the collapse of negotiations at a critical moment. That diplomacy survived this episode may ultimately be one of the most important developments of the entire process. But it also serves as a reminder that reaching an agreement and sustaining it are two different tasks. The forces that opposed this agreement before it was signed are unlikely to disappear after it takes effect.

Indeed, even before the agreement is formally signed, its first major challenge has already emerged. While the reported framework calls for an immediate and permanent end to military operations across all fronts, including Lebanon, Israeli officials have signaled that they do not view themselves as bound by that provision. According to reports in the Israeli press, Prime Minister Netanyahu informed President Trump that Israel does not consider itself committed to the Lebanon-related provisions of the U.S.-Iran understanding. Israeli officials reportedly indicated that Israeli forces would remain in their current positions, continue operations against Hezbollah, and retain freedom of action to strike what they consider threats to Israeli security.

Inside Israel, opposition leaders such as Yair Lapid and Avigdor Lieberman have described the emerging understanding as a major strategic setback for Netanyahu’s government. Their criticism reflects concern that military pressure failed to secure broader concessions from Iran on missiles, regional alliances, or other long-standing Israeli priorities. That Netanyahu got his Iran war after decades of campaigning but did not improve Israel’s regional position is a major setback to his government and a boon for his political opponents, almost all of whom are equally if not more hawkish toward Iran but do not have anywhere near as much of a track record as Netanyahu in leading the nation or handling relations with the United States.

If military operations in Lebanon continue despite the agreement, Tehran may conclude that Washington is either unwilling or unable to deliver on commitments that were central to the negotiations. If the U.S. does not restrain Israel from violating the apparent terms of the agreement, the negotiating process could break down, paving the way for at least a resumption of the Israeli-Iranian portion of the war.

The agreement has also faced opposition from other quarters. Inside Iran, hardline critics have also voiced strong opposition. Conservative newspapers, political activists, and demonstrators associated with more hardline factions have questioned the wisdom of the agreement and accused negotiators of making unnecessary concessions. In Washington, some influential critics have decried the terms, highlighted Vice President JD Vance’s role in brokering the agreement and hinted at a Congressional debate on the deal.

The agreement announced this week is not a final peace treaty. Many difficult issues remain unresolved. The implementation of sanctions relief, the future of Iran’s nuclear program, mechanisms for verification, maritime security arrangements, reconstruction efforts, and broader regional tensions will all require difficult negotiations in the weeks and months ahead.

Success is not guaranteed. But after months of suffering, the region has been given an opportunity that seemed impossible only a short time ago.

The significance of this moment extends beyond governments and political leaders. For families in Iran, it means the possibility that air raid sirens may finally fall silent. For communities in Lebanon, it means the ongoing war that has devastated the south of the country and extended to Beirut may end. For Americans, it means avoiding deeper military entanglement in another costly Middle Eastern conflict. For the global economy, it means the reopening of one of the world’s most important commercial waterways and the prospect of greater stability in energy markets.

Additionally, it means that diplomacy has once again proven its value. The central lesson of the past one hundred days is not that war succeeded where diplomacy failed. It is precisely the opposite. After months of destruction, enormous economic costs, and tragic loss of life, all sides have returned to a negotiating process that was already available before the conflict began.

The agreement’s success will ultimately be measured not by the ceremonies surrounding its signing, but by whether it can withstand the pressures that have undermined so many previous diplomatic openings. The question of Lebanon is likely to be the first test. If the parties can prevent renewed escalation there, the agreement may begin to build the confidence necessary for more difficult negotiations ahead. If they cannot, the forces that repeatedly pushed the region toward war may once again gain the upper hand.

For now, however, the people of the region - and those who worked tirelessly to keep the possibility of diplomacy alive - have earned a moment of relief and hope. After so much suffering, diplomacy has been given another chance. The responsibility now falls on all sides to ensure that it is not squandered.

Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif shared on X, “Amid ongoing intense mediation efforts by Pakistan, we are fully aware of incessant misinformation campaign being waged by those who want to sabotage the peace deal. Setting aside the noise, we can confirm that a final, agreed upon text of the peace deal has been reached and Pakistan is now working closely with both sides to finalize the next steps. Peace has never been this close as it is now.”

If finalized, such a development would represent a significant diplomatic achievement. After months of military escalation, repeated threats of further conflict, and considerable economic disruption, even a preliminary understanding would demonstrate that diplomacy remains capable of producing results despite deep mistrust between the parties. The reported framework could help reduce tensions, lower the risk of renewed military confrontation, and create space for negotiations on longer-term issues that have divided the two countries for decades.

At the same time, it is important to recognize that a final agreement has not been released. Iranian officials continue to emphasize that the proposed memorandum remains under review by the relevant decision-making bodies within Iran. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei has repeatedly stated that reports regarding the timing and location of a signing ceremony remain speculative and that discussions over the final text continue. Iranian media outlets close to the government and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have similarly reported that the document has not yet received final approval from the relevant authorities. While the Pakistani Prime Minister is signaling that the deal is all but final, additional work may be needed or the agreement could unravel before the finisih line.

While Iranian officials have avoided declaring victory prematurely, their recent statements have become noticeably more optimistic. The clearest indication came from Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who stated that the “Islamabad Memorandum has never been closer to finalization” and urged media outlets to refrain from speculation regarding its contents until the process is complete. Araghchi also stressed that all details would be shared with the public at the appropriate time. Although he stopped short of confirming that a final agreement has been reached, his remarks represented one of the strongest public indications from Tehran that negotiations are advancing successfully and may be approaching their final stages. President Trump himself shared a screenshot of Araghchi’s remarks on Truth Social.

On the American side, President Donald Trump has repeatedly asserted that the agreement is nearly complete and could be signed in the coming days. He has described the emerging document as a “very strong” and “very detailed” memorandum of understanding and has stated that the agreement would ensure that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. Trump has gone so far as to declare that the United States has effectively “ended the war with Iran” and suggested that a signing ceremony could take place in Europe in the near future.

At the same time, Trump has also acknowledged that the memorandum is not itself a final settlement. Rather, it appears designed to serve as a framework for future negotiations and implementation. By definition, a memorandum of understanding is not the same as a comprehensive or legally binding agreement. Even if signed, it would likely represent the beginning of a new diplomatic phase rather than the conclusion of the dispute.

One of the most notable features of the current situation is the large number of competing reports regarding the contents of the proposed memorandum. The depiction of the agreement by Mehr News outlining 14 separate points appearing to tilt in Iran’s favor seemingly provoked anger from President Trump and led to near-simultaneous statements from Araghchi and Vice President JD Vance pushing back on media speculation and indicating that all would become clear once the deal is final.

Over the past several days, different media outlets have published dramatically different accounts of the agreement. Some reports describe a relatively narrow arrangement focused on nuclear issues, including limitations on enrichment levels, commitments regarding nuclear weapons, and the future disposition of enriched uranium stockpiles. Other reports describe a much broader framework involving sanctions relief, access to frozen Iranian assets, maritime security arrangements, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, reconstruction assistance, and a sixty-day period of negotiations intended to produce a final settlement.

Some leaked versions of the agreement suggest that sanctions relief would be gradual and conditional on Iranian compliance, while other reports describe more substantial economic measures. Certain accounts claim that issues such as Iran’s missile program and regional activities remain part of the broader diplomatic discussion, while other reported drafts explicitly exclude those subjects from future negotiations. American, Israeli, and Iranian media have each presented different interpretations of the memorandum’s contents.

At present, none of these leaked drafts can be independently verified. The existence of multiple and often contradictory versions likely reflects the fact that negotiations remain ongoing, that political factions are selectively leaking information in an effort to influence public opinion and shape the final outcome, and potentially that different actors only have insight into portions of the discussions.

Qatar and Pakistan have reportedly played central mediation roles throughout the process. Qatari officials have publicly acknowledged discussions with Washington regarding recent understandings reached between the parties, while Trump has repeatedly referenced the involvement of regional governments in facilitating progress. These diplomatic efforts appear to have contributed significantly to keeping communication channels open during a period of extraordinary tension.

The negotiations also face determined opposition from multiple directions, including within Iran itself. As reports of a potential memorandum began to circulate, several conservative political figures, commentators, and media outlets quickly moved to criticize the government’s negotiating strategy and warn against what they view as excessive concessions.

Some of the sharpest criticism has come from figures associated with the political camp of former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, which has long advocated a more confrontational approach toward negotiations with the United States. State television and other conservative media outlets have reportedly provided platforms for commentators critical of the government’s diplomatic efforts, while some opponents have sought to portray the emerging agreement as a strategic setback for Iran.

Among the most vocal critics has been Mahmoud Nabavian, a parliamentarian closely associated with the Paydari Front and the broader hardline camp. Nabavian has argued that the emerging agreement risks being presented domestically as a diplomatic victory despite, in his view, failing to secure meaningful sanctions relief while potentially sacrificing important Iranian leverage, including over the Strait of Hormuz. His criticism reflects broader concerns among hardline factions that diplomacy could produce an arrangement they believe falls short of Iran’s strategic objectives.

At the same time, other figures linked to the negotiating process have adopted a more cautious tone. Mohammad Marandi, who has often served as an informal voice close to Iran’s negotiating team, recently sought to lower expectations regarding an imminent breakthrough, stating that “nothing will happen in Geneva on Sunday” and that important work remains to be completed. While Marandi did not reject the possibility of an agreement, his remarks underscored that negotiations remain ongoing and that unresolved issues still need to be addressed before any final announcement can be made.

The emergence of these public disagreements is noteworthy because it suggests that the debate inside Iran may be shifting from whether negotiations should occur to what kind of agreement should ultimately be accepted. Rather than arguing primarily over the desirability of diplomacy itself, many critics are now focused on the substance of the proposed arrangement and whether it adequately protects Iranian interests.

The timing of these criticisms is also significant. Much of the opposition has intensified only after reports emerged suggesting that the memorandum may be nearing completion. This pattern may indicate that opponents increasingly view the prospect of an agreement as credible and are therefore stepping up efforts either to influence its contents, raise political costs for its supporters, or prevent its finalization altogether.

Opposition also exists outside Iran. Israeli officials continue to express doubts regarding Iran’s intentions and have emphasized that any final agreement must include major concessions on Iran’s nuclear capabilities and reject sanctions relief. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently reiterated that Iran would not obtain a nuclear weapon while he remains in office and stated that he and President Trump remain aligned on that objective. According to some reports, Israeli officials remain doubtful that any interim memorandum will ultimately produce a comprehensive final settlement.

Perhaps the most revealing aspect of recent developments is not what officials are saying about the agreement itself, but how they are speaking about it. Both Iranian and American officials increasingly appear focused on managing domestic political reactions rather than debating whether an agreement is possible. This interpretation remains speculative, but it helps explain why public messaging on both sides has increasingly focused on managing expectations, countering criticism and reassuring skeptical domestic audiences.

Significant obstacles undoubtedly remain. Important questions concerning implementation, sanctions relief, verification mechanisms, security guarantees, and future negotiations have yet to be fully resolved. The existence of competing leaks, conflicting narratives, and vocal opponents in Tehran, Washington, and Jerusalem demonstrates that the process remains politically fragile.

Nevertheless, the balance of available evidence increasingly points toward a process that is moving closer to completion rather than further away from it. The combination of increasingly confident statements from senior officials, reports that the memorandum is in its final stages, and growing efforts by both governments to address domestic criticism all suggest that negotiators believe a diplomatic breakthrough is within reach. Whether the emerging memorandum ultimately becomes the foundation for a durable agreement remains uncertain. Yet after months of military confrontation and escalating tensions, diplomacy appears to possess more momentum than at any previous point in the crisis. The coming days will likely determine whether this momentum produces a lasting breakthrough or joins the long list of unrealized opportunities that have shaped U.S.-Iran relations for decades.

The news follows significant military exchanges. Overnight, the United States carried out a new wave of attacks against targets inside Iran, including areas in southern Iran and locations around Tehran, Karaj, Qazvin, and Hormozgan. Iranian officials condemned the strikes as a violation of international law and argued that the ceasefire established earlier this year has effectively become meaningless. Tehran stated that its response would continue under the principle of self-defense.

Iran responded by launching missile and drone attacks against U.S.-linked military positions across the region. Iranian sources claimed strikes against American facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jomdan, and Iraq. Jordan announced that it intercepted 20 Iranian missiles, while Bahrain reported damage to homes and vehicles from the debris of intercepted drones and confirmed that an 11-year-old girl was injured. Kuwait also reported engaging hostile aerial targets. Some Iranian claims regarding significant damage to U.S. military facilities and aircraft remain unverified.

The confrontation has also expanded into the maritime domain. U.S. forces have reportedly targeted several commercial vessels accused of transporting Iranian oil or violating the American blockade. India has strongly protested after three Indian sailors were killed in a strike on a tanker near Oman and has accused the United States of targeting additional vessels carrying Indian crew members. These incidents illustrate that the conflict is no longer solely a bilateral confrontation between Washington and Tehran. It is increasingly affecting third countries, civilian shipping, and international energy security.

President Trump’s rhetoric throughout the military exchanges further escalated tensions. He repeatedly threatened to strike Iran “very hard,” suggested that the United States could seize Kharg Island and other Iranian oil infrastructure, and claimed that much of Iran’s military capability has already been destroyed. Kharg Island is particularly significant because it serves as the primary export terminal for the vast majority of Iran’s crude oil exports. Any attempt to attack or seize the island or other Iranian territory would trigger a fierce battle.

At the same time, the President appears to be pursuing a form of coercive diplomacy. The logic behind the strategy is straightforward: apply overwhelming military, economic, and psychological pressure on Iran in order to force Tehran to accept a political agreement on terms favorable to Washington. The assumption is that the costs of continued resistance will eventually outweigh the costs of compromise.

However, the previous rounds of military confrontation involving Iran, the United States and Israel did not produce a stable political outcome. Instead, each cycle of escalation was followed by retaliation, disruption to regional security, threats to energy supplies, attacks on military assets, and growing risks to civilians and commercial shipping. Rather than forcing a quick concession, military pressure repeatedly expanded the scope of the conflict.

Additionally, Iran has demonstrated a significant degree of resilience. Despite sanctions, military strikes, attacks on infrastructure, and repeated claims by U.S. and Israeli officials that its military capabilities have been severely degraded, Iran has continued to retaliate, challenge its adversaries, and impose costs on regional actors and global markets. This does not mean that Iran possesses military parity with the United States. Rather, it suggests that Iran is not an actor that can easily be coerced into accepting unfavorable terms through military pressure alone.

The recent attacks have also strengthened voices inside Iran that argue the previous ceasefire was a mistake. Mehdi Mohammadi, an adviser to Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, recently argued that Iran should have continued military operations while simultaneously pursuing negotiations. According to this perspective, Tehran weakened its bargaining position by reducing military activity before securing meaningful concessions.

Similar arguments have appeared across Iranian state media. Some commentators have openly questioned the timing of the ceasefire, arguing that it was accepted precisely when President Trump was threatening strikes against Iran’s electricity infrastructure and other critical facilities. In their view, accepting a ceasefire under those circumstances may have convinced Washington that military threats are an effective tool for extracting concessions from Tehran.

One of the most notable examples came from Iranian television analyst Hadi Masoumi Zare, who argued that Iran failed to impose sufficient costs on the United States during the previous conflict. According to his argument, if greater American casualties had been inflicted during the war, Washington’s calculations today might be very different. While such comments do not necessarily reflect official government policy, they reveal a growing current of opinion that views restraint and de-escalation as strategic mistakes rather than successes.

Whether these voices represent a majority position within Iran’s leadership remains unclear. However, their growing visibility highlights a fundamental challenge for coercive diplomacy. Military pressure does not always produce moderation. In many cases it produces resistance.

Given the expected impact of coercive diplomacy on decisionmaking in Iran, the latest strikes may have less to do with the terms of the Iran negotiations and more on domestic politics inside the United States. Striking a deal with Iran could entail significant concessions from the United States that could be fiercely opposed by a significant section of the Republican Party’s foreign policy apparatus. With Trump’s announcement of a new breakthrough, the optics of bombing Iran hard and demonstrating bellicosity could make hawkish attacks on the Trump administration more difficult to land, given that he has run the Iran hawk playbook before pivoting to a possible deal.

It remains far from clear at this juncture whether Trump’s pullback on strikes will hold and whether there will be a new announcement of a deal. However, with the threat of war looming for Iranians, Americans and others across the globe, the decisions made or not made at the negotiating table in the hours and days to come will likely prove highly significant.

However, important questions surrounding the incident remain unresolved. President Trump has claimed that the helicopter was brought down during an encounter involving an Iranian drone that crashed into the Apache helicopter, with the pilots somehow surviving the collision and retaining enough control of the helicopter to down it in the waters below, allowing for their escape and eventual rescue. However, it remains unclear - if such events are true - whether the collision was the result of intent by the Iranian armed forces, or an accident involving Iranian or American pilot error.

Recent conflicts, including the war in Ukraine and other modern battlefields, have demonstrated that helicopters are often used to intercept and destroy drones. Such operations are inherently dangerous and have occasionally resulted in the loss of helicopters and even advanced fighter aircraft. Until an independent investigation establishes the circumstances surrounding the Apache’s loss, it will likely be difficult to determine whether the incident represented a deliberate attack or a tragic escalation resulting from military operations in a highly contested environment.

Despite these uncertainties and President Trump himself asserting that the downing of the Apache was “wasn’t a big deal,” the United States launched a major military response. According to U.S. officials, American forces conducted strikes against approximately 20 targets in southern Iran over multiple waves of attacks. U.S. Central Command stated that the operation targeted Iranian air-defense systems, radar installations, and command-and-control facilities near the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian authorities confirmed strikes in several locations, including Jask, Sirik, Minab, Qeshm, and areas near Bandar Abbas. The attacks represented one of the most significant direct U.S. military operations against Iran since the conclusion of the April 7 ceasefire.

Among the most troubling reported consequences of the attacks was the destruction of civilian water infrastructure in Hormozgan Province. Local officials reported that two strategic water reservoirs in the Bamani district were struck and completely destroyed. According to the Hormozgan Water and Wastewater Company, the reservoirs supplied drinking water to the city of Kuhestak and approximately ten surrounding villages.

As a result, an estimated 20,000 residents reportedly lost access to reliable drinking water. Officials further stated that the region lacks sufficient alternative groundwater resources to immediately replace the damaged facilities. If confirmed, the destruction of these water facilities raises serious humanitarian and legal concerns. Water infrastructure serves an essential civilian function and its destruction can have severe consequences for public health, sanitation, and daily life.

Iran strongly condemned the attacks, describing them as a violation of international law and the United Nations Charter. Iranian officials rejected responsibility for the Apache helicopter incident while simultaneously warning that attacks on Iranian territory would be met with retaliation.

Iran subsequently launched missile and drone attacks against U.S. military facilities across the region. Iranian military statements claimed that bases and military assets in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan were targeted. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps asserted that it had attacked the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and launched missile strikes against facilities at Azraq Air Base in Jordan, including alleged targets associated with F-35 fighter operations.

Some of these claims remain unverified. Jordanian authorities reported intercepting five missiles and stated that no casualties or material damage occurred. American officials, meanwhile, acknowledged that at least four ballistic missiles and multiple drones had been launched toward U.S. facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. At present, independent verification of the extent of damage on either side remains limited.

Iranian forces also claimed to have shot down a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone over southern Iran during the course of the confrontation. U.S. Central Command has not publicly confirmed that claim.

The military exchanges have further complicated ongoing diplomatic efforts. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated that Tehran would reassess the future of negotiations in light of the latest American attacks, arguing that diplomacy cannot proceed in an environment characterized by military escalation and repeated violations of ceasefire arrangements.

Notably, President Trump has also stated that more attacks against Iran are forthcoming, telling reporters “We’re going to be attacking them...We hit them hard yesterday. We’re going to hit them again hard again today.” Separately, he accused Iran of deliberately delaying negotiations and declared that Tehran must now “pay the price.” He described Iran as the “bully of the Middle East” and claimed that much of Iran’s military capability had already been destroyed. Additionally, Trump has reportedly threatened additional attacks against Iranian infrastructure, including bridges and electricity facilities. Such statements represent a potentially dangerous expansion of the conflict beyond military targets and toward infrastructure that is essential to civilian life.

The significance of these threats is heightened by the reported destruction of the water reservoirs in Bamani. While military facilities may be considered legitimate targets in a lawful war, attacks on infrastructure that provide water, electricity, transportation, and other basic services are clear-cut violations of international law and risk devastating consequences for civilian populations. Damage to bridges can disrupt the movement of people, food, and medical supplies. Damage to electrical infrastructure can affect hospitals, water treatment systems, communications networks, and emergency services.

Another indication of the seriousness of the current crisis is President Trump’s announcement that he will deliver an emergency address to the American public and the media at 5:30 p.m. Eastern Time. While the White House has not yet released details regarding the content of the speech, the announcement comes amid the most significant direct military exchange between the United States and Iran since the recent ceasefire.

At the same time, diplomatic activity has not entirely ceased. A high-level Qatari delegation traveled to Tehran to discuss bilateral relations, regional developments, and ongoing diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing a reignition of the broader war. The visit reflects continued regional concern that further escalation could destabilize the region and undermine attempts to reach a political settlement.

Senior U.S. officials have also continued to express support for diplomacy. In recent interviews, Vice President JD Vance has stated that the United States remains close to reaching an agreement with Iran and suggested that such a deal could potentially be reached within weeks or months if negotiations continue. Yet such optimistic views have to be balanced against Trump’s increasing bellicosity in recent days.

The current crisis demonstrates how quickly an unclear battlefield incident can evolve into a wider regional confrontation. The circumstances surrounding the Apache helicopter crash remain disputed and require independent investigation. Yet before those questions were resolved, both countries became engaged in a cycle of military retaliation that has already endangered civilians, threatened critical infrastructure, and increased the risk of a broader regional war.

The recent conflict also demonstrates a broader reality. The February 28 - April 7 campaign against Iran imposed enormous costs on Iran, the region, and the international community, but it did not resolve the underlying political disputes between Washington and Tehran. This suggests that military force alone is unlikely to produce a durable solution, though it appears that President Trump - impatient with the apparently slow pace of diplomatic progress - is increasingly turning to force in hopes it can be a shortcut to a deal.

The unresolved questions surrounding the Apache incident, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, the exchange of missile and drone attacks, and the increasingly aggressive rhetoric from all sides underscore the dangers of further escalation. A sustainable resolution to the dispute can only emerge through diplomacy and negotiated agreements, not through an expanding cycle of military confrontation.

This author once played and coached Division I soccer and on lower‑level professional teams, but at any level one truth stands out: the beautiful game is most spectacular at the World Cup. Its beauty lies in groups of players working in unison, attackers creating space for each other, quick decisions and quick relinquishing of the ball, and the trust that you will get it back later. There’s no shortage of individual talent, but that’s not what defines a game built on speed of thought, trust, and running for others.

One brilliant attacker might change a match, but no one player can carry a team the way American sports mythology teaches us to imagine sports. The best soccer teams understand that the ball moves faster than any individual, and that collective intelligence is its own power. Most fans have a special appreciation for this, but it is striking that our leaders do not.

The 2026 World Cup should be a celebration of global connection, but the way it is being staged is different. Ticket prices are soaring, with resale marketplace and secondary platforms listing in the six‑ and seven‑figure range. For many fans from travel‑banned countries, the price of admission is not the only obstacle as a World Cup as a ticket does not guarantee a visa, and the U.S. blocks or restricts entry for travelers, including for players and staff whose national teams are participating.

There is no better illustration of this than Iran, whose Football Federation announced just days before the World Cup kicks off, that its entire ticket allocation for group‑stage matches in the United States has been revoked, leaving thousands of supporters who booked flights and hotels suddenly unable to enter the stadiums where their own team will play. FIFA’s rules entitle each participating federations to distribute a share of seats—roughly 8 percent of a stadium’s capacity—to fans, but now that allocation to Iran has been rescinded. It is a slap in the face to the most basic kind of diplomacy—letting people show up, cheer, and share a game together.

The “World Cup” is effectively telling a segment of that world that they are not allowed in the seats set aside for them. Whatever the bureaucratic justifications, the message lands as collective punishment. It turns a symbol of global connection into another instrument of exclusion and shows how fragile the norms of neutrality and equal treatment really are.

The United States loves to call itself a great sports nation, but it often confuses greatness with individual domination. That mindset helps explain why we keep struggling with soccer on the world stage, why we are already mishandling the 2026 World Cup, and why our Iran policy keeps defaulting to war instead of diplomacy. For a country obsessed with the star quarterback, the unstoppable scorer, and the singular highlight reel, soccer’s demand for mutual collaboration is an uncomfortable mirror.

That same philosophical failure shows up even more dangerously in our foreign policy on Iran. War hawks have spent years pretending that Iran’s nuclear issue can be solved by pressure, threats, and eventual war, when the world already demonstrated a better path. The 2015 JCPOA, negotiated by the United States, Iran, and the international community, constrained Iran’s nuclear program and kept it peaceful through verification and limits. Donald Trump tore that agreement up, and ever since, too many officials have acted as if “might makes right” is a strategy rather than a dead end.

A chorus of hawkish voices insists that concessions are weakness and that only escalating pressure can bend Iran to our will. From think tanks that treat sanctions and strikes as default tools of statecraft to commentators who openly float “surgical” attacks or regime change, the story line remains that cooperation is naïve and coordination is for suckers. That story line sells in a media environment that rewards tough talk and simple villains, just as highlight reels reward the most spectacular dunk or solo run.

This is the same logic that distorts our sports culture: we privilege the biggest names and the most “dominant” individual, then act surprised when we fail at the things that require coordination. Just as soccer is not won by the most spectacular solo act, the same is true of diplomacy, of governing a diverse country, and of hosting a global tournament with any seriousness about access and fairness.

The Iran World Cup ticket debacle should be a warning about how quickly “rules” can be bent when those in power decide certain people do not belong. A host country that can find a way to block an entire national fan base from accessing its allocated tickets days before a tournament sends a signal not only to Iranians but to other marginalized and politically disfavored communities: your ability to participate is contingent, your presence is a privilege, and that privilege can be revoked at any time. That is the opposite of the ethos that international sport is supposed to embody.

Sports, at their best, are a low‑stakes rehearsal for coexistence. When fans from rival countries sit in the same stadium, ride the same trains, or wait in the same concession lines, they are living out a small, tangible version of the world we claim to want: one in which political boundaries and ideological battles do not dictate who gets to show up. Denying that experience to Iranian supporters does not make anyone safer or resolve any of the underlying disputes between Washington and Tehran. It simply narrows the space where ordinary people might otherwise build familiarity and empathy.

America keeps reaching for the wrong kind of greatness. We are at our best when we build systems, coalitions, and institutions that let people do hard things together. We are at our worst when we mistake domination for strength and spectacle for strategy. In soccer, that means an endless cycle of disappointment as we try to brute‑force our way through a game that rewards pattern recognition and shared movement. In foreign policy, it means tearing up working agreements because they do not offer enough opportunities for chest‑thumping, then feigning surprise when the situation deteriorates.

If we want to understand American lag in soccer, our World Cup skewing toward exclusion, and an Iran policy stumbling toward disaster, we should start with the basic question of might versus cooperation. The real test of power is not whether one person can take over the field. It is whether a society can move as a unit—and resist the temptation to use something as simple as a ticket allocation as another arena for discrimination.

Additionally, Iranian media have reported that two members of the Iranian Army’s Air Defense Force were killed during Israeli strikes carried out on Monday, marking the first publicly acknowledged fatalities linked to the latest round of Israeli attacks on Iran. According to Iran’s Tasnim News Agency, the two servicemen, Bahman Hosseini and Alireza Abiri, were killed while carrying out operational duties during the recent limited military exchanges between Iran and Israel. Their funeral ceremonies were reportedly held on Tuesday.

The announcement is significant because Iranian authorities had previously reported no fatalities from the Israeli attacks conducted on Monday and Tuesday, stating only that 15 people had been injured. The confirmation of the deaths therefore represents the first officially-reported fatalities associated with the latest escalation.

The Israeli military stated on Tuesday that it had conducted a “comprehensive” operation against strategic Iranian air defense systems. According to the Israeli military, Iran’s air defense capabilities were significantly degraded during the 12-day war earlier this year, but Iranian forces subsequently attempted to rebuild those capabilities by deploying and repositioning air defense systems across different parts of the country.

Israeli officials claimed that the latest operation specifically targeted these reconstruction efforts and that multiple air defense systems deployed to restore Iran’s defensive network were destroyed. The strikes were described as part of an effort to prevent Iran from reestablishing the air defense coverage that had been weakened during the previous conflict.

Recent developments, however, suggest a more complicated picture. While Iran’s air defense network has not proven capable of preventing Israeli aircraft and missiles from operating inside Iranian airspace, it has demonstrated that it retains at least some operational capability and can do damage - even to advanced American fighter jets. During the 39-day war, Iranian air defenses reportedly engaged a number of Israeli and U.S. aircraft, and damaged one F-35 fighter jet and hit or downed several other aircraft. Others appear to have avoided damage or destruction following near misses. Reports from the conflict also indicated that two downed pilots landed inside Iran and were later rescued, though this remains unconfirmed. Regardless, along with the apparent shoot down of the Apache helicopter, numerous incidents suggest that Iran’s air defense network retains the ability to challenge hostile air operations.

A second notable development concerns Iran’s missile force. During the 39-day war, Israeli and U.S. forces repeatedly targeted Iranian missile bases, launch sites, and underground missile tunnel complexes in an effort to reduce Tehran’s ability to launch retaliatory strikes. However, the missile launches carried out by Iran in recent days appear to have originated from some of the same facilities that were reportedly attacked during the conflict.

This underscores that the strikes do not appear to have caused lasting damage as sometimes claimed. In some cases, the attacks only temporarily disrupted operations or damaged tunnel entrances and supporting infrastructure, rather than destroying the underground facilities themselves. The continued use of these bases both before and after the ceasefire indicates that significant portions of Iran’s missile infrastructure either survived the attacks or were restored to operational status relatively quickly, allowing Tehran to maintain missile-launch capabilities despite an extensive bombing campaign against its strategic missile network.

Overall, the recent conflict demonstrated that while Israel and the United States were able to inflict significant damage on Iran’s military infrastructure, the campaign did not fully eliminate either Iran’s air defense network or its missile-launch capabilities. The continued operation of both systems suggests that military action alone may be insufficient to permanently resolve the underlying security concerns, reinforcing the importance of diplomatic negotiations as a more sustainable path toward addressing the dispute.

Iran, which qualified for the tournament and was drawn into Group G alongside Belgium, Egypt, and New Zealand, has encountered challenges related to ticket access, visa issuance, travel logistics, and the participation of team officials. While Iranian players were ultimately granted visas to enter the United States and compete in the tournament, the process leading up to that decision was marked by uncertainty that disrupted preparations and generated concerns among both the team and its supporters.

One of the most significant controversies involves access to World Cup tickets. According to the Iranian Football Federation, approximately 8 percent of tickets for each World Cup match are normally allocated to participating national federations, allowing supporters to purchase tickets through official channels. The Federation stated that after initially receiving its allocation and beginning the sales process, it was informed that the allocation would no longer be available. As a result, Iranian supporters lost access to the official ticket distribution mechanism only days before the tournament. The Federation argued that preventing Iranian fans from accessing their designated ticket allocation was inconsistent with the principles of equal treatment and fair participation that should govern international sporting competitions. Although the precise decision-making process behind the ticket allocation remains unclear, the outcome has significantly reduced opportunities for Iranian supporters to attend matches through official channels.

Visa-related issues have also became a major source of concern. In the weeks before the tournament, Iranian officials publicly warned that delays in visa processing could affect preparations, and ultimately switched their training facility from Arizona to Tijuana, Mexico, where the team established its World Cup camp. Although the relocation allowed preparations to continue, it created additional travel requirements and operational complexities. Instead of training in the same country where all three of its group-stage matches would take place, Iran is seemingly required to operate from outside the United States and travel into the country for competition.

Iranian diplomats and football officials reported uncertainty regarding whether players and members of the delegation would receive permission to enter the United States in time for the competition. While all Iranian players received visas approximately ten days before their opening match against New Zealand on June 15, allowing the team to participate in the tournament as scheduled, the team encountered separate visa denials for members of the supporting staff.

Multiple reports have indicated that a number of federation officials and support personnel were unable to obtain visas. Hedayat Mombeini, Secretary-General of the Iranian Football Federation; Mehdi Mohammad Nabi, Vice President of the Federation; Mehdi Kharati, a senior team administrator; and Mohsen Motamedkia, Media Director of the national team were all reported to not have secured visas. Reports also suggested that the visa status of Mehdi Taj, President of the Iranian Football Federation, remained uncertain and may have been affected by the restrictions. The inability of key administrative and support personnel to travel creates operational challenges for the national team and limits the Federation’s ability to manage its World Cup participation under normal conditions.

Iranian football officials openly expressed concern about the treatment the team could face during the tournament. Federation President Mehdi Taj criticized what he described as excessive interference in football administration and warned that uncertainty regarding entry procedures and delegation access could continue throughout the competition. The Federation indicated that it intended to raise its concerns with FIFA, arguing that football governance should remain within FIFA’s authority and be insulated from political disputes.

The political dimension of the issue became particularly evident in statements by U.S. officials. Responding to questions regarding visas for the Iranian delegation, the U.S. State Department confirmed that visas had been issued for players and essential personnel while stating that the United States would not allow Iran to “exploit the system” to enable individuals connected to terrorism to enter the country under false pretenses. Although the statement was framed as a security matter, critics argued that linking participation in a major international sporting event to broader geopolitical tensions risked politicizing the tournament and reinforcing unequal treatment of one participating nation.

Taken together, these developments created burdens that extended beyond the normal challenges of international competition. The uncertainty surrounding visa approvals, restrictions affecting federation officials and support staff, the relocation of the team’s training base to Mexico, additional travel requirements, and the loss of access to the Federation’s ticket allocation collectively placed Iran in a less favorable position than many other participating teams. While none of these measures prevent Iran from competing, they complicate the team’s preparation and limit opportunities for Iranian supporters to participate fully in the World Cup experience.

While the Iranian national team appears to have faced the most extreme hurdles to participation, other notable incidents have undermined the reputation of the U.S. as a host country. This includes the denial of a visa to Somali-born referee Omar Artan, who was denied entry to the United States and ordered out of the country despite having a valid visa and enduring an 11-hour interrogation session. Video circulating online also shows the Senegalese World Cup team enduring a security screening on the airport tarmac, which is highly unusual.

The issue extends beyond football. Major international sporting events are often presented as opportunities to transcend political disagreements and bring people together through shared competition. When athletes, officials, and supporters face barriers that other participants do not encounter, questions inevitably arise regarding equal treatment and the integrity of the competition itself.

The 2026 FIFA World Cup should ultimately be remembered for what takes place on the field. However, the experience of Iran’s national team demonstrates how political tensions and administrative restrictions can affect participation in global sporting events. When supporters lose access to official ticket allocations, when key team officials face travel restrictions, and when uncertainty over visas disrupts preparation for the world’s most important football tournament, the principle of equal participation is called into question. Regardless of broader political disagreements between governments, international sporting competitions function best when all participants are afforded comparable opportunities to compete, travel, and support their teams on equal terms.